

AD-A252 823



(2)

Defense Academic Research Support Program

JUNE 1992

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 15 1992
S A D

European Military and Political Environment in a Post Cold War Era

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

92 6 30 028

92-17181



European Military and Political Environment in a Post Cold War Era

Conference Papers

**Editors: Steven R. Dorr
LT Neysa M. Slater, USN**

**Defense Academic Research Support Program
May 1992**

Preface

These papers were prepared for a conference entitled "European Military and Political Environment in a Post Cold War Era," sponsored by the Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP), and held at the United States European Command (USEUCOM) Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, 6-7 November 1991. This conference was the fifth major event sponsored by DARSP at USEUCOM.

Our objective was to bring together scholars and analysts to share ideas and perspectives on critical aspects of changing regional relationships in Europe and North Africa, with particular attention given to the impact of the demise of Marxism-Leninism on east and central Europe and the Balkans. The topics discussed spanned a broad range of issues, from managing conventional and nuclear forces, to the political, economic, and social problems attendant to rising rival nationalism, as well as the implications for Europe and in Europe of the political change emerging in North Africa. The result was two days of intensive discussions which placed the problems of the post Cold War era in a new light.

Inevitably, the discussion went well beyond the confines of these papers. Many presentations were not linked to written presentations; nevertheless, the papers included here capture important perspectives on security trends in the new Europe.

The views contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence College, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. Although this conference was held before the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, to avoid unnecessary confusion, the new orthography for the emergent republics has been used.

The Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP), initiated in 1982, provides a vehicle for direct contact and scholarly exchange between defense analysts and noted experts on the Third World. DARSP is managed by the Research Center of the Defense Intelligence College, a professional, accredited, degree-granting institution. DARSP concentrates exclusively on the Third World and supports only unclassified research.

Acknowledgements

The success of the conference and the appearance of this printed volume are due to the efforts and dedication of many individuals. A special note of thanks to the United States European Command and particularly to General James P. McCarthy, USAF, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Major General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, Director of Intelligence, United States European Command, for their support for the conference.

The administrative and substantive assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Lahnstein, USA, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Evans, USAF, and Sergeant First Class James Mason, USA, were

critical to the success of the proceedings. They and many others on their staffs provided indispensable support. Thanks must also go to members of the Defense Intelligence College staff. Mr. Steven R. Dorr, Dr. Joseph S. Gordon, and Dr. Robert O. Slater worked with LTC Lahnstein and others at USEUCOM and at the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop the conference agenda. Ms. Patricia E. Lanzara provided exemplary administrative assistance, and Lieutenant Neysa M. Slater, USN, provided exceptionally valuable copy editing and desktop publishing support. Without all their efforts this volume could not have appeared.

Table of Contents

Preface	iii
Acknowledgements	v
From Clear and Present Danger to the Risks of a Decay , Vladimir V. Kusin	1
The New Security Environment in Europe: American Interests, Strategies, and Policy Options , Stephen Van Evera Massachusetts Institute of Technology	9
National Versus Supranational Political Loyalties in Western Europe , Mattei Dogan National Center of Scientific Research, Paris, and University of California, Los Angeles	23
Interaction of Political and Economic Change in the Soviet Union: Implications for Foreign Policy , Hannes Adomeit Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	41
Rival Nationalisms in the USSR: Reviving Political Discourse , Martha Brill Olcott Colgate University and Fellow, East-West Center, Duke University	53
Eastern Central Europe: Social and Economic Consequences of Political Change , Joseph S. Gordon Defense Intelligence College	65
Social and Economic Change, the Transformation of the Balkans, and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia , William Zimmerman University of Michigan	73
Sensitivity and Vulnerability: European-North African Relations in the 1990s , Dirk Vandewalle	83
Contributors	99

From Clear and Present Danger to the Risks of a Decay

Vladimir V. Kusin

This paper discusses some aspects of the East-West security relationship since the abortive coup in Moscow of August 1991. Developments which the defeat of the putsch set in motion make a new look at international security relations once again necessary, despite the fact that earlier strategic reviews have not yet been finalized. Soviet danger to the West has evidently further diminished, but new risks are arising from processes which the defeat of the hardliners brought about. Security postures and international linkages will have to be rethought and amended. East Central Europe, in particular, faces an immediate need of adaptation to the exigencies which the Soviet unravelling and the Yugoslav break-up have engendered. As the sands are still shifting, only tentative assessments can be made.

The Dwindled Danger

The Soviet military now represents a much greater challenge domestically to the various post-Soviet leaderships than it does to the West. From the Western standpoint, the Soviet danger is no longer clear, present, and direct. It remains residual, derivative, and prone to escalate as a result of uncontrollable developments rather than by design.

In the aftermath of the failed coup, the Soviet threat has been diluted on three levels. First, the use of force for expansive or revisionist purposes has become virtually inconceivable. Second, political room for use of force against domestic ethnic and ideological deviation is further circumscribed, though not yet ruled out. Third, the pressure for, and the possibility of, a genuine military reform has considerably increased, including reduced size and influence on the making of policy.

Under the communist Soviet regime, the military served a number of purposes: it was a challenge to the West; it held down East Central Europe; it interfered directly and indirectly with Third World developments; it protected communist power at home; and it fulfilled a socializing mission among the younger generation. The military had influence on political and economic decision-making in regard both to the Soviet state's foreign policy and its domestic course of action. After the putsch, the Soviet military is no longer really capable of complying with any of its previous missions. The post-Soviet regime, in a nascent state as it is, can no any longer project its force either around the world or around its home territory; the USSR has ceased to be a military superpower.

The heirs to Soviet power face four interrelated tasks: the deregulation of imperial centralism, the dismantling of militarism, the institution of a viable economic life-support system, and the development of a practicable political system. Failure to bring about a workable, even if only transitional, solution to any one of these tasks will heighten the danger to their own security and, by extrapolation, the risks that the post-putsch processes present to the outside world. The options that appear to be favored are commendable. A combination of flexible contractual ties is to replace federal unitarism while the dissenting republics are to be allowed to secede peacefully. Demotion of military might is to be controlled from a benign center deriving legitimacy from a freely negotiated treaty among the constituent republics. Transition to a market economy is to be promoted under central guidance and with Western assistance. Consensus appears to be growing about the democratic foundations of the future political system. The program is one of security through stabilization, not through augmented militarization.

Considering the enormity of the agenda and the

many independent variables that will influence its implementation, good intentions and the choice of correct prerequisites do not guarantee success.

Risks Old and New

The possibility that the remnants of traditional Soviet militarism may yet cause harm have not altogether disappeared. The consequences of imperial disintegration, the attendant decline of lawfulness, and the old military establishment's penchant for protective interventionism can combine to produce a highly combustible situation.

At least five potential risks or danger points must be mentioned:

1. The emergence cannot be ruled out of one or several regional centers of resistance to the democratization processes, to which a part of the military machine may give allegiance.

Generally speaking, a shift of risk generation from the center to the regions can be observed. Diffusion means dissipation only in terms of a major East-West collision. A regional confrontation in which armed force is used can cause damage to the progress of domestic stabilization which, in turn, will indirectly affect the ex-USSR's international standing. The worst scenario, snowballing of local insurrections from region to region, is perhaps overly speculative.

2. It cannot be entirely excluded that the Russian Republic's leadership may become as influenced (or not much less) by its own military-industrial complex as the Soviet Kremlin was.

For good enough reasons, the Yeltsin leadership sought to put on the custodian's mantle for all Soviet military might right after the thwarting of the putsch. This is now being contested by some of the republics. Be the outcome of the dispute as it may, the Russian coercive apparatus can hardly turn out to be insignificant and its inclusion into the democratic process is bound to cause problems. The more the Russian government has to resort to government by emergency decrees, the less willing can it be to divest itself of enforcement powers. Conversely, the more the Russian military feels it is needed, the greater say in policy matters is it bound to claim.

3. Disagreements about borders and possession rights over natural and industrial resources are already in progress among republics and their

ethnic subsystems. Should disagreements develop into conflicts, the military may well be drawn into them either as a belligerent party or an arbiter.

The "regionalization" of the military's cutting edge, as mentioned above, will be a factor. If the main republics, such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, create their own forces, albeit designed as national guards or similar, it would be natural for them to pursue the respective republic's "national interests" vis-à-vis other republics. A proliferation of "national interests" can be expected within the ex-USSR's confines, extending to areas and disputes of which the West is today only barely aware.

4. Demilitarization, with its drastic reduction in the number of troops (especially non-commissioned and commissioned officers) and in the outlays to sustain them, is almost certainly bound to generate social unrest and stimulate anti-government behavior among the demobilized soldiery.

Paradoxically, it now may cost the ex-USSR authorities more to demobilize an officer than to retain him in service for another year or even longer. The cost in terms of fuelling social unrest is unmeasurable; active and reserve officers and their families have begun to organize themselves for social lobbying. The squalor into which officer families are being repatriated from Germany and Poland continues unabated.

5. One must take into account the possibility that the emergent central authority in the ex-USSR or its Russian alternative lose full control over a part of the immense Soviet nuclear arsenal.

Whereas most of these risks have primarily domestic implications in that they threaten to augment the new regimes' instability and block ability to cope with the overwhelming economic priorities, the nuclear risks are of course of immediate concern to the non-Soviet world. It can be argued, as has been done in regard to the Yugoslav crisis, that a communist implosion makes the West in fact less threatened by a conflagration than continued reform-communist stability. In the last instance, the security and well-being of the United States and Western Europe remains unaffected by what form the feud takes, say, between Russia and Ukraine, and even less so between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the selfish terms that security relationships tend to be viewed,

this is indeed the case. The nuclear dimension makes, however, the difference.

An observer feels encouraged by, but cannot put his full trust in, the emphatic assurances that non-release of the Soviet nuclear capability is being safely controlled by the embryonic post-communist leadership. For one thing, with the number of warheads and delivery systems in the many thousands, the identity of the owner alone makes only a certain amount of difference.

To illustrate this point in a deliberately provocative way: the United States might feel itself quite at ease if the British had almost 30,000 nuclear warheads in deployment, but would it feel equally unworried if France had the same number: or Italy, India, Brazil?

As regards the Soviet nuclear war-making capacity, there are as many good reasons to be concerned as there are to be sanguine.

First, the huge nuclear arsenal, including the support systems, is still in place.

Second, the removal of nuclear launch facilities from Ukraine and Kazakhstan and their establishment in Russia is not as simple an operation as the first reports suggested; moreover, transfer begs the question which only elimination could answer.

Third, concentration of the nuclear potential in Russia does not in itself guarantee non-use as long as a democratic regime has not consolidated itself there. There is a long way to go before that takes place.

Fourth, the larger part of warheads are tactical, short-range weapons, dispersed over ex-Soviet territory at division level, with a lesser degree of central control and more exposed to unauthorized handling than the strategic mastodons.

Fifth, the electronic blocking systems (PALs or Permissive Action Links) are either non-existent or cruder on Soviet weapons than on Western ones.

Sixth, nuclear missiles on submarines and nuclear bombs on airplanes are by definition less controllable and blockable than those attached to ground-based launch systems.

Seventh, the dual safeguard practiced by the Soviets, whereby the KGB controls warheads and the military controls launchers, is being put under a great deal of strain as a result of the anti-KGB and demilitarization drives.

Eighth, it is not clear how tightly the warfare-support systems are being supervised

against ill use, such as maintenance, testing, manufacture, and modernization of nuclear weaponry, and how efficiently are production and stockpiling of enriched uranium, plutonium and tritium controlled.

Ninth, even if firing nuclear weapons with hostile intent is to be excluded or preempted, misuse can take the form of blackmail, accident or transfer to terrorist hands, possibly outside the old USSR.

Tenth, reducing the nuclear military program under the new regime, and making it safe, will necessarily cost money which the authorities will have to deny other areas of military and social activity, thus causing an attitudinal backlash.

Extending Security Textures

Even if Soviet danger has gone down from a massive mono-directional threat to a cluster of disparate risks, Western defenses must obviously retain a function that can counter them appropriately. Scaling down the counter-threat capabilities need not lead to their dilution in an endless sea of debates about goodwill gestures and strategic revisions. First and foremost, the West would want to continue to deter, prevent, and if necessary counter a nuclear hostility. The focus may shift toward a cooperative management of Soviet denuclearization, but the quintessential retaliatory capability must be preserved as long as the nuclear panoply remains in risk-full existence on the other side.

That is where NATO still holds good value, both as the ex-Soviet Union's partner in the process of nuclear de-escalation and as the West's *ultima ratio* should this process fail.

The post-putsch environment allows NATO to go further than it was ready to go before August in its policy of entailing East Central Europe (now including the Baltic states) into the international security architecture. Fear of causing offense to Moscow need not now be a factor of the same weight as it was only a few months ago. While offering East Central Europe an institutionalized form of non-nuclear partnership in political-military fields, in the shape of associate membership NATO could also extend an offer of consultative relationship to both the post-Soviet collective leadership and the three nuclear successor states of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. (It is understood that the mobile

nuclear launch systems will be withdrawn from Byelarus.)

Diffusion of the dangers that still emanate from Soviet nuclear weaponry could be the explicit purpose of such consultative relations.

A three-tier NATO, comprising the West's core defenses, the East Central European associates, and the ex-Soviet partners in consultation, can be conceived as an international political organization which enmeshes the West's response to its own security concerns with cooperative regulation of other East-West concerns in the political-military field. The underlying philosophy would assume the Euratlantic and the Eurasian security *desiderata* now dovetail more than they diverge, but their full consolidation requires further action. The ongoing amalgamation of concerns should find reflection in a form of institutional intertwining while a baseline separateness is still preserved.

It can be envisaged that Russia and the other component states of the new treaty-bound conglomerate may want to administer their own military potential through a kind of collective arrangement. With it, they will want to reduce the danger of belligerency in the Soviet successor area, especially as the newly independent republics begin to build up their own armed forces in the form of national guards or military-style police units. For this purpose they may wish to create a security partnership among themselves, obviously under Russian leadership and with a hitherto unknown measure of ceded sovereignty. This development would be basically welcome to the West. The existence of a responsible and accountable organization of this kind could introduce a degree of stability into the East-West security relationship, as long as it does not lead to the re-emergence of international adversarial polarization in new clothes. NATO's third tier, consultative partnership with the heirs of Soviet military might, could help create an instrumental safeguard against the gestation of renewed confrontationism. Plainly and perhaps brutally expressed, leave post-communist Soviets alone with their military heirloom and you are asking for trouble in the not so distant future.

International Intertwining

It is commonplace to say that man does not live by the military bread alone. Co-opting a national polity

into established international networks is a time-honored manner of assistance as well as an instrument of control over potential rogue behavior. Before problems of behavior arise, the more rudimentary and technical question of representation will have to be addressed. Which successor entities to the USSR can and ought to have seats in which international organizations?

The universalist United Nations and the all-regional Helsinki process (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE) have had little difficulty in accommodating the Baltic states. Problems arise with all the others, both those that wish to secede fully and those who still subscribe to a surrogate union. Admission of Georgia into the United Nations will obviously depend on the resolution of indigenous strife and consolidation of political power there. But, can the UN deny membership to a state in which factions contest governance? And, should Georgia join CSCE when conventional wisdom of geographers locates it into Asia?

A word should be put in here about an area that seems to belong nowhere, the Transcaucasus, a mini-world that Moscow has long found difficult to govern, and that for all practical purposes does not yet seem to possess the qualities of someone who governs himself. Europe or Asia? Dozens of minority conflicts, including three or four truly nasty ones, plague the region. There are oil deposits, religious disparities and southern tempers. Only Turkey and Iran are contiguous non-Soviet neighbors. Who will prod these nations along non-confrontational lines, who will invite them into which organizations, who will want to arbitrate over their conflicts, and whose judgment will they be willing to accept? Is the Soviet Transcaucasus out-of-area for NATO although it borders on Turkey? To be sure, there is no threat to the Atlantic Alliance from the region, as there was only recently when nuclear weapons were stored in Azerbaijan, but there certainly is a hotbed of conflict and privation.

Moldova presents a problem, since everybody knows it will sooner or later merge with Romania, but not as yet. Of which international organization can it claim membership in the interim? Does it have to settle the dispute with its non-Moldovan minority and the border issue with Ukraine first?

It is not clear to what extent the remaining ten

republics (including Russia) are ready to sign away their international rights to the residual superstructure led by Mikhail Gorbachev. The useful life of what calls itself "the center" need not be long; it can either disintegrate completely or it might have to release more of the constituent states from its tutelage. It is in fact difficult to imagine that at least some of the republics which have become a party to the collective arrangement can desist claiming the right to foreign representation while the interim contract-based centralism is still alive. Ukraine and Byelarus have, after all, been always members of the UN. Should Russia and Kazakhstan not be? Who should CSCE seek to enroll? In fact, how European should CSCE remain, considering that the post-Soviet emancipation process has already enveloped the entire northern half of the Asian continent?

Any one of these tantalizing questions merits knowledgeable examination which, one hopes, sharp minds are already undertaking somewhere. Only an angle common to them all can be adduced here. United Nations and CSCE memberships carry a commitment to peaceful behavior and observation of human rights which the international community would dearly like to see projected into the entire post-Soviet conglomerate of successor republics, whether they declare full independence or tolerate some supra-national administration. Can peace and human rights be better secured by fostering direct accession or through the good offices of an agency whose writ in the constituent republics runs weak at best and not at all at worst? In fact, to continue the sequence of rhetorical questions, what claim does the post-Soviet collective agency have on international representation of a host of "independent and sovereign republics" that these republics do not have themselves?

We do not really know what kind of a confederal or contractual "center" will in the end emerge from the present negotiations. As things look now, the element of centralism will be very, very weak. It will most likely be (if there is any common agency at all) an elastic, rather badly congealed multi-member linkage between diverse constituents, lop-sided because of Russian size and strength, and as multifarious as any imaginable international organization. The subscribers to the confederal contract over which Gorbachev seeks to preside differ from each other in levels of development,

religion, culture, possession of resources, prospects for advancement, international inclinations, strategic location and many other respects. In fact, the self-styled Union of Free and Sovereign States may best be viewed as an international organization, in the incipient stage, rather than a state. It may coalesce into a tighter entity, or it may break up altogether, or it may linger lamely. Moreover, the erosion of associative statehood continues, as the ethnic and possibly territorial subdivisions of the Russian Federation begin to assert their claims to self-determination. It has become fashionable to say that Boris Yeltsin is the harbinger of hope; in reality, the disintegrative process does not stop with him.

At this stage, the West obviously cannot do much more than it is doing; realignments inside the residual Soviet Union will continue to change for some time yet. The West can only stay on guard, give advice, seek to pacify the extremists, and extend humanitarian assistance. At the same time, clever brains everywhere will be at work to provide politicians with the best possible picture of what the world can expect and how it can best meet the challenge.

The margin of error is great, but the following predictions do not look overly outlandish:

1. *The residual Soviet Union will not be able to constitute itself into a stable state either for purposes of domestic government or as a cohesive international factor.*

2. *Contractual ties among states which choose a mode of association will be weak and ineffectual. They will mostly concern economic flows, but will not include common military forces or control over them. Nor will they (eventually) include joint foreign policy and representation.*

3. *Russia, obviously the strongest of the successor states, will undergo a period of internal strife and some dismemberment.*

4. *For quite some time, the successors to the USSR will exist as a cluster of self-contained entities, perhaps 15 or 20 of them, most of which will interact only marginally with the outside world.*

5. *Ethnic and regional turmoil will continue.*

6. *There will be one fully-fledged nuclear power (Russia) and two nuclear powers with restricted decision-making and access to facilities (Ukraine and Kazakhstan).*

7. *All successor entities will have their own military forces and military support systems. Russia,*

Ukraine, and Kazakhstan will carry the greatest weight in military matters, but fierce fighting forces, albeit smaller, will be active elsewhere.

8. Three ideologies will influence policy-making: European liberalism, indigenous nationalism, and Islam.

It will be in the West's interest to devise new ways through which the rules of organized international life can be made to apply in the post-Soviet states, including their impact on the conduct of domestic politics. The three strongest republics (also in the military sense), Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, can play a pivotal role in this respect, and their cooperation ought to be enlisted.

Intermediate Europe

The area east of NATO and west of the USSR has suddenly become larger, more diverse and more conflict-prone than it seemed to be after the democratic revolutions only less than two years ago. The virtual dissolution of the Soviet state and the falling apart of Yugoslavia have increased the number of states which seek affiliation with Western Europe in their own right, notably the Baltics, Slovenia, and Croatia. They have also created uncertainty about the national aspirations and the international status of others, such as Ukraine, Byelarus, Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. New ethnic turbulences have exploded with a vengeance (Serbian residents of Croatia) while others are maturing (between Czechs and Slovaks, Lithuanians and Poles, as well as in Bosnia). Few of the festering problems have been resolved, including those in the economy. The new political scene witnesses intense fragmentation (like in the Bulgarian and Polish elections) and the attendant inability to pursue consensual objectives. Law enforcement has been limping badly throughout the region.

In short, difficult as the detachment of East Central Europe from the communist empire was in 1989, it is the Soviet and Yugoslav break-ups of 1991 and the failed expectations that are really converting the region into a hotbed of instability in which eruptions can surely be envisaged to occur.

Next to the evident need for a higher measure of international involvement in the economic process and the obvious dictum that states of the region must

do more to help themselves, two security-related considerations are clearly on the agenda. First, an effective mechanism of conflict resolution and crisis management must be put in place; and, second, the military forces in the area must be prevented from intervening in political disputes.

The Yugoslav crisis, however special it may be, has high-lighted the need for both. *Ad hoc* commissions of the European Community (of which none of the East European states is a member!) or undernourished task forces of CSCE are simply not good enough to stem the kind of pent-up irrationality that threatens to engulf several hot spots in the region. What is needed is an international mechanism with teeth and authority, perhaps under the joint auspices of several international organizations, and naturally with East European participation. It must be ready to anticipate conflicts, work for their resolution before they break out, take the culprits to task, and perhaps even summon armed power to quell hostilities if they explode. It should be noted that the type of conflict that can erupt is manifold; it can include escalating constitutional logjams as much as a general breakdown of law and order that makes a country ungovernable, bellicose behavior by a government as much as belligerency by diffused vigilantes, suppression of an ethnic minority as much as armed disrespect for a majority, and much more. It would be wrong to make the arbitration system wholly governed from outside the region, even if Western contribution must obviously be essential. In the last instance, confrontations in Eastern Europe no longer threaten world peace, but they do cause harm to the nations of the area. The West could ill afford to coexist for a length of time with a part of the continent in which people keep generating strife and perpetuating inadequacy, but it can equally ill afford to keep policing troubles outside its own realm of responsibility.

As argued above, the extension of some of NATO's functions to the eastern parts of Europe can help bolster the feeling of military security there. Nevertheless, the major problem of today is not the danger that the USSR might wish to reclaim its erstwhile fiefdoms by force, but rather the danger that some groups of East Europeans will start fighting other groups of East Europeans. Nuclear umbrellas, forward deployments, and integrated command structures are not the goods that are most in demand. The most precious commodity that the

West can now offer to the East Europeans in the security field is the knowledge that the military force is not here to settle ethnic and political disputes. No one wants armed clashes between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Ukraine and Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, Hungary and Romania or, for that matter, among the as yet unaffected ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. Preaching the message will not be sufficient. A modality of institutional affiliation with NATO and the attendant interweaving of doctrines and mindsets can help: you don't fight a fellow member of the same alliance. Military assistance in the sense of shared values as much as in the actual build-up of the military machine along professional lines, as in a peacekeeping force, can of course flow into Eastern Europe outside NATO, too, through bilateral channels. (Some cooperative processes have already been underway for some time.)

There are of course pitfalls and caveats. An extension of NATO into Eastern Europe as a factor of security through non-belligerency (if it ever comes to pass) is an entirely new ball game for

which the Alliance presently lacks resources and expertise. As most things in this world, a development in this direction would cost money which the East Europeans cannot provide. Secondly, entailing the East into NATO's new philosophy and practical activity could only come about gradually, on an incremental, selective basis. Some countries could become associates almost immediately, while others would have to wait for a clarification of their status or until they comply with indispensable conditions. NATO would have to avoid scrupulously a situation in which they would be arming and training one East European country against another or even be perceived as doing it. A great deal of preparatory and public relations activity would have to precede any practical steps, and the foundations would naturally have to be laid in full cooperation with the political authorities in East Central Europe. After all, it is first and foremost political security that the West would want to project into the East, not a fictitious and dangerous notion that enhanced militarism is the region's answers to its ills.

The New Security Environment in Europe: American Interests, Strategies, and Policy Options

Stephen Van Evera

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Introduction

This paper addresses four questions: What are American interests in Europe today? What threats to these interests can be discerned? What strategies would address these threats most effectively? What foreign and military policies are required to implement these strategies?

America's main interests in Western Europe lie in preserving peace, protecting the Western liberal international economic order, and preventing nuclear proliferation. These interests are best protected by sustaining America's military commitment to Western Europe and revamping NATO into a collective security system. America's main interest in Eastern Europe and the former USSR lies in preventing a regional war. This interest is threatened by the collapse of the Soviet external empire and the Soviet state, which has created a significant risk of war. Such a war is best prevented by using the West's economic leverage to encourage the emerging states of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet Union to pursue peaceful policies. The West should probably avoid making military commitments to the emerging Eastern states, but it should strictly condition its economic relations with all Eastern states on their peaceful conduct.

The next section discusses American interests in and policies toward Western Europe; the following section explores American interests and options toward Eastern Europe and the former USSR. To enhance discussion, options some will find implausible or misguided are included.

Western Europe: American Interests and American Strategy

The Transformation of America's Interest in Western Europe. The nature of America's interest in Western Europe has changed markedly since America's European commitment took shape in the late 1940s. The US launched the Marshall Plan, helped forge NATO, and sent troops to Europe mainly for balance-of-power reasons: to avert Soviet hegemony in industrial Eurasia. Such a Soviet hegemony would have controlled greater industrial power than the United States. Had it chosen to convert this industrial might into military power, the USSR could have out-armed the United States, thus threatening American security. The US moved to contain Soviet expansion mainly to avert this threat. American leaders earlier opposed Nazi German expansion for similar reasons.

Three changes have removed this geopolitical interest in European security. First, of course, Soviet expansionism has waned, and Soviet power has collapsed. The Soviet Union is now dissolving rapidly. When the dust settles, most of the Soviet Union's 15 republics, including Ukraine, will be independent states, and some may subdivide into several states. The entire former USSR will also undergo a cataclysmic economic collapse that will remove its remnants from the world geopolitical stage for some years to come.

The USSR was the only plausible candidate for hegemony over Eurasia: its collapse leaves Eurasia devoid of potential hegemonies. Some observers have voiced fears of Germany, but these fears are misplaced: the roots of past German aggression are gone, and are not likely to reappear.¹ With no candidate for continental hegemony on the scene, the main traditional rationale for America's

European commitment is removed.

Second, the nuclear revolution has brought a defensive revolution to warfare. This defensive revolution has undermined the geopolitical ideas, like those of Mackinder, Spykman, and Kennan, that were the basis for containment. Nuclear weapons make conquest among great powers almost impossible, since a victor now must destroy almost all of an opponent's nuclear arsenal, an enormous task requiring massive technical and material superiority. As a result, the states of Western Europe are better able to defend themselves without American assistance. Moreover, their conquest and subjugation would now pose less danger to the United States.

The nuclear revolution reduced the strategic value of all conquered territory, because even huge conquests would not provide the conqueror with enough technical or material assets to give it decisive nuclear superiority over another great power. As a result, a hegemonic Eurasian super-state would now pose less threat to American sovereignty than before the nuclear age: the US could preserve its freedom against such a super-state by relying on its nuclear deterrent, despite the super-state's superior resources. Therefore, American security interest in preserving Western Europe's freedom has sharply diminished. (The nuclear revolution is very old news, but American strategists were slow to recognize its implications, illustrating Albert Einstein's lament that nuclear weapons changed everything except the way we think.)

Third, the logic of the old geopolitics has been weakened by the high-technology revolution in the Western economies. The industrial economies of the smokestack era could be conquered and milked (as Hitler's Germany conquered and milked its conquests in Central and Western Europe); this is less true of knowledge-based post-industrial economies. These economies depend on free access to technical and social information. This access requires a free domestic press, as well as access to foreign publications, foreign travel, personal computers, and photocopiers. But a conqueror must forbid these, because political dissidents could use them to organize and subvert the empire. Thus, to maintain control, a conqueror would be forced to impose police measures that would ruin economic production. Industrial empires now "pay" their

owners far less in a strategic sense; hence, a Eurasian industrial empire would pose less threat to American sovereignty.

In short, then, the geopolitical rationale for America's European commitment is obsolete. The possibility of a Eurasian hegemony has largely disappeared, and such a hegemony would now pose far less threat to American sovereignty than in the late 1940s.

However, America's commitment to Western Europe still serves important American interests, specifically, the preservation of peace and prosperity, and the control of nuclear proliferation.² As America's geopolitical, sovereignty-related interest has waned, these peace, prosperity, and proliferation-related interests have grown. As a result, America's European commitment should continue, but under a new rationale.

Preserving Peace. By expanding war's violence, the nuclear revolution has enlarged America's stake in maintaining peace in Europe. Nuclear weapons vastly multiply the suffering that a general war could inflict on Europeans; this enlarges America's humanitarian interest in Europe's peace. Nuclear weapons also expand the devastation the US could suffer should a European war spread across the ocean.

Should this worry Americans? Answer: yes. The United States was drawn into three of the last four general European wars (the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II), escaping only the Crimean War. Whether wisely or foolishly, it could well be drawn into the next, by a process that parallels its entry into past wars, or by some course of events we cannot now foresee.

Some argue that the US could address this danger by simply standing aloof from future European wars. They correctly note that the fading of America's geopolitical/security stake in Europe now gives the US more latitude to pursue such a policy. However, this argument overlooks America's deep cultural and ethnic ties to Europe. It would be difficult for the US to stand aside while the homelands of American ethnic groups were conquered or destroyed. It also overstates our ability to manage war and predict its course and nature. War has an inherent propensity to grow, spread, and get out of control. It often presents surprises, and usually bad ones at that. It injures bystanders often by

causing damage through unforeseen dynamics. Like past European wars, the next war could once again spark American entry by injuring the US in ways not now predictable.

In short, the United States cannot guarantee its own isolation from a European war. This gives the US a large stake in Europe's peace and recommends a continued US military commitment to Europe. Both World Wars might well have been prevented had Germany and Japan recognized that America would move to prevent expansion. Likewise, the American presence in Europe since World War II has helped keep peace by deterring Soviet aggression. A continued American presence will bolster peace if it is configured to check aggression and do so by defensive means.

What we see in the USSR is a *nuclear-age imperial collapse*. It is like other imperial collapses but takes place in a nuclear context. This is in part reassuring: the nuclear context means that the security implications of the collapse are smaller than normal to outside powers, lowering their impulse to intervene, and lowering the risk of spreading war. However, the nuclear context also means: (1) if outsiders were sucked into a war this would be far more catastrophic; and, (2) the collapse of a nuclear-armed empire presents extra, special dangers of proliferation, an environment-damaging civil war, and a human rights-damaging civil war. Therefore, the fact that this imperial collapse is occurring in a nuclear context is both reassuring and alarming.

Preserving Prosperity. The United States also has economic interests that would be jeopardized by conflict in Europe. A major war in Europe would obviously injure American prosperity by destroying America's trading partners. More importantly, intra-European conflict far short of war could threaten the fabric of the cooperative liberal, postwar, western economic order. This order, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Community (EC), and other international economic institutions, has bolstered prosperity by encouraging free economic exchange among Western states. It arose largely in reaction to the now-fading Soviet threat which had forced the states of Western Europe to bury their quarrels and stand together. This threat also brought American forces back to Europe, and their police

presence further dampened the possibility of intra-Western European war.³ As a result, the Western European states became confident that their Western neighbors posed no security threat. They further saw self-interest in helping their neighbors grow stronger, since all were allies in a long-term struggle against a common foe. Hence, each was sheltered more than threatened by its neighbors' power.

This situation dampened the relative gains problem that often hampers international cooperation.⁴ When states see their economic partners as potential military competitors, they approach possible transactions asking not "do we both gain?" but "who gains more?" Their partner may convert gains into military strengths which could be used to prevail by coercion in later disputes. Cooperation becomes very difficult unless its rewards are precisely distributed to reflect the existing power balance. When the possibility of military competition is removed, states can afford to ask only if both gain, and cooperate even if gains are unequal. Since the late 1940s, the Soviet threat has eased the relative gains problem by dampening intra-West European security competition by creating a general interest in common Western prosperity, and by bringing the American police presence to Europe. This laid the basis for the liberal post-war economic order.

As the Soviet threat fades into history, the states of Western Europe may again come to see each other as security competitors. If so, the relative gains problem will reappear, threatening the West's liberal economic order. To protect this order, war must remain not merely unlikely, but unthinkable, since even mild security competition can spark "who gains more?" thinking.

An American guarantee to oppose any aggression in Western Europe would mitigate this problem. Therefore, the US should remain in Western Europe, committed to oppose any aggression there. The purpose of this commitment would be to prevent war. An American presence would keep war manifestly unthinkable, preserving the environment required for economic cooperation.

Limiting & Managing Nuclear Proliferation. The dangers attending nuclear proliferation supply a third, albeit minor, reason why the United States should remain in Europe. Nuclear weapons can have

pacifying effects, which can follow nuclear weapons as they spread.⁵ Unbounded or mismanaged proliferation, however, can raise the risk of war.

Accordingly, American policy should not oppose all proliferation in Europe, but should seek to bind and manage the process. The US should counsel Germany against acquiring nuclear weapons, but if Germany nevertheless decides to become a nuclear power (a possibility that now seems unlikely, but that might arise under changed conditions), the United States should not resist. Germany has demonstrated its responsibility, and it has the resources needed to develop an invulnerable deterrent secure from accident or terrorism. Europe, though, is more dangerous with 20 or 25 fingers on the nuclear trigger than with a handful, because the additional states might be unable to build secure nuclear forces.⁶ Hence, the United States should seek to confine proliferation sharply. It should also actively manage any proliferation that might occur by deterring preventive attack on emerging nuclear powers in cases where nuclearization is deemed acceptable, and by providing technical assistance to assure the safety and effectiveness of a new nuclear state's deterrent.

Managing proliferation will require a continued American military presence in Europe. Such a presence would better enable the US to constrain proliferation by extending security guarantees to states that otherwise might seek nuclear weapons. It would also give the US a greater voice in European affairs with a greater ability to managing any proliferation that occurs.

Needed: A New Rationale for NATO. To support this policy, the US should maintain a substantial military force in Western Europe. This force should be small enough to forestall taxpayer complaints, but large enough to symbolize America's commitment to both Europeans and Americans, and to carry some weight in the European military balance. A force of roughly 75,000 to 125,000 troops, backed by large additional forces in the United States, would seem to fit this requirement.

Such a deployment requires an institutional framework to define its purpose and bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the American and European publics. The current NATO framework is inadequate for this purpose. A continued American

deployment would have the purpose of deterring aggression from any quarter, while NATO exists only to address the now-vanished Soviet military threat. As a result, NATO's aim and the aim of American deployment no longer match.

One solution might be to broaden NATO's purpose by adding a collective security function (under which its members would guarantee each other against attack by other member states) to its current collective defense function (under which members guarantee each other against attack by non-NATO members).⁷ This would clarify that NATO now has a new mission of peacekeeping in the West not made obsolete by the demise of the Soviet threat, and which deserves and requires an American contribution.⁸

Collective security systems have a dismal history; the hapless League of Nations is the main exemplar. However, a NATO collective security system need not work like a Swiss watch. Its main purpose would simply be to provide a public rationale for a continued American (and Canadian) presence in Europe, and to legitimize American action if needed. This task is far less demanding than the tasks faced by the League. Moreover, the League of Nations failed because it lacked strong leaders, but if the United States decides to continue playing a peacekeeping role in Europe, this gives NATO the strong leader it needs.

Eastern Europe and the Former USSR: American Interests and Strategy

Rumors of War. The risk of war in Western Europe is very low because the whole region has witnessed a social transformation since 1939 leaving it far less war-prone.⁹ America's task in Western Europe is not demanding.

The situation in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, however, is the opposite. The region is primed for war. America's main interest in the region is the prevention of such a war, and America's policy in the region should focus on this goal. The US should be involved for obvious moral and humanitarian reasons, but also because such a war could injure or even engulf nearby states, to include NATO states.

The danger of war in the East is a by-product of the disintegration of the Soviet empire. History warns that the international system deals poorly with the

collapse of great empires; their demise often sparks war. The slow collapse of the Turkish empire during 1832-1914 was the catalyst for four great crises, two great wars, and several smaller wars.¹⁰ The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire likewise sparked World War I by spurring Austria to lash out against Serbia for its subversion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The dismantling of the European empires in Asia and Africa was often followed by great violence among the newly-independent peoples.¹¹ The demise of the Soviet empire has brought the end of the Cold War and freedom for millions who have suffered Moscow's subjugation and should be celebrated for these reasons. Demise also conjures up images of the dangers which accompanied the fall of other empires. These images include war.

Danger arises from three specific sources: the unsettled nature of borders in Eastern Europe and the former USSR; the intermingling of nationalities in this region; and the intense conflicts among these nationalities.

Many borders in the region lack legitimacy, especially those in the former USSR arbitrarily established by Stalin. This sets the stage for border wars in the region once Moscow's authority evaporates.¹²

Wars could also spring from the bitter national conflicts reappearing with the retraction of Moscow's power. These conflicts are made more dangerous by the intermingled distribution of the peoples of the region. A survey of Eastern Europe reveals more than a dozen minority group pockets that may seek independence or be claimed by other countries.¹³ In the former Soviet Union, nationalities are even more intermingled. The USSR's population totalled some 262 million people, comprising 104 nationalities living in 15 Soviet republics. Of these, 64 million (24 percent) either live outside their home republic, or are among the 89 small nationalities with no titular republic, who will be minorities in the successor states to the dismantled USSR (assuming that all 14 non-Russian republics secede but are not further sub-divided).¹⁴ Of these 64 million, some 39 million (15 percent of total Soviet population) are members of nationalities that have a titular republic, but live outside it; these include 24 million Russians (17 percent of all Russians) and 15 million members of other nationalities (15 percent of all such nationalities).

Another 25 million people (9 percent of the total Soviet population) are members of the 89 smaller nationalities without titular home republics, who will be minorities wherever they live.¹⁵

The dismantled USSR will thus be riddled with national conflicts. These will arise from nationalities' demands to annex territory of other republics inhabited by their own members; from complaints against the oppression of national kin who live across accepted borders;¹⁶ and from demands by the small, stateless nationalities for autonomy or secession from the republics where they reside. If large numbers of people are expelled from their homes, these expellees may call for revenge or recovery of lost land and property.¹⁷ Border disputes may also arise among the republics because some nationalities may claim larger borders dating from their days of independent pre-colonial greatness.¹⁸

Could these disputes spawn a general war that spreads into Central or Western Europe? The risk of westward spread is less than in the past, because the nuclear revolution has made conquest harder and the high-technology revolution has reduced the strategic value of empire. These changes reduce the security implications of events in the East for West European states, which lowers their impulse to intervene in Eastern wars. However, some nationalities in Eastern Europe (most notably the Poles) have ethnic kin in the West, and many Soviet nationalities (including the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Moldovans, Armenians, Azeris, Turkmen, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs) have ethnic kin just outside the former USSR, or farther afield in Western Europe and North America. If these peoples were threatened by violence, their co-nationals in other countries would understandably pressure their governments to intervene. As a result, a war among the peoples of the former USSR could involve East European, Middle Eastern, or South Asian states, and a war in Eastern Europe or the Middle East could affect others farther west.

This danger creates a Western interest in helping to ensure the Soviet empire is dismantled peacefully. The West also has other interests at stake. A general war could generate millions of refugees needing humanitarian assistance or asylum. War could also produce vast environmental damage affecting the West, especially if nuclear

weapons were widely used, or if the former Soviet Union's many nuclear reactors were damaged or mismanaged in the chaos of war.

American and Western Policy Options. What can the US do to preserve peace in Eastern Europe and the former USSR? Six basic options have been, or might be, offered. These options are not, in all cases, mutually exclusive, and more than one could be pursued at once. I am partial to Option 5 (the use of economic leverage to induce peaceful conduct from Eastern states), and would also consider Option 6 (pursue a general settlement with Russia). However, strong arguments can be made against both.

1. Unilateral Isolation (the "Yellowstone" Option). The Western powers stay out of Eastern Europe and the former USSR; if it burns, let it burn (just as the Forest Service let Yellowstone Park burn during the summer of 1989.) The West might offer humanitarian assistance but would not extend itself to prevent or control Eastern wars. This isolationist policy makes sense if the West has little interest in preserving peace in the East, insufficient leverage to bolster peace, insufficient wisdom to know how to use leverage to promote peace, and/or insufficient wisdom to avoid entanglement in wars it tries but fails to prevent.

However, the argument that the West has little interest in preventing Eastern wars seems wrong on its face: these interests, both practical and humanitarian, seem large. Moreover, as I note below, it seems likely that unique aspects of this crisis give the West substantial leverage. The West probably has the wisdom to use this leverage to good effect and has ways to influence events in the East that raise little risk of military entanglement.

In the end, the Yellowstone option may win, and it may be the wisest choice. The West should choose this option, however, only after actively considering all alternatives and not by default. The following options should first be considered.

2. Create a Bismarckian Defensive Alliance Network. The West deters war in the East by extending security guarantees over some Eastern states. This might be accomplished by extending unilateral security guarantees to these states, or by including Eastern states as full members in NATO. The model for such a solution is found in the defensive alliance network woven by Bismarck in

the 1880s. Bismarck's purpose was to prevent war in central Europe; his method was to establish a network of defensive alliances ensuring any aggressor would face many defenders. His network did, in fact, help prevent war by deterring aggressors and calming the fears of *status quo* powers. A parallel defensive alliance network might be established today.

This method of peacekeeping seems ineffective and dangerous. It would be ineffective, because the Western public would be leery of direct Western involvement in Eastern wars, limiting Western government ability to meet commitments. This method would be dangerous, because military commitments, once given, are hard to escape. Any Western program for preserving peace in the East should be chosen with an eye toward minimizing the risk of Western entanglement in the wars it fails to prevent. However, a Bismarckian scheme cannot avoid raising this risk.

This risk is magnified by the possibility that the newly-freed Eastern states may later embrace aggressive goals now latent. The domestic politics of the Eastern states will remain turbulent for years to come, and their long-term foreign policy goals will be inchoate until this turbulence is over. NATO membership for Eastern states will make more sense after this time of change. In the meantime, though, Western states risk adopting the latent expansionist goals of Eastern states if they guarantee Eastern state security.

Certainly any Western security guarantees should be issued with this risk in mind and should be strictly conditioned on the Eastern states' disavowal of aggressive aims or behavior.¹⁹ Otherwise, NATO guarantees will encourage the emergence of aggressive programs, and NATO will risk being sucked into the wars these programs create.

3. Collective Security. The West seeks to establish a comprehensive collective security system, probably using the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the foundation.²⁰ This idea is similar to Option 2, the Bismarckian Defense Alliance Network; it differs only by committing all states to defend all others, while a Bismarckian system would only commit certain states to defend certain others.

A collective security solution, however, is both impractical and unnecessary. It is impractical for the reasons that have doomed collective security

systems to failure in the past: collective action by a large group of states is unwieldy, and states are seldom willing to pay short-term costs merely to earn the right to claim reciprocal help from an unreliable community sometime in the distant future.²¹ (I recommend adopting a collective security framework for Western Europe because such a system provides a useful public rationale for the American commitment to Western Europe, not because I think collective action is really the answer to West European security problems.) It is unnecessary because the weight of the whole international community is required to deter aggression only by the very strongest states in the system. Far less power is required to deter aggression by lesser states. If Western powers seek to deter aggression by Eastern states, two or three of them can simply do it by themselves; there is no need to organize a Rube Goldberg system that involves all lesser states of the region in decision making.

4. Institutionalized Consultation. Europe relies on CSCE for peacekeeping, and as a consultative forum for raising security issues on an *ad hoc* basis.²² While this scheme would be better than nothing, it would not provide an effective and reliable security program.

5. Use Economic Leverage to Promote Peaceful Conduct. The Western powers condition their economic relations with states in Eastern Europe and the former USSR on their willingness to behave peacefully. The logic supporting such a policy is straightforward: if the West wants *peace in the East*, then it should encourage the states of the East to *behave peacefully* by offering appropriate economic incentives.

This requires the Western powers first define a common standard of peaceful conduct. That standard could be framed several ways, but I think it should include five main elements: (1) robust guarantees for the rights of national minorities, including both individual and group rights;²³ (2) acceptance of current national borders, or acceptance of a duty to promptly settle on new borders without resort to the use or threat of force; (3) willingness to adopt democratic reforms; (4) willingness to renounce the propagation of hyper-nationalism through the schools and other official channels; and (5) adoption of free market economic policies, and disavowal of protectionist or other beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies

toward other Eastern states.²⁴ Then the Western powers should pursue a common economic policy toward the states of the East, offering the carrot of full membership in the Western economic system to states that behave "peacefully," while threatening the "unpeaceful" with the stick of exclusion and economic sanctions.²⁵

The rationale for these five conditions is that an effective code of "peaceful conduct" must require that states renounce the use of force against others. It cannot stop there: it must also require that states refrain from policies provoking others to use force against them (conditions 1 and 2); and refrain from creating domestic conditions which would encourage their own decisions to use force (conditions 3, 4, and 5).²⁶

Such a policy has a fair chance of working, because the West enters this situation with more leverage than usual for two reasons. First, the Eastern states will suffer an economic implosion during the next several years, as they transit from command to market economies. This implosion will leave them desperate for Western economic aid and membership in the Western economy, far more so than they would be in normal times. The promise of Western economic help and the threat of economic sanctions will carry great extra weight. (It may be that Eastern leaders now exaggerate the value of economic relations with the West, and that the West cannot help as much as Eastern leaders think. If so, however, the West should exploit these misconceptions while they last, if this assists Western efforts to build a peaceful order.)

Second, the West has cultural leverage that should not be underestimated. The peoples of the East admire the people and culture of the West. Perhaps they exaggerate the West's virtues, and someday they may recognize that Western societies also have warts. Right now, however, they see Western societies as role models, they respect Western opinion, and they want Western approval. The threat of chastisement and exclusion by the West is a sanction carrying real weight. The West also derives leverage from the unformed nature of Eastern political thought. The collapse of communism has left an intellectual void, leaving the East more than normally receptive to Western notions of appropriate political conduct.²⁷

Two basic variants of this option should be considered: an expensive ("large aid") variant and a

less expensive ("little or no aid") variant. In the expensive variant, the West would offer a substantial economic aid package (perhaps \$15-\$20 billion per year for several years), focused on providing the resources needed to transit from command to market economies, and conditioned on Eastern compliance with the above-noted five point peaceful conduct standard.²⁸ The less expensive variant would keep aid to a minimum, offering only free access to Western capital, markets, and technology in exchange for peaceful Eastern conduct.

The first variant is far superior, if Western publics will accept the cost. It would give the West greater leverage over Eastern policies, and would ease the economic pain of marketization, thus lowering the risk of anti-democratic reaction and fascism. However, even the second variant could give the West substantial leverage, because the emerging Eastern states will place a high value on membership in the Western economic system. In short, the West should use large carrots in its carrot-and-stick policy, but even small carrots can produce significant results.²⁹

Both variants have the virtue, missing from Options 2 and 3, of minimizing the risk of the West's entanglement in wars it fails to prevent.

6. Pursue a general European settlement with Russia. The Western powers seek an understanding with Russia on the size and nature of spheres of influence in the new Europe. This proposal makes sense only if Russia wants a special Russian sphere of influence, which it may not, preferring instead status as a normal state with full membership in the Western club. However, if Russia wants a special sphere, and the West is willing to grant it, the Western powers might consider discussing the "rules of the game" for that sphere before a Western-Russian competition for influence develops. For example, the West might ask Russia to agree to non-interference in the domestic affairs of its neighbors, in exchange for a Western promise not to incorporate these states into alliances hostile to Russia (in essence, an agreement to "Finlandize" Russia's newly-free neighbors).

This idea would have the appearance of a new Yalta, and would generate a commensurate domestic backlash in the United States. However, it would reduce the risk of a Russian-Western collision on Russia's periphery, and might gain

greater freedom for Russia's neighbors. Absent such an agreement, the new states on Russia's periphery may find their sovereignty limited by persistent Russian intervention in their internal affairs, much as the United States has often intervened in the Caribbean and Central America since 1898.

Summary

I would focus on Option 5, because I believe the West has a strategic and humanitarian interest in preserving peace in the East, the West has considerable economic and cultural leverage, the preservation of peace depends most directly on peaceful conduct by the emerging Eastern states, and other means of peacekeeping will be insufficient or ineffective by themselves, entailing greater risk of Western entanglement in Eastern wars. I would also investigate Option 6, although it is far less promising and important.

Reasons to Doubt Option 5: Dilemmas and Counter-arguments. Thirteen dilemmas and counter-arguments could be raised against Option 5. Together they constitute good reason for caution, but I do not believe they defeat the *prima facie* case for Option 5.

Charge 1: A policy of economic conditionality would rest on an incredible threat. Option 5 involves a Western threat to impose economic sanctions on Eastern states; but if the West executes this threat, it would worsen an economic implosion that we all fear could itself cause fascism, dictatorship, and war. In short, the West would be threatening to cut off its nose to spite its face; hence its threat may not be credible.

Answer: This is a real dilemma, but a familiar problem with policies involving negative sanctions. They often have some counterproductive effects. The answer lies in convincing the world that Western leaders believe the overall policy makes sense, even if it has deleterious effects in some instances.

Charge 2: The US lacks the expertise to manage the Soviet transition. The post-Soviet transition presents a problem of enormous complexity. The American foreign policy community never before has attempted such an intellectually demanding project. The American post-war reconstructions of Germany and Japan supply hopeful precedents, but

they required long preparation and massive resources and were conducted in relatively homogeneous societies under politically simpler circumstances. The Soviet Union is a more complex society Americans know little about. Thanks to the myopic Kremlinological focus of the Soviet Studies profession, the US has few objective and reliable experts on the Soviet nationalities; too few give confidence the American state could craft appropriate policies. Social engineering is hard enough in our own society; it would be folly to attempt to engineer a society that we understand so poorly.

Answer: There is much truth in this argument. However, it does not argue for inaction, unless we assume American ignorance is so deep that by acting, the US is likely to cause more trouble than it solves.

Charge 3: American policy will be captured and distorted by ethnic special interests. If so, the US will be unable to pursue the evenhanded policies that would be required for effective peacekeeping; hence, the US should pursue disengagement from the East.

Answer: History certainly suggests this possibility; witness the important role played by domestic special interests in shaping US policy toward the Greek-Turkish conflict, Central America, and East Asia during the 1940s and 1950s (the China Lobby), and the Middle East. However, this problem argues in favor of Option 5, as well as against it. If America's relevant ethnic special interests prove strong enough to influence US policy, they are likely to propel the US into Eastern Europe in any case. The enunciation of general principles to guide US policy would help insulate policy from such special interest capture, by creating a general standard for action. In fact, the real choice is less likely to be between principled action and no action, but rather is a three way choice between principled action, no action, and unprincipled, special interest favoring action. A statement of principles would help head off unprincipled action.

Charge 4: Economic leverage will be insufficient to influence the wilder nationalist leaders, but these are the leaders that the West must influence to preserve peace. This is a variant of the general argument, "economic sanctions seldom work." It also takes the form of "Look at Yugoslavia. Western

pressure failed there!"

Answer: As noted above, I think the power of Western economic and cultural leverage will be at zenith during this crisis. Thus, simple extrapolation from the past failures of economic sanctions suggests unduly pessimistic conclusions. The Yugoslav example shows how not to intervene, not that successful intervention is impossible. Western efforts to prevent war in Yugoslavia were ineffective largely because these efforts came late and lacked coherence. The European Community emerged as Europe's peacekeeping agency only at the last minute, and the EC states sent contradictory messages, with Germany working against the other EC states. Moreover, their main message, "do not use force," was incomplete. Europe also should have asked Belgrade and Zagreb to adopt policies that would have diminished impulses to use force. (Europe should have asked Belgrade to establish a fair secession procedure allowing Croatia to gain freedom while asking Croatia to grant its Serb minority the right to autonomy or freedom. Such noises were eventually made, but not before the war began.)

Moreover, the charge that economic sanctions never work is historically overstated, and not really applicable. Sanctions have proved an unreliable instrument, but they have worked on occasion.³⁰ Scholars have measured their effectiveness by assessing their ability to persuade states to stop or reverse policies already adopted, not to deter states from adopting policies not yet begun. In short, analysts have asked if sanctions work for compellence (which is difficult, because it involves forcing opposing elites to climb down from established positions), not deterrence (which is easier, since it requires no climb-down). Option 5, however, would use threat of sanctions for deterrence, not compellence. The Western powers would publicly detail the Eastern policies that would activate Western sanctions before Eastern governments adopted these policies. This would give Eastern governments ample time to take Western reactions into account before they publicly take policy positions or make policy commitments. In short, it is unfair to assess the probable success of Option 5 by recalling the past failures of sanctions to compel: Option 5 should produce better results than these failures suggest.

Charge 5: A clear standard of peaceful conduct

cannot be devised. What, in particular, does it mean to protect "minority rights?" What is a "minority," and what does adequate protection consist of? Can tiny groups claim minority rights? Can all minorities claim a right to secede? If not, what minorities have that right? The Americans are the wrong people to answer these questions. The US brings little wisdom to this problem: America had a poor record of protecting minority rights before the 1960s, and the American political system is still no model for the protection of minority rights.

Answer: These are knotty problems, but are hardly unsolvable. European political models for protecting minorities (Switzerland and Belgium) are indeed more appropriate than American models, and should receive focus.³¹

Charge 6: The West would be arrogant to presume the right to manage the East's transition. What gives Westerners the right to lecture Easterners on minority rights, or the need to control nationalism? The Western powers have often abused their own minorities, and have indulged their own nationalism.

Answer: This is true enough, but it provides no reason for inaction. Instead, the Western powers should admit their failings and accept the duty to live up to their own standards. It might do the West good to listen to Eastern criticisms and agree to lift its own performance on this score.

Charge 7: The goals of preventing and isolating conflict in the East are contradictory. An activist Western policy is more likely to entangle the West in unpreventable conflicts than to prevent them.

Answer: A policy of economic engagement leaves ample room for disengagement if it fails to prevent war. Entanglement could well arise from military guarantees and troops on the ground, but Option 5 avoids these.

Charge 8: The collapse of past empires sparked war mainly because outsiders came in and fought each other over the carcass of the dying empire. Therefore, instead of intervening in Eastern affairs, the Western powers should reach a mutual agreement that all will stay out. In other words, what is needed is a "Yellowstone" regime for the Western powers, agreed to by all.

Answer: This argument rests on a misreading of history. Much of the violence attending the collapse of past empires occurred among the newly-freed peoples and arose with little stimulus from outsiders.

The bloody histories of post-colonial India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, and Lebanon illustrate the danger.

Charge 9: The Western publics will not support this policy if it proves expensive.

Answer: This is probably true, but the policy will not cost much. Even the expensive variant of Option 5 is fairly cheap; the American share of a "large aid" \$15-20 billion aid package would be perhaps \$4-5 billion for several years, or roughly equal to the aid the US already gives Israel, and a tiny fraction (2-3 percent) the size of the defense budget (or the Savings & Loan bailout!). The costs of the "little or no aid" variant are even smaller: they are embodied in the opportunity cost of lost commerce with the East if sanctions against the East prove necessary, and will total zero if Western persuasion succeeds, so that sanctions are not needed.³²

Charge 10: No general prescription applies to all the Eastern states; in some, democracy may promote peace, but in others, democracy will produce further fissuring, secession, and civil war. For example, democracy in Soviet Georgia would have the same effect it had in the larger USSR; enfranchised minorities would use their franchise to gain freedom. The South Ossetians, Abkhazians, Ajaris, and Azeris would all press for their own sovereignty, raising the risk of civil conflict. In short, only an authoritarian government in Tbilisi could preserve peace in Georgia: democracy is a recipe for chaos.

Answer: Democracy may empower small groups to seek independence, perhaps bringing even more states into being, and raising the risk of war among them. The West should judge these on a case-by-case basis. It should consider the possibility that a policy favoring the independence of sub-minorities who desire it may produce the most durable peace.

Charge 11: A great war in the East is not likely, so an active policy to avert it is premature. So far, Eastern Europe has seen no major violence outside Yugoslavia, and strife within the former USSR has produced only 3,000-4,000 deaths and 2,000,000 refugees. The future probably holds more of the same: occasional violence, but no bloodbath.

Answer: The task of national security policy is to address unlikely but disastrous contingencies. A Soviet invasion of Western Europe was never likely,

but NATO was wise to spend vast sums to make it even less likely. A general war in the East seems unlikely today, but it cannot be ruled out, nor can we rule out the westward spread of such a war. The fact that the odds are against such a war is no argument against taking steps to avert it. Moreover, a successful effort to avert war probably must begin before the war is in sight. If the West waits until the risks are manifest, it may be too late to act effectively.

Charge 12: The West lacks an agency or instrument for taking unified action toward the East. The Western powers can have an effect only if they act in unison. This requires a coordinating institution. The Group of Seven (G7) states (US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) form the logical action group, but G7 has no secretariat or staff. Through what agency, then, would the Western powers act? If no existing organization is appropriate, could a new agency be established in time to be effective?

Answer: There is no agency appropriate for Western action. COCOM has the most appropriate membership, but the wrong staff. An *ad hoc* approach may work. President Bush has already designated Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to coordinate all American assistance programs to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union;³³ Eagleburger's responsibilities should be broadened to include the establishment and management of a common policy among G7 governments.

Charge 13: If the West acts and fails, the peoples of the East will blame the West for their suffering.

Answer: Great powers risk blame for bad results whenever they act. That's life in the big city of international politics, and no excuse for inaction.

Reasons to Doubt Option 6. Three main problems arise with Option 6. First, some Americans would argue that a spheres of influence agreement with Russia would amount to a sellout of the newly-won freedom of Russia's non-Russian neighbors. This argument is unfair if the alternative would leave the Eastern states under informal Russian dominion with even less freedom, but it would persuade many Americans. Second, the Russians may not want a sphere of influence; in this case a settlement is unnecessary. Third, a settlement is worse than none if it would not stand the test of time, as it might not

if the parties were uncertain of their own future intentions and desires. Russian post-communist politics are still taking shape and may remain unsettled for years to come; the current Russian government may be unable to speak for Russia's future desires. This makes Russia an unreliable partner for a general settlement. If so, a settlement may be unwise, because broken settlements sow mistrust and bitterness, and may be worse than no settlement at all.

All in all, these are telling criticisms of a problematic notion. However, most policy ideas are problematic, and should be judged by whether the benefits the policy would provide outweigh the problems it would raise, as in this case they may.

American Policy toward the Former Soviet Empire: Summary

The United States should pursue an active policy of peacekeeping toward the former Soviet empire, but should use largely non-military means to achieve its goals. It should probably avoid extending the boundaries of NATO eastward for the time being; this might be appropriate after the states of the East have stabilized their domestic politics and clarified their foreign policy goals, but not today. American military forces have a role to play in this policy, but that role is indirect. Specifically, the American military presence in Western Europe casts a sobering shadow over the East, and lends force to American policy statements by symbolizing American interest in the general region. The US should not adopt strategies that could require deploying American military forces in the Eastern region.

Conclusion

For the fourth time since Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo, the Western powers face the task of designing a new political order following a decisive great war. The decisions they make will match the importance of those which shaped the peace settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945. If wise, these decisions can lay the foundation for a durable peace; if not, they may sow the seeds of a new war, as the errors of 1919 sowed the seeds of World War II. This is not a time for normal policy-making or for letting small considerations guide decisions. The West's

leaders should stand ready to invest the intellectual and financial resources needed to produce a stable settlement, even if these prove substantial, and to run political risks to bring that settlement about.

Endnotes

I wish to thank Charles Glaser and Adrian Basora for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Pages 1-15 are adapted from Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 2 (June 1990): 1-51; and from Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 7-57.

¹I develop this argument in Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 7-57, at 8n, 41-43.

²The United States has an interest in seeing that all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), biological and chemical as well as nuclear, are controlled or managed. I focus on nuclear weapons because they pose the largest problem, but other WMD (especially biological weapons) should not be neglected. On non-nuclear WMD see Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" *International Security* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 5-42, at 15-28.

³Developing this argument is Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984): 64-82. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner recently echoed this argument, suggesting that the American and Canadian commitment to Europe eased Europe's progress toward greater union, and "if you took the US away ... the nations of Western Europe could fall back into competing alliances and counteralliances." Craig R. Whitney, "NATO, Victim of Success, Searches for New Strategy," *New York Times*, 26 October 1991, 5.

⁴On the relative gains problem see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 104-107.

⁵See Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 171, 1981).

⁶Some of Europe's lesser powers lack the geographic expanse to secure a deterrent by means requiring large territory, such as rail-mobile or road-mobile missile basing. Some are landlocked and could not secure a deterrent by basing it on submarines. Many might lack the technical resources to build reliable command and control systems that are invulnerable to a decapitating attack, terrorist attack, or accidental launch. As a result, unlimited proliferation could create a crisis-unstable world of powers that are mutually vulnerable to preemptive attack. Noting these dangers is John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56, at 37-40.

⁷The term "collective security system" has been debated over the years, often being used to refer to an alliance directed against an external threat. However, it properly refers to a system in which members guarantee one another against attack by other members. On the debasement of the term, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House,

1962), 115-123.

⁸Such a policy would require a new NATO Charter. The current Charter obliges NATO members to defend one another from attack by non-NATO states, but it does not protect NATO members from attack by one another. See "The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Anxiety and Affluence: 1945-1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 85-89. Moreover, in the past, the Alliance has refused pleas from member states for guarantees against other NATO members. See, for an example, Athanassios Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel, and Sweden*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1986), 165-166, recounting NATO rejection of Greek requests for NATO guarantees against Turkey, on grounds that NATO's purpose does not include the defense of NATO members against each other.

⁹I develop this argument in "Primed for Peace," 11-44.

¹⁰Disputes arising from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire spawned the great European crises of 1832-33, 1839-40, 1875-78, and 1908; the Crimean and First World Wars; and the Balkan wars of 1885 and 1912-13. A general account is contained in M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923* (New York: MacMillan, 1966). A summary is Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 40-55, 84-92, 167-177, 196-197, 259-272, 280-286, 321-334.

¹¹During the post-1945 era, four newly-independent places saw more than one million killed in local warfare (India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Nigeria, Cambodia, and Sudan), and nine other places saw at least 100,000 killed (Angola, Burundi, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Vietnam, Uganda, and Zaire). Casualty data on these wars is from William Eckhardt, "Wars and War-Related Deaths, 1945-1989," in *World Military and Social Expenditure 1989* 13th edition, ed. Ruth Leger Sivard (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1989), 22.

¹²For a map of border conflicts in the former USSR, see Graham Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (New York: Longman, 1990), appendix 1.

¹³Frontiers that may be disputed include the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian, Romanian-Hungarian, Polish-Lithuanian, Polish-Ukrainian, Polish-Byelorussian, Polish-Czechoslovakian, Hungarian-Czechoslovakian, Hungarian-Yugoslav (Serbian), Yugoslav (Serbian)-Albanian, Greek-Albanian, Greek-Turkish, and Greek-Yugoslav (Macedonian)-Bulgarian. Ethnic pockets include Romanians in Soviet Moldova; Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia; Poles in the former USSR (Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine) and Czechoslovakia; Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania; Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece; Turks in Bulgaria; Greeks in Albania; and Albanians in Yugoslavia (Serbia). Summaries include F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 58-91; Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," *Orbis* 34, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 51-65; and Barry James, "Central Europe Tinderboxes: Old Border Disputes," *International Herald Tribune*, 1 January 1990, 5.

¹⁴All demographic figures are for 1979 and are calculated from John L. Scherer, ed., *USSR Facts and Figures Annual*, Vol. 5 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1981), 49-51.

¹⁵This excludes the Kazakh residents of Kazakhstan, although a strict accounting based on the 1979 census should include them,

because that census showed the Russians outnumbering them in Kazakhstan by 41 percent to 36 percent. However, data from 1989 indicates that the Kazakhs again outnumber the Russians in Kazakhstan, by 40 percent to 38 percent. See Alan P. Pollard, ed., *USSR Facts and Figures Annual*, Vol. 15 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991), 501. In all other Russian republics, the nationality after whom the republic is named was the majority or (in Kirgizia) a plurality in 1979, and all were a majority in 1989.

¹⁶By mid-1990, the USSR already had over 600,000 internal refugees who had fled from such oppression, and hundreds had died in communal violence. Francis X. Clines, "40 Reported Dead in Soviet Clashes," *New York Times*, 9 June 1990, 1. By late 1991, that toll had risen to 3,000 to 4,000 deaths and nearly 2,000,000 refugees, according to US State Department officials.

¹⁷For example, it seems quite possible that millions of Russians will be expelled from non-Russian republics; if so, these expellees could form the core of a Russian nationalist movement that poisons Russian politics, just as the *pied noire* poisoned French politics after the Algerian war.

¹⁸Western Europe itself is largely free of such problems; its borders are well-settled, and its populations are not significantly intermingled. The Polish-German boundary is the only Western frontier that conceivably might be disputed. However, before unification, the East and West German governments agreed to guarantee the current German-Polish border; if the united German government adheres to this agreement, this border dispute is settled. See Serge Schmemmann, "Two Germanys Adopt Unity Treaty and Guarantee Poland's Borders," *New York Times*, 22 June 1990, 1; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Two Germanys Vow to Accept Border With The Poles," *New York Times*, 18 July 1990, 1.

¹⁹NATO also should make no guarantees to states unwilling to allow peaceful secession by national minorities, since such refusal could spark a civil or international war that would entangle NATO. Noting the importance of this and other conditions (and recommending NATO security guarantees for Eastern states that accept them) is Hans Binnendijk, "NATO Can't Be Vague About Commitment to Eastern Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 November 1991, 6.

²⁰Advocating the creation of a trans-European collective security system are Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 114-161.

²¹On collective security and its shortcomings see Claude, 94-204. I am also grateful to Charles Glaser for sharing thoughts on this subject; his insights have influenced my own thinking.

²²NATO also might serve as a Europe-wide consultative forum for security issues. The embryo for such a system is already seen in the consultations between NATO and some East European states that began in 1990, and now continue in the new 25-nation NATO Consultative Council. See Alan Riding, "NATO Chiefs Seek To Define Its Role," *New York Times*, 7 November 1991, A7.

²³Should minority rights be defined to include the right to secession and national independence? On this question the Western powers face a difficult decision.

²⁴The argument for the first four conditions is straightforward: states that oppress their minorities may provoke nearby states to intervene to protect these minorities; states without settled borders will experience more border conflicts with their

neighbors; democratic states generally have relatively peaceful relations with other democratic states, and may have more peaceful relations with all states; states whose schools teach false self-glorifying history and whose public discourse is infected with nationalist propaganda are more prone to aggressive foreign policies, and, therefore, the protection of minorities, settlement of borders, promotion of democracy, and the dampening of false chauvinist history all promote peace. The logic of the fifth condition is that the Eastern states must transit from command to market economies sooner or later; they will magnify the economic dislocations produced by marketization if they procrastinate this decision; these dislocations will be even more severe if the Eastern states fail to adopt cooperative economic policies toward one other; the resulting economic cataclysm will raise the risk of fascism, dictatorship, and war; and, therefore, early decisions to adopt radical market reforms and cooperative economic policies toward their neighbors will reduce the overall risk of war.

The West might also ask the emerging Eastern states to take steps to control or prevent nuclear proliferation (perhaps to themselves, more certainly to others), and/or to limit defense spending. Such conditions, if accepted, would probably promote peace: proliferation is dangerous because the emerging Eastern states may lack the capacity to secure a nuclear arsenal from preemptive attack, terrorist seizure, accidental or unauthorized use, or (most ominously) sale on the world arms market; and Eastern states that militarize themselves may be more warlike. However, the West should be mindful of the infringement of sovereignty that such demands would represent, and the obligations that such requests would generate. Specifically, Western requests that Eastern states renounce nuclear weapons and limit their military forces may create a Western obligation to offer these states security guarantees. Moreover, these issues have not yet arisen, and may not arise, so Western persuasion may be unnecessary. No East European states have moved to acquire nuclear weapons, and the Soviet republics have voiced a desire to destroy Soviet nuclear weapons on their soil and accept American help with this project. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Hurdles, Big and Small, for Baker's Trip," *New York Times*, 14 December 1991, 6. Nor have any republics embarked on the building of a large military establishment.

²⁵The Western powers should not assume the Eastern states must be persuaded to adopt these policies; some may embrace them on their own. See, for example, Francis X. Clines, "Yeltsin Plan Wins a Quick Approval," *New York Times*, 2 November 1991, 7, reporting the Yeltsin government has announced a plan of rapid market reforms for Russia.

²⁶In speeches on 4 September 1991 and 13 December 1991, Secretary of State James Baker outlined a similar set of standards and indicated they would guide American policy. These standards followed the five standards noted above; Baker diverged only by omitting number 4 (the renunciation of nationalist propaganda) and referencing the need to adopt "responsible security policies," to include responsible policies toward nuclear weapons. "Baker's Remarks: Policy on Soviets," *New York Times*, 5 September 1991, A12; and "Baker Sees Opportunities and Risks as Soviet Republics Grope for Stability," *New York Times*, 13 December 1991, A24. The overall approach of the Bush administration has closely resembled the Option 5 approach.

²⁷To put the matter in Kuhnian terms: the East's dominant political paradigm has been shattered, leaving it for the moment highly receptive to Western paradigms. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The*

Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

²⁸This variant follows the "Grand Bargain" proposed by Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, except my variant would attach more conditions to Western aid than would the Grand Bargain proposal. See Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, "America's Stake in the Soviet Future," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 77-97. They suggest an aid package offer of \$15-20 billion per year for three years, with costs to be spread among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. They would condition aid on full market reforms and democratic reforms. Also recommending sizable economic aid to the former USSR is Anders Aslund and Richard Layard, "Help Russia Now," *New York Times*, 5 December 1991, A33, suggesting an aid package of \$17 billion for next year, including a once-only \$5 billion currency stabilization fund, \$6 billion in food aid, and \$6 billion to finance imports required to restart the economy.

²⁹The Western powers should also consider offering to help the Eastern powers devise specific policies to implement these five principles, and offering active assistance with peacemaking if conflicts nevertheless emerge. Specifically, Western governments and institutions should offer to share Western ideas and experience on the building of democratic institutions; the development of political and legal institutions that protect and empower minorities; the development of market economic institutions; and the best means to organize and then control nationalism in education. (On this last point, accounts of the West

European experience include Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 1 (January 1973): 77-100; and E.H. Dance, *History the Betrayer* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), 126-150.) Finally, if serious conflicts emerge despite the West's preventive efforts, the West should offer active mediation, just as the Nixon-Ford, Carter, and Bush administrations have actively mediated the Arab-Israeli conflict.

³⁰A recent survey of 115 twentieth century sanctions efforts found sanctions successful in 34 percent of the included cases. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985), 93.

³¹On Western efforts to design democracies that empower minorities see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

³²Sooner or later, one way or another, the Eastern states will join the Western economic world. The "little or no aid" variant of Option 5 merely suggests that the Western states not throw away their leverage by granting that membership unconditionally.

³³Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Presents Steps to Aid Transition by Soviets," *New York Times*, 13 December 1991, 1.

National Versus Supranational Political Loyalties in Western Europe

Mattei Dogan

National Center of Scientific Research,
Paris
University of California, Los Angeles

Each word of this title needs some semantic clarification. *National loyalty* should not be understood as an exclusive feeling, since it does not forbid other solidarities across national frontiers. *Supranational* should not be confounded with *international*, because it implies only a partial transfer of national sovereignty, not its abandon. *Europe* is a geographical entity, but from the political, economic, cultural, and military points of view, there are still two Europes. Do Czechoslovakia and Hungary belong to Western or Eastern Europe? We do not know yet where the eastern frontier of Western Europe will be settled, and when. For the moment, it is a moving frontier.

After four decades of cold war and military bipolarity, the current acceleration of history in Eastern Europe is generating a new era in international relations, with vital consequences Europe; the expression *post-Cold War environment* designates only a short, transitory period.

Versus does not suggest a dichotomy (one term excluding the other) but a combination of two identities, in a zero sum game. The principal catalyst of the West European consciousness during several decades, the specter of the Red Army, is disappearing at a moment when this consciousness is already in an advanced stage of maturation. A European consciousness, as a supranational loyalty, can develop itself only by nibbling gradually at national political loyalties. In the vernacular, national political loyalty is called nationalism. We have to adopt this term.

National consciousness is a primordial term which

has evolved over a long period of time. The available empirical evidence indicates that Western European countries are experiencing a decline of nationalist loyalties, but such an erosion is a long term process. The direction is predictable, but not the speed of the change.

Asynchronism of Nationalisms

Nations are located not only in space but also in time. Given the great variety of nationalisms, it is hard to encapsulate them in a single definition. An asynchronic view would help us to better understand the originality of Western Europe in the world today.

Nationalism as a doctrine was generated in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is a product of European thought. It occurred at a specific period in history in Europe and was later propagated throughout the entire world with the exception of the democratic "melting pots" (the United States, Australia, English-speaking Canada).

Most of the 170 independent countries are currently at the stage of national construction or consolidation, a phase in which Western European countries found themselves six or seven generations ago. Thus, it is not surprising to observe two contrasting trends today: a decline of nationalism in parts of Europe at the moment when nationalism is the dominant ideology elsewhere. This asynchronism could be explained by the fact that nations, like individuals, do not have the same age, either in terms of national maturation or socioeconomic development. At the moment when most countries in the Third World are discovering nationalistic values, these same values are fading in Western Europe. A look at a bibliography on nationalism is instructive: while an important body of literature is devoted to the Third World, the subject has been almost neglected for Western Europe since World War II.

The countries of Western Europe and those of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe coexist sociologically in a diachronic manner. As this century draws to a close, Western Europe is not only a geographical reality but also a temporal category, a phase in world history. Nasser and Ho Chi Minh rose up one century after Bismarck and Garibaldi.

In a temporal dimension, we can distinguish four different types of countries: first, there are those countries whose people are still loyal to their primordial ties and have not yet acquired a national feeling. They are in a prenationalistic phase. Most of them belong to the category of the poorest of the poor countries, the so-called Fourth World.

The second type consists of the modernizing countries, the richest among the poor countries. Almost all are relatively young nations that achieved their national independence only recently. These are the most nationalistic. It took a long time for Britain, France, and Spain to mature. Can the long experience of centuries be compressed into one generation?

The third type is clearly located in time and space: today Western Europe has the national maturity followed by a post-nationalistic *Weltanschauung*. The distance between these mature nations already immunized against nationalism and those nations still experiencing the nationalistic fever should be measured not in kilometers but in generations.

The fourth type includes a few countries where the roots of nationhood are not based on ancestral soil, and where nationalism has consequently taken a novel form, as in the United States.

The Eastern European countries are, in terms of nation-building, national boundaries, national integration, national maturity, and nationalistic feelings, far behind the Western European countries by one to several generations depending on the specific country. Poland, independent only since 1919, saw more than one-third of its territory slide in 1945, losing on the east side and gaining on the west. Romania achieved its national unification as late as 1919, losing part of it again in 1945. Yugoslavia is still a fragile multinational federation. In this part of Europe, nationalism does not have the same ingredients as in Western Europe. The exacerbated nationalism in most Eastern European countries can be explained by the fact that being born out of the collapse of three empires in 1919,

they became in 1945 what is commonly referred to as "satellites" of a giant neighbor (which they hated traditionally) and remained deprived of national independence until 1989-1990. These countries have enjoyed national independence for short periods of time, in some cases less than twenty years. The "dependence theory," much favored by specialists of Latin America, should be applied also to Eastern Europe.

Today in Western Europe, nationalism is no longer nourished by religion: the churches are no longer the network of nationalist movements, even if it remains true that Spanish culture centuries ago was shaped by the Catholic Church, even if the bloody battles of the Thirty Years' War resulted in a multitude of German political entities born out of religious strife. Only in a few regions of Western Europe are the primordial ties still strong, the Basque region being the most famous. By contrast, in Eastern Europe, churches have been historically the fortresses of national survival. This religious impregnation is still visible, and nationalism is still intimately related to religion.

Because of these religious roots and the geo-historical context, nationalism in Eastern Europe is of a different kind than that of Western Europe. What can be said about the erosion of nationalism in the West cannot be extrapolated to the East. This phenomenon of decline seems, for the moment, to be limited to Western Europe, admitting that from many points of view, Czechoslovakia and Hungary belong more to the West than to the East of Europe.

The American Exception in a European Perspective

A comprehensive comparison of national identities in Western Europe and in the United States will not be attempted here. Americanism as a creed is a specific form of patriotism resulting from a specific historical context.

Hans Kohn distinguishes between the nationalism corresponding to the "closed society," which "stresses the nation's autochthonous character, the common origins (race, blood) and rootedness in the ancestral soil," and the nationalism of the "open society," which reflects "a nation of fellow citizens irrespective of race or ethnic descent" and "finds its ideal image in a future that will build bridges over

the separations of the past. The open nationalism stresses the free self-determination of the individual; the closed nationalism, biological or historical determinism."¹ This dichotomy seems appropriate for stressing the profound difference between the nationalism on each side of the Atlantic.

The United States is a multi-ethnic society with a heterogeneous culture, lacking common traditional roots. It is a "new" nation which does not invoke "common ancestry," "common descent," "common blood," or an "attachment to the soil," a "mythical father," or an atavistic feeling. In Europe, most ethnic groups have a territorial base and take the form of ethnic linguistic, regional or separatist communities or movements. On the contrary, the American society is, for the white population, a "melting pot." Its ethnic diversity was continuously renewed. "Ethnic, cultural or historical criteria of the identity of descent can no longer be constitutive for the formation of a nation in an ethnically heterogeneous society."²

Today for four out of every ten Americans, at least one of their grandparents was born outside the United States.³ In Europe, such a mixing is significant for only a few countries which have experienced an important influx of immigrants during several generations. France, the first western country in modern history to have known a decline in birthrate, has received several waves of immigrants of European origin since the beginning of the century: Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Portuguese, Hungarians, Greeks, and others. Many national cataclysms around the world have left a layer of refugees in France. How many contemporary French citizens have at least one grandparent of foreign ancestry? In the absence of comprehensive research on this subject, only a hypothetical evaluation could be attempted here by taking into consideration the available statistics on naturalizations during the last century. Including the more recent immigrants of non-European origin, particularly those from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Vietnam, it could be hypothesized that one out of every five French citizens is to some degree of "foreign stock." This is a much lower proportion than that found in the US population. The French school system has facilitated the assimilation of millions of sons and daughters of these "foreigners." The number of immigrants has been less important for other European countries.

When asked to give the reasons for their national pride, Americans are the only ones among Western peoples to rank "freedom and liberty" highest, and not historical reasons. A high 71 percent of respondents mentioned freedom or liberty as the source of their greatest national pride.⁴

In most cases, exacerbated nationalism is directed against a neighboring nation. Most wars occur between contiguous countries about territorial disputes. The United States had only two contiguous neighbors. The northern neighbor has become, from many viewpoints, like a fifty-first American state. This border is permeable because Canadians, with the exception of those living in Quebec, are anglophones. For the southern neighbor, California is clearly not a kind of Alsace-Lorraine, even though Mexican-Spanish is slowly becoming the second official language in Southern California. Racist reactions and ethnic prejudices are not unknown, but they should not be taken as a nationalistic hostility toward a foreign country.

According to all available empirical evidence, American patriotism is not in a process of erosion. There are objective reasons for this. Among them, one could mention the size of the United States (as large as fourteen European countries put together), its sustained economic growth, its achievements in so many domains, and its successes in world affairs (the United States military has saved European democracies on three occasions: during World Wars I and II, and during the Cold War by opening the atomic umbrella).

Four Indicators of Nationalism

Erosion does not mean eradication. Nationalism obviously has not disappeared in Western Europe. What we try to observe is the declivity of a long process. Decline should not be confounded with decadence, since never in its history has Europe enjoyed more wealth, culture, freedom, and civic rights than today. All Western European countries today are pluralist democracies. Thus, only a rigid and superficial moralist could deduce that the decline of nationalism in Western Europe reflects a decline of moral standards.

Most of the data presented here takes a clearer significance if placed in historical perspective, but only in a few cases could we sail upstream.

Observing the recent trends in nationalism, four

indicators seem particularly significant: the feeling of national pride; the willingness or reluctance to fight for one's country in the event of war; the degree of confidence in one's national army; and, the trust or mistrust of neighboring countries. These indicators of nationalism are correlated, but they are not interchangeable. Some people may be proud of their country without being willing to fight for it in a war. Some identify themselves with the nation but are not necessarily very proud of it. Nevertheless, the variables constitute true configurations confirming that we are dealing with a profound trend.

Mitigated National Pride

Examining survey data on 22 countries, one finds that there is a weak relationship between the level of national pride and the economic or cultural achievements in the modern world. It would be wiser to abstain here from making comments about the most obvious discrepancies.

Nationalistic attitude necessarily implies a feeling of national pride. If one is not proud of his own country, he "logically" cannot be nationalistic, even if a profound frustration may engender exacerbated nationalistic beliefs among some groups. The level of national pride refers to the nation as such, to the nation-state. It does not measure the confidence in the capacities of the people, but in practice this distinction is not always clear.

National pride has been investigated several times since 1970⁵ and by the European Value Systems Study Group in 1981 and 1982. The convergence of the results of these surveys shows we are dealing with a consistent phenomenon.

For most countries, national pride is mitigated. The persons interviewed had the option of choosing among four replies: "very proud," "rather proud," "not so proud," or "not proud at all." One out of every five Europeans admitted that he or she was "not so proud" or "not proud at all." Should we distinguish "very proud" and "rather proud," assuming that one reply expressed a jingoistic attitude and the other edulcorated nationalism? Some cross tabulations validate such an interpretation.

There is a strong relationship between national pride and the position on the left-right dimension. Among the most leftist oriented Europeans, 29 percent were very proud of their nationality in 1981;

among the most rightist oriented, 60 percent.⁶

National pride is not incompatible with the perception that one's country is stagnating. The Greeks, for instance, are very proud of their country (70 percent "very proud," and 20 percent "rather proud"), but at the same time, 45 percent admitted in 1987 that their country was following a downward trend, and only 34 percent perceived their country as still prosperous. The Greeks' high national pride should be interpreted from the recent historical perspective. Contrary to a certain imagery, Greece is a young nation-state, having achieved its national independence only in 1830, after four centuries of Turkish occupation.

The level of national pride does not depend on the size of the country, since Iceland, Ireland, and Greece show the highest national pride, but within the countries, it varies according to the educational level of the individuals. For instance, in Norway, "in all age groups with high education a high national pride is infrequent."⁷

Germany, Italy, Japan, and Belgium are the countries in which we found the lowest levels of national pride in 1981: only 35 percent of the Germans, 28 percent of Italians, 25 percent of Belgians, and 22 percent of the Japanese were "very proud." Germany could be considered here as a clinical case. It seems that the syndrome of defeat had lasting effects on the population. "Rather than being strongest immediately after the end of the war, the effect seems to take hold over a lengthy period of time."⁸ The cultural debates that took place in Germany during the four decades preceding the reunification certainly contributed to the diffusion of such mitigated feelings. It is highly probable that the national pride of Germans has risen since the fall of the Berlin Wall and national reunification in 1990. As for Belgium, the reason for such a low level of national pride could be found in the deep division between the Flemish and the Walloons.

In a few countries, some people experience a kind of "negative identification." Pertinent questions permit detection of such a feeling: "In which country would you have wished to be born?" "In which country would you like to live?" The majority of Hungarians did not choose Hungary (although this was before the fall of the "Iron Curtain"). The Hungarians felt that they belonged to a "disadvantaged country," a frustration which can only weaken national identification.⁹

Defeatism

Another indication of the decline of nationalism is the reluctance shown by an important part of the population to fight for one's country. In the 1981 European survey on values, it was asked: "Are you willing to fight for your country?" The question did not specify under which circumstances or against whom. But in the political climate of that time, there was no doubt in the minds of the interviewed persons that the Eastern Empire was the implied enemy. For all nine European countries, an average of 43 percent said they were willing to fight, and 40 percent said they were not (17 percent did not reply or gave unclear responses). This average covers important differences.

Who was willing to fight, and who were the defeatists? For the entire European sample, the willingness to fight was more frequent among farmers than among industrial workers, among religious people than agnostics, on the right rather than the left, among those who gave more importance to freedom than equality, and among owners rather than tenants.

Table 1: Defeatism			
"Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"			
	Yes (%)	No (%)	? (%)
Great Britain	61	29	10
France	43	46	11
Germany	35	41	23
Italy	31	54	15
Spain	54	28	18
Belgium	27	49	23
Netherlands	46	35	19
Denmark	59	23	19
Sweden	79	11	10
Norway	83	10	7
Finland	69	24	7
Ireland	50	31	19
USA	66	24	10
Canada	57	32	10
Australia	71	22	7
Japan	19	46	35

Source: European Value Systems Study Group, 1980 and 1982.

In the political field, "these people who would fight for their country allow a higher priority to the goal of maintaining order in the nation, they have more confidence in the armed forces, the police, the parliament, the institutions in general, they favor more free enterprise and have a greater respect for authority."¹⁰

There are significant differences between the countries. In Germany only 35 percent of the respondents showed themselves willing to fight; 31 percent in Italy; 27 percent in Belgium; and 19 percent in Japan. The proportion varied from 27 percent in Belgium to 83 percent in Norway (see Table 1). The number of undecided persons was particularly high in Germany (23 percent), Belgium (23 percent), and Japan (35 percent). For Germans, a war appeared to be fratricide, pitting East against West. The slogan *Mehr rot als tot* reflected this situation.

The relation between defeatism and absence of national pride or a mitigated pride was highly significant. Among the French willing to fight for their country, 49 percent were "proud" as opposed to 18 percent who were "not proud;" in Spain, 57 percent to 31 percent; in Italy, 31 percent to 19 percent; in Germany, 43 percent to 22 percent; and in England, 66 percent to 39 percent.¹¹

In a Eurobarometer survey conducted in November 1989, interviewees were asked to choose one of twelve "great causes" worth fighting for. "Defense of the country" was ranked seventh, following "human rights," "peace," "protection of nature," "fight against poverty," "freedom of the individual," and "fight against racism." "Defense of the country," nevertheless, ranked higher than "defense of religious faith." Maybe there is a logic in this: defense of the country is a collective endeavor, whereas religious faith is an individual issue.

In France and Italy, among those who did not believe in "life after death," the proportion of defeatists was higher than among believers (France, 51 percent to 38 percent; Italy, 61 percent to 48 percent). For other countries, the difference is less significant.

No doubt, in the event of a real war, the behavior may be very different from the verbal reactions in the survey. But verbal behavior is a sociological fact. It is important to stress here that the opinions expressed on a variety of issues are coherent and

constitute meaningful psychological configurations.

If such a question had been asked in 1938 or 1939 in France, Britain, Germany, or Italy (supposing for a second the existence of freedom of survey research in a totalitarian regime) what proportion of people would have manifested a willingness to fight? We have no data to attempt any evaluation of the number of potential defeatists or pacifists.

These defeatist feelings should be interpreted in light of a military history that "apologetic historians" prefer not to remember: Parents and grandparents of the present German generations have lost the war twice; Italy began World War II in one camp and ended in the adverse camp; France paid for victory in World War I by losing so much blood that its demographic pyramid remained distorted for half a century, and in World War II after losing the battle in June 1940, was occupied for four years; the military forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway succumbed in 1940; the Greek army was not able to maintain its country's independence, not even in the islands; Polish soldiers were crushed in 1939; the Romanian army was tossed between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army; the Spanish army was used not against foreign enemies but against half of the Spanish people in 1936-38; the Portuguese army was humiliated one generation later in colonial wars. The most notorious European case is Czechoslovakia, which "capitulated" three times without trying or having the possibility to fight: in 1937, 1948, and 1968. But under similar circumstances, small Finland chose to fight and did so successfully. Only the British army, protected by the channel, has been fully victorious, but war accelerated her economic decline. The truth is that without the massive help of the American army, Europe would not have been liberated from totalitarianism (brown or red) in spite of the abnegation and heroism of millions of European soldiers and fighting resistant. In order to try to explain today's defeatist temptations, it is necessary to recall these important historical facts.

Today, Japan seems to be the most defeatist among the advanced democracies. Surveys conducted in 1980 and 1981 indicated that almost half of the Japanese would likely desert (21 percent) or surrender to their enemy without a fight (23 percent) if their territory were invaded. Only 31 percent of

the Japanese sample declared themselves to be willing to fight.¹² The proportion was even smaller for cases when the question specified "at risk to one's life."

A survey done simultaneously in Japan and the United States in 1983 showed a deep contrast between the two. If their country were transgressed, only 21 percent of the Japanese would have been willing to fight.¹³ Asked in March 1981 to choose "one thing they would most like to protect," only eight percent of Japanese adults chose "country, our land," to 44 percent who chose "freedom and peace" or 45 percent "myself, family, property."¹⁴

The psychological aspect should not be neglected. The technology of contemporary weapons has important psychological consequences for fighting capabilities. For one out of every four American soldiers evacuated from the front during World War II, the cause was psychological trauma. During the first three days of the Yom Kippur War, 60 percent of Israeli soldiers evacuated had psychological problems, not physical injuries. The French army studied "stress on fighting soldiers."¹⁵ Psychiatrists were present in the American army fighting against Iraq in 1991.

Low Level of Confidence in the Army

Defeatism of such a great number of citizens could be explained in part by the absence of confidence in the army and by the country's real capacity to resist and win in the event of war. What is involved here is not necessarily the competence of the military staff, but rather an evaluation of the military potential of the country.

The specter of the Red Army played an important role in lowering the level of confidence in Western European armies. For four decades, European peoples and their leaders lived with this fear. Already by December 1945 (seven months after the Armistice) half of French citizens believed that "a new world war would blow up in the following years."¹⁶ This fear oscillated between 35 percent and 45 percent during the Cold War in most countries. In the presence of such danger, European military officers and politicians realized that "their" armies had become "too small." The old rivalries within Europe entered into "old history." Each European country ceased to be militarily independent, and this loss of independence was soon

Table 2: Confidence in the Army (%)					
	Great deal	A lot	Not very much	Not at all	?
Great Britain	34	44	18	2	1
France	13	38	22	22	4
Germany	10	42	38	10	-
Italy	17	38	28	17	-
Spain	24	38	25	11	2
Belgium	7	33	34	19	6
Netherlands	6	35	43	14	2
Denmark	9	30	43	16	1
Sweden	8	50	29	5	1
Norway	16	50	29	2	1
Finland	9	59	29	2	1
Ireland	33	43	21	3	1
USA	37	42	17	3	1
Canada	17	40	32	7	3
Australia	22	44	29	4	1
Japan	6	28	50	14	3
Mexico	21	28	35	16	-

Source: European Value Systems Study Group, 1981 and 1982.

perceived by the masses.¹⁷

Western Europe consists of five large countries and twelve small countries (including Hungary and Czechoslovakia). The size of the country is not a significant parameter in determining citizens' degree of confidence in the army. As indicated in Table 2, in 1981, 57 percent of the Dutch, 59 percent of the Danish, and 53 percent of Belgians had no confidence in their army; but the larger countries, which spent a significant part of their national budgets on their armies for a long period of time did not show themselves much more confident: 44 percent of the French, 48 percent of the Germans, 45 percent of Italians, and 36 percent of Spaniards had no confidence in their armies. Only the British (who no doubt have a vivid collective memory of the winter of 1940) showed themselves, four decades later, confident of their army and their insularity. Nevertheless, the Finns, in the shadow of the Colossus, manifested a strong confidence (68 percent) in their small army. From a comparative point of view, we may notice that 64 percent of the Japanese had no confidence. Among all post-industrialist countries, Japan appears to be the most anti-militaristic.

The military career has lost most of its traditional prestige. A reliable symptom in France is the fact that the graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, an old selective military school, no longer choose to become military officers as they did before 1940; they opt for civilian positions in the state apparatus, except a few who belong to hereditary military families.

There is a strong relationship between confidence in the army and religious beliefs (see Table 3). A striking contrast is observed in all countries: most agnostics do not have confidence in the army (87 percent in Germany, 77 percent in Spain and Ireland, 71 percent in France); the majority of religious persons do have confidence in the army.

Simultaneous with the decline of confidence in the national army grew the idea of a multinational army. One of the most important and passionate debates took place in the French parliament in 1954 on the proposal of a "European army." At that time, the majority of the French were not ready to accept "the rearmament of the hereditary enemy." The project was rejected by 319 against 264 deputies, reflecting public opinion: one-third for, one-third against, one-third hesitating.¹⁸ One generation later in December 1990, 66 percent of French adults showed themselves favorable to a "common European defense." In the entire European community, seven out of ten adults favored it.¹⁹ The idea required one-third of a century to mature!

Low confidence in the army goes hand in hand with dislike of military draft. Only one-third of French adults severely condemned an attempt to escape the draft by cheating (42 percent of practicing Catholics, 27 percent of agnostics). Only one out of every five youths directly concerned (between 18 and 24 years) saw a serious moral problem with such behavior.²⁰ The same phenomenon has been observed in other European countries, particularly in Italy and the Netherlands. But it is in Germany that this "hate of militarism" is the most pronounced, as periodically illustrated by mass demonstrations of young people in the largest cities. Already in 1955, only 40 percent of Germans were in favor of the reconstitution of a new Germany army.²¹

Having lost the war, Germany and Japan have in one generation passed from extreme militarism to strong anti-militarism. The irony of history is that these two countries have succeeded in obtaining by

Table 3: Religion and Confidence in the Army								
	Religious		Not Religious		Atheist		All	
Confidence in the Army	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)
Great Britain	82	17	79	20	69	31	79	19
France	64	32	42	54	26	71	51	43
Germany	60	39	41	59	13	87	52	48
Italy	60	40	31	69	22	78	55	45
Spain	71	27	47	52	23	77	62	37
Netherlands	49	49	27	71	24	72	42	56
Belgium	42	53	38	59	25	60	41	54
Ireland	78	28	69	31	27	77	74	24
USA	81	19	73	27	59	41	76	20
Japan	37	56	35	62	27	70	35	62

Source: European Value Systems Study Group, 1981 and 1982.

technological superiority and economic expansion what they failed to achieve by military aggression: to become the second and third economic powers in the world.

One does not need to be a prophet to foresee that after tomorrow, either there will be a professional European army, based on some kind of proportionality, or that European integration will become an aborted ideal.

Thus, one of the traditional components of nationalism, the capacity of military defense of individual countries, seems today to be fading.

Mutual Confidence among Western European Nations

Another indication of the decline of nationalism is the trust that European nations show towards their neighbors as revealed by Eurobarometer surveys sponsored by the Commission of the European Communities and carried out in 1970, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1986, and 1990. During these 20 years, the results of the surveys have varied but have not reversed the basic findings. We will concentrate our analysis on the survey conducted in October 1980, the most detailed of these six surveys.

Questions asked did not make any distinction between trust of people as individuals, trust of the country as a collective body, and trust of rulers in power at the moment of the survey. Only by such distinctions could clear interpretations be possible. The available data carries various stereotypes. In the replies of some French about Italians, the stereotype

was "the knife in the back," driven 40 years earlier by Fascist rulers. The stereotype of the US is "capitalism," "imperialism." It does not refer to Americans as individuals. It is well known that American and European businessmen trust Japanese and Chinese businessmen, even if they do not have any particular reason to trust Japan and China as nations. In practice, it is difficult to obtain "aseptic" data.

The majority of Europeans polled in 1980 had confidence in nine of the 13 European countries considered. Only four countries, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, were perceived as not trustworthy by the majority of Europeans belonging to the other nine countries.

After several generations of nationalistic antagonism between France and Germany, three wars, and a tenacious collective memory full of prejudices, an important turning point has taken place in European history: today the majority of Germans have confidence in the French, and vice versa. In surveys conducted in France and Germany in May 1983 and October 1988, in response to the question, "Among the following countries, which are the two that you consider as friends of your country?" France was at the top of the list in German samples, and Germany in French samples.²²

The majority of the French show confidence in the English, but the feeling is not reciprocated (there is, perhaps, residual resentment due to the Gaullist foreign policy which tended to keep Britain out of the Common Market).

A higher number of British trust Germans than

trust French: 60 percent to 34 percent. Similarly, the French tend to rank their former enemy higher than their former ally, 60 percent to 53 percent. This is not too difficult to understand: world wars belong to history, European unification represents the future.

The majority of Italians have confidence in the French and Germans, but a smaller proportion of the French and German trust Italians. There is a strong affinity between Belgians and Dutch. Curiously enough, the majority of the Irish trust Britain, and vice versa.

A significant proportion of Greeks do not have confidence in Americans (53 percent), Germans (45 percent), Italians (45 percent), or British (42 percent). They are paid in return: one-third of the European public does not trust Greeks (with 27 percent not responding). Not only do many Europeans not trust Greeks, but even one out of every four Greeks does not trust his own fellow citizens. The country which inspires the most confidence for Greeks is France (58 percent), without doubt for historical reasons dating from the nineteenth century.

The most interesting case is Italy. In 1980, one out of every two Europeans had no confidence in Italians, especially Germans (64 percent). At the same time, Italians did not trust their Mediterranean neighbors, in particular Greeks (45 percent) (no doubt due to residual memory of the Italian-Greek War of 1941) but also Spaniards (45 percent) and Portuguese (42 percent).

Should we see the persistence of xenophobic tendencies in Italy in this data? Or should we take into consideration a feature of Italian political culture, especially in Mezzogiorno, which results from a millenarian history: the mistrust of others, even compatriots, except for one's family. This low level of mutual trust has been noticed by a host of Italian writers and was confirmed in the 1950s by a survey on prejudices. Edward Banfield labelled this "amoral familism." A survey in twelve European countries in 1986 showed that Italy was the country which mistrust of compatriots was highest (35 percent), as opposed to 25 percent in Greece, 17 percent in Portugal, 16 percent in Spain, 17 percent in France, 14 percent in Ireland and Belgium, and 11 percent in Britain and the Netherlands. Such a mistrust is a cultural feature that should not be confused with nationalism and xenophobia, because it refers to compatriots. The geographical

distribution of this phenomenon, much more common in southern Italy than in the center or the north, confirms such an interpretation.²³

The absence of trust in Italians by many Europeans dates back to World War II, when the Italian army did not show a great enthusiasm to fight. This has been misinterpreted, because in the minds of many Italian soldiers, a great combative spirit would have signified support for the Fascist regime.

It is difficult to rank countries according to the degree of confidence they enjoy in the minds of their neighbors, because too many failed to express any opinion about the smaller countries; these countries seemed to ignore each other and to gravitate towards the largest ones. For instance, 54 percent of the Irish did not have any opinion about the Greeks; and reciprocally, 42 percent of Greeks did not know what to think about Irish people. A large proportion of the Irish did not express any opinion about other smaller European countries; 48 percent had "no opinion" about Belgians; 46 percent about Danes; 40 percent about the Dutch; 53 percent about Luxembourgers, but only seven percent had no clear opinion about the British. Similarly, many Greeks responded by "no opinion" about the other smaller countries: Belgians (37 percent), Danes (36 percent), and Dutch (33 percent). One-third of Belgians did not know if the Portuguese or Greeks are trustworthy. One-third of the French and 44 percent of Italians had the same hesitation about the Irish. It seems that some "small peripheral" countries like Ireland, Portugal, and Greece are not really integrated into the European consciousness. Other "small" countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, are among the most trusted because they are not perceived as a possible threat.

Briefly stated, a minority of Western Europeans do not trust other Western Europeans, but the majority showed trust unencumbered by nationalism.

Mutual confidence among peoples in Western Europe contrasts with the absence of such confidence in Eastern Europe. In a survey conducted in October 1990, the majority of Poles declared they "do not trust very much" or "not at all" Russians (69 percent), Ukrainians (75 percent), Byelarusians (63 percent), Romanians (64 percent), Bulgarians (56 percent), and Czechs (61 percent). Only two percent of Poles "have a lot of trust" in Russians, Ukrainians, or Byelarusians. Americans, British, French,

Italians, and Swiss are the only ones to be "trusted a lot" by at least 10 percent of the Poles. The collective memory is still alive 45 years after the end of the war: 70 percent of Poles mistrust Germans.²⁴ We could conclude that the majority of Poles feel they live in a hostile environment. Such a feeling can only nourish a strong nationalism.

Czechoslovakians also believe themselves to be in a hostile environment. The majority of Czechs and Slovaks do not trust Russians (62 percent), Poles (77 percent), Romanians (77 percent), Hungarians (67 percent), or Bulgarians (64 percent), but only 44 percent of them do not trust Germans. The most curious finding is that a significant minority of Czechs do not trust the Slovaks.²⁵

The figures about mutual confidence between Western European countries display their full meaning when compared to those concerning Eastern Europe.

European Consciousness

As we have seen, many Europeans express a limited national pride, are unwilling to fight for their country, are not fully confident in their country's army, but in exchange, trust their neighbors. These four indicators are related to multiple parameters, but have a combined cumulative effect which counteracts the secular trend of nationalism. How does one explain such a decline? Nationalism is declining in Western Europe because a supranational consciousness is rising by a progressive interaction at several levels: economic, military, social, cultural, political.

The consequences of the interpenetration of European economies are obvious and decisive. Each country needs to trade with other countries and, first of all, with their immediate neighbors. For most countries, about one-half of the GNP is based on foreign trade, mostly within Europe. Western European economies penetrate each other. They are undoubtedly in competition but also show reciprocal dependency. Considering current technological performance, no European country (not even Germany, France, or Great Britain) has a viable economic space. This interdependency engenders a supranational market, detrimental to the old-fashioned economic isolationism or protectionism.

Secondly, on a military level, four decades of Cold

War during the age of missiles under the protection of the American atomic umbrella have convinced many Europeans that no nation of this "Asian peninsula" could resist an attack from the Eastern Giant, who, in turn, may have had the same reaction to the Atlantic Alliance. This conviction has been solemnly ratified during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Paris on 20 November 1990, a date which will be remembered by tomorrow's historians.

The nation-state, having been for several decades too weak to protect its citizens against the "Eastern superpower," has lost part of its military function. It is significant that the military establishments in Western European countries are no longer nationalistic. No European democracy could claim today to be militarily independent: nationalism has lost its military foundation.

In parallel, the frontiers between the old states of Western Europe have received, so to speak, the seal of perpetuity: a war between these countries is inconceivable today, except in Northern Ireland. Consequently, nationalism in Europe can no longer nourish itself from territorial revindications.

The increasing complexity of social stratification is another important aspect of this trend toward a European consciousness. Each European country is characterized by considerable internal diversity, from many points of view. There is a striking cross-national similarity between these intra-national diversities. There are more similarities between two bourgeois, one French and the other British, than between a British middle-class person and a British manual worker, or between a French lawyer and a French farmer. There are more social differences within each country than between the countries at all levels.²⁶

On the cultural level, European consciousness has progressed enormously during the last decades. A series of surveys gives an idea of the rapid internationalization of these national cultures. Today people, ideas, and goods circulate freely in the European community. More Europeans have crossed the frontiers within Europe during the last four decades than during the previous eight centuries. Every summer millions of people migrate from northern lands to southern seas. Television ignores national barriers; Eurotelevision is already a reality. In spite of linguistic diversity, cultures become less and less national and more and more

eclectic among young people more than among their elders. Of course, the mixing of cultures does not penetrate equally everywhere. Spain and Italy each year receive numbers of tourists higher than their numbers of adult inhabitants. The majority of Dutch teenagers are familiar with two or three foreign languages.

It is possible to rank the countries according to the level of their "pro-European feelings." Eurobarometer has repeatedly measured the proportion of people favoring European integration. In three kinds of countries, the levels of favorable attitudes were the highest from 1973 to 1990. First, several small countries whose economic performance depends largely on foreign trade: the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Second, countries for which the European Community was a protecting institution: the German Federal Republic before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Greece also felt the need for European protection. Third, countries which believe they could resolve national problems more efficiently by delegating some power to the European superstructure. Many Italians believe that the legitimacy of their political systems could be improved if some decisions were made in Brussels instead of being debated in Rome. Belgians also see the European Community as a source of legitimacy for their "tribal system." One of the ramparts against European integration subtly fell in France: the Conseil d'Etat has decided that in case of conflict between a French regulation and a European regulation accepted by France, the second prevails. Slowly but surely the European parliament increases its domain of intervention. The Eurobarometers periodically indicate in which domains the population is willing to accept common regulations and the "harmonization" of laws.

In most countries, the nationalist extreme right parties represent a negligible fraction of the electorate. France and Austria are the only European countries where nationalistic extremists have received more than 10 percent of the vote in the 1980s, and this can be explained primarily as hostility toward non-European immigration and not as hostility against other European countries. The fate of extreme right parties is a consequence of the decline of nationalism. Upon receiving the Nobel Prize, Willy Brandt stated: "I repeat here what I said in Germany: a good German cannot be nationalist." Even the political vocabulary has changed. Very

few politicians use a xenophobic or jingoistic vocabulary today. In Italy, the word *patria* has been replaced in the political forum by the word "people," and by even more neutral words, such as "territory" or "country." The Italian politician who emphatically pronounces the word *nazione* in an electoral meeting places himself at the extreme right with the exception of the President of the Republic during official ceremonies. In the Italian electoral arena, the word "nation" has become a partisan label.

Survey data mirror this reality. One could easily agree with R. Inglehart: "The feeling that the nation-state incarnated a supreme value, as the haven and the sole defense of a unique way of life, has largely vanished in contemporary Western Europe."²⁷

The European Tower of Babel

One of the main difficulties in creating a European community is the multiplicity of languages. For a long time, the most efficient vector of popular nationalism in Europe has been the national language.

To the five major languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish), one should add seven other "state languages": Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, Portuguese, and Greek, without counting the regional languages or dialects, like Catalan, Basque, or Welsh. In the Western European Tower of Babel resound 12 tongues. Eastern Europe is the historical arena of another cacophony: Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Czech, Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian. In total, Europe has 24 state languages, of which 19 are practically unknown outside of their community. A Greek and a Swede, or a Finn and a Portuguese, or a Dutch and an Italian can communicate with each other only in a third language, in most cases English or French. Bilingualism in a single country is possible, but only on a territorial basis, as in Switzerland, Belgium, or Canada.

A survey conducted in the 12 European Community countries just after German unification about things all Germans have in common showed that language is considered most significant before historical collective memory, relatives, literature, way of life, even sense of national identity. Germans

themselves ranked their mother language highest (91 percent). Similar surveys about other countries would give analogous results. What do people from Veneto and from Calabria have in common first of all? The Italian language.

Compromises are possible in many domains, but not on linguistic matters. A language survives or dies out; it cannot become half-French, half-Flemish: we see this in Belgium. Languages will continue to carry national identities. The linguistic barriers will limit the migrations within Europe so that during the next generations, as in the past, most Europeans will live and die in the country in which they are born. This continent will probably never become a "melting pot." Most people will be hyphenated Europeans: French-European, English-European, German-European, and so on. But the persistence of several languages will not impede, all other factors playing their roles, a slow but continuous decline of nationalism.

A future scenario would be the partial elimination in some professions, by a slow process over many decades, of the minor European languages, and in a second secular trend, the spread of a new vulgar Latin, the "broken English" (which already exists in the tourist industry and in international meetings among scientists) in competition with an elitist literary English.

Decline of Nationalism, Rise of Individualism

Traditional values are being replaced by new values, with one dominating all others: individualism. In our society of anonymous crowds,

Table 4: Individualism Versus Nationality and Class				
"In your opinion, what is an individual's most important characteristic: his nationality, his social class, or his own personality?"				
France	Practicing Catholics (%)	Not practicing (%)	Agnostics (%)	All (%)
Nationality	6	4	1	4
Social Class	7	10	8	8
Personality	83	78	84	81
Other	4	5	6	5
?	1	3	1	2

Source: Survey CNRS-IFOP, National Sample 3200, July 1968 (unpublished results).

an increasing number of people place the individual at the summit of the values hierarchy, above the masses, the classes, the churches, and the nations. Only the nuclear family escapes this hierarchical ranking.

Asked to indicate the "most important characteristic of an individual," a strong majority of French responded "one's personality" and very few, "nationality" or "social class" of the individual (see Table 4). "Upon what does the betterment of your personal situation depend?" was asked of the French public in July 1968. "Upon my personal effort first of all," was the response given by 49 percent; "Upon the conquests of my social class," responded 23 percent; and "Upon the economic progress of my entire country," responded 25 percent.

"In what kind of society are we living?" was asked of the English people in 1987. "In a society in which everyone is for himself," replied 88 percent of the British.

The available data on public opinion suggests that individuals tend to view their personal development as an opportunity not to be achieved necessarily within the national community, but in spite of it. As a result, there is a strong incentive to raise individual interests above those of their group, with consequent downgrading of traditional group values such as patriotism.

Individualism is gnawing away at nationalism and social solidarity, but it should not be confounded with egoism. Individualism is generated by the pluralistic character of advanced democracies and by the conflicts between the multiple roles played by the citizens in the complex post-industrial societies. The dichotomy of nationalism individualism should be interpreted in the framework of a general decline of all ideologies, including religion. In recent decades, nationalism and religion went down the road together, whereas during another epoch, they allied to maintain their dominant positions in the system of values. Today individualism challenges these traditional values.

The Intergenerational Dynamic of the Decline of Nationalism

The decline of nationalism will almost inevitably continue because it is inscribed in the demographic pyramid. In effect, surveys conducted in almost all European countries show that nationalistic

tendencies are less common among the upcoming generation than in the aging generation. Mountains of statistics attest to the importance of this dynamic.

The best way to observe the potential trend according to generations is to distribute the individuals in the national samples by cohorts of five years. In order to obtain a sufficient number of individuals for each cohort, two Eurobarometer surveys have been combined (April 1982 and April 1983). The first cohort is composed of those born before 1915, the second of those between 1916 and 1920 and so on; the last cohort groups those born between 1954 and 1958.²⁸ An index has been calculated showing a significant relationship between cohorts and the level of national pride in 1982-83. The proportion of "proud" people is higher among older cohorts, particularly in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

In the six countries for which comparison is possible, the feeling of national pride has diminished between 1970 and 1982. The index has lost 10 percent of its value.²⁹

In a special survey devoted to young people between 15 and 24 years old in ten European countries, the young showed themselves less frequently "very proud" of their nationality in 1988 than their elders (26 percent to 40 percent). An

almost identical survey was carried out in five countries in 1970. It is possible to compare, during the 12 year interval, the opinion of the same cohort (born in 1946-50) when they were 21 to 24 years old in 1970, and in 1982, at the ages of 33 to 36.

Three findings should retain our attention. First, the feeling of national pride was higher among old people than among young people at both moments. Second, the level of national pride declined for all age groups between 1970 and 1982. The shapes of the curves according to age varies slightly from country to country, between the two dates; the strongest decline occurred in Belgium and the weakest in Germany (for this country, the level of pride was already very low in 1970). Third, in Germany, the generation born in 1931-35 manifested a slightly higher national pride than the generations born before or after.³⁰

The generational gaps are confirmed by a new survey conducted in April 1983. The proportion of people in ten European countries who were "very proud" of their country was much weaker among the young than among the old: 29 percent among youths aged 15-24; 35 percent among those 25-34 years; 39 percent among those 45-54 years; 52 percent among those 55-64 years; and 54 percent among those 65 years or more.³¹

Table 5: Causes Worth Doing Something About (%)										
	France	Great Britain	Germany	Italy	Belgium	Netherlands	Denmark	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg
My country's defense	19	24	15	17	11	7	16	13	37	21
My religious faith	4	12	7	15	7	11	4	22	18	10
Freedom of the individual	57	36	44	41	39	34	28	32	71	51
Human rights	53	48	48	50	49	59	52	44	68	64
Struggle against poverty	53	26	34	31	38	31	36	36	57	56
World peace	75	51	63	72	66	64	66	45	83	84
Protection of the environment	35	30	48	28	38	49	39	25	48	53
Sexual equality	19	15	27	20	23	22	31	16	50	30
Revolutionary movement	7	3	5	5	4	2	5	2	17	3

Source: *Eurobarometer*, April 1982, Youth aged 18 to 24 years. The same questions were asked of entire adult populations in July 1989 (*Eurobarometer, Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia*, November 1989). A comparison between the results of the two surveys shows significant differences of attitude between the very young and the mature population.

"For which of the following causes would you be willing to sacrifice or take risks?" was asked of youth aged 18 to 24 years in a Eurobarometer survey in ten European countries in 1982. "For my religion" garnered seven percent in Germany and Belgium and four percent in France and Denmark (only in Ireland does the proportion rise in a significant manner to 22 percent). "For the defense of my country" was indicated in numbers that would make military generals cry. "World peace," "against poverty," and "sexual equality" were much more often mentioned, particularly "freedom of the individual" and "human rights." (Table 5)

As basic values are forged by socialization processes early in life, what teenagers and very young adults believe today is a good indication of potential beliefs tomorrow. In response to a question asked about the importance of *patrie* (mother country) in 1977 in France, only 28 percent of the entire sample declared that it was less important today than in the past, and 48 percent that it remained equally important. But among young people under 25 years, about one-half said that they attached less importance to the idea of *patrie*. In the same survey, two-thirds of French adults attached great importance to nation symbols (the Marseillaise, 14 July, the national flag), but a full half of young adults under 25 felt that such an attachment was "old-fashioned."³²

Did military service have more positive or more negative consequences in generating patriotic feelings among youth? For 61 percent of those under 25, military service had a negative influence; 46 percent for people between 25 and 34 years; 32 percent between 35 and 49; 37 percent between 50 and 64; 24 percent over 65 years.³³

In the event of invasion of French territory by a foreign army, only seven percent of youths between 18-25 years would agree to "risk their lives" under any circumstances, whatever the cause of war; 56 percent would do so only if they were certain that their country "defended a just cause." Patriotism is no longer unconditional, unrelated to ideological or moral principles; many people no longer believe that what is good for the country is *a priori* moral and just.³⁴

A similar question, "Suppose France is in danger of foreign invasion, what would be your reaction?" was asked by SOFRES in June 1987 of a national sample. The proportion of French people who stated

that they "could not sacrifice their life for their country increased progressively by generations: from 25 percent among those older than 65 years, to 44 percent among those aged 18-24 years.

Two-thirds of young people (18-25 years) refused to admit that France gave birth to more great men than any other European country. Their nationalism is no longer chauvinistic.³⁵

One-half of French youth between 18 and 25 years admitted in 1977 that they felt closer to a foreigner of his or her social class than to a French person from a different class, and more than half (58 percent) felt themselves closer to a foreigner of their own age than to French people of their parents' age. Clearly, there is generational and class solidarity across nations.³⁶

In Germany, to a question asked by Emnid in 1987 about the importance of the flag as a national symbol, the proportion of those responding "it is unnecessary" varied strongly according to age: 15 percent among those aged 65 or more; 19 percent of those 50-54 years; 25 percent for those 30-39 years; 49 percent for those 20-29 years; and 46 percent for those under 19 years. This referred to the West German flag.³⁷ It is probable that the attitude toward the flag as a symbol of united Germany is very different.

The public is aware of this difference between generations. In Britain, the majority of people under the age of 34 declared in March 1988 that they were less patriotic than their elders.³⁸ Similar perceptions have been found in other European countries.

Even in Ireland, the most traditionalist country in Europe, the generational dynamics are at work: the proportion of those who have no confidence in the army, or not very much, is significantly higher among younger people than among older people (40 percent for the cohort between 18-24 years, to 11 percent for those over 65 years). The youngest are less frequently than the older people proud of being Irish.³⁹

The decline of nationalism is more visible in the most educated strata. There is no exception to this tendency among European countries. It was the opposite at the apogee of nationalism around 1848, when it was the intellectual elite who carried the patriotic torch in Europe. The fact that citizens with more education tend to be less nationalistic in the old sense of the word has important potential consequences. As Richard Rose comments:

"Governments spending large sums of money to raise the level of education of their citizens may find that their actions have the unintended consequence of reducing the national pride of younger citizens as they become better educated."⁴⁰

In fact, the youngest and oldest parts of the population are not socially identical. The first is much better educated and much less attached to religious values. This phenomenon is visible in all countries, without exception.

There is a strong relationship between religious and nationalistic beliefs: the youngest less attached to religious values rank also relatively low on the scale of nationalistic attitudes.

One of the most significant aspects of this cross-national comparison is that we observe the same basic trends everywhere, all countries moving in the same direction, even if the basic speed of change differs here and there. And this phenomenon appears with particular clarity for the youngest part of the adult population.

In summation, there are obviously important differences between younger and older people everywhere across national frontiers. What is the real meaning of these gaps? Two theoretical interpretations are possible: we are dealing with age groups or with generations. In the first case, what is involved is a life cycle: the youths of today are adopting the same attitudes as their parents at the same age. Later, the young of today will adopt the same opinions as contemporary old people.

The most famous example of the age phenomenon is the political role of students. The twentieth century is punctuated in many countries by political movements started by students, from Cairo to Tienanmen Square. The eruption of students in the political arena has taken the most diverse forms, from the extreme right to the extreme left. It appeared first in Europe at the beginning of the century, but spread to all other continents, before or after access to independence in numerous countries in Asia or Africa, the Middle East or the Far East. In 1968 it spread like an epidemic in ten countries. Here we obviously have an age phenomenon, explained by the privileged place that students enjoy in society, periodically renewed. It is not a generational phenomenon.

In the second case, we are observing a generational effect: the youth of today have been influenced by a series of factors specific to contemporary historical

circumstances, to such a degree that their beliefs can be explained better by historical experiences and the changes of society as a whole, than by the fact that they are young.

The first hypothesis has to be excluded without hesitation for an obvious reason: there is a real contrast between the beliefs of contemporary youth and the beliefs of youth 30 or 40 years ago. We can empirically demonstrate this contrast because there is sufficient survey data for the 1950s when the fathers and mothers of contemporary youth were themselves young. In addition, as we have already noticed, the younger generation and older generation are today sociologically very different in terms of education and religious orientation.

For these reasons, the generational gap seems to be irreversible. Certainly, some young people today could change their attitudes as they get older. Nevertheless, we are in the presence not only of age categories but also of cohorts of a generational change. A large part of today's youth will continue to carry with them the new values they have forged about religion, freedom, equality, the work ethic, sexuality, and nationalism. The older generation looks like a rear guard defending the traditional values against the younger cohort who advocate non-conformist values.

If basic values can change so much from one generation to the next, should we not reconsider the pertinence of the concepts of "civic culture" and "national character" which have seduced so many scholars from 1963 until recently?

Given this intergenerational dynamic, it is highly probable that the nations of the old Europe will become less and less nationalistic and will tend toward blossoming of a European consciousness. It is a long way off, even if it is true that more changes have occurred during the last generation than during the previous century.

Concluding Remarks

The dosage of national loyalty and supranational consciousness varies significantly from country to country and across nations between social categories. The Netherlands has been the most Europeanist, Great Britain the least, for a variety of reasons among which the economic ones predominate. People involved in agricultural activities tend to be more protective of their regional

interests than people in the tertiary sector. The opinion of urban workers varies according to the competitiveness of their industrial sector. Men are better informed than women about the issues of the common market and are more willing to take position, favorable or negative. But the most important cleavage, as already emphasized, is the generational one. The national averages are canceling these intra-national diversities.

This essay has focused on attitudes, values, and feelings of citizens, without giving sufficient consideration to the institutional aspects, the analysis of which would require a different approach. It is nevertheless obvious that nations are organized in states and that we are dealing in fact with nation-states, with complex societies heavily penetrated and regulated by state administrations. European integration involves not only the changing balance between national loyalty and supranational orientation, but also what is called the "harmonization" of laws and rules.

The European Parliament, Council, Commission, and bureaucracy are taking initiatives and decisions which result in a reduction of national sovereignties. This transfer of power from the national level to the supranational level is rarely spectacular, but it is consistent and efficient. An impressive body of European regulations already exists in various domains affecting people's daily lives.

Periodic surveys at the national and European levels indicate how far and how rapidly "Eurocrats" could or should advance. Supranational loyalty is constantly nourished by supranational legislation as the sovereignty of the nation-state is slowly but progressively being reduced by a vague confederal sovereignty called "Community." People will have to react increasingly to the substance of European policy and will have to express opinions on many issues rather than a few basic values.

Are the citizens of California and Texas more loyal to their state or the United States? The basis of legitimacy and the location of power are clear for all. For the moment and for a long time in Western Europe, the source of power and legitimacy will remain in the framework of the nation-state in a clearly defined territory. European integration is a strong and seemingly irreversible movement not yet a complete reality.

Endnotes

¹Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: MacMillan, 1968), 66.

²M. Rainer Lepsius, "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany," *Social Research* 52, no. 1 (1985): 49.

³Everett Carl Ladd, *Examining the American Idea of Nation*, paper presented to the Congress of the International Political Science Association in Paris, 1985, 13.

⁴C. Frederick Turner and Everett Carl Ladd, "Nationalism, Leadership and the American Creed," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 13, no. 2 (1986), 187.

⁵*Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community* (June 1982), 26-28.

⁶Stephen Harding, David Phillips, and Michael Fogarty, *Contrasting Values in Western Europe* (London: MacMillan, 1986), 61.

⁷Willy Martinussen, *Nationalism as Self-Defense? The Case of Norway*, paper presented to the World Congress of Political Science in Paris, 1985, 17.

⁸Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *National Identity and Self-Esteem*, paper presented to the World Congress of Political Science in Paris, 1985, 2.

⁹Gyorgy Csepeli, "Negative Identity in Hungary," *Social Research* 4 (1984) (Quarterly published in Hungarian by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

¹⁰Jean Stoetzel, "Defeatism in Western Europe: Reluctance to Fight for the Country," in *Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy*, ed. Mattei Dogan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 169.

¹¹Richard Rose, "National Pride in Cross-National Perspective," *International Social Science Journal* 37 (1985), 94.

¹²Sigeki Nishihira, *Les Japonais face aux problèmes de défense*, paper presented to the World Association for Public Opinion Research in Wiesbaden (1985), 11.

¹³Nishihira, 11.

¹⁴*Index to International Public Opinion*, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1981 and 1982), 458.

¹⁵Armée de Terre, 1989, 13.

¹⁶Sondages, *Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique* (Paris: IFOP, 1948), 91.

¹⁷Sondages, 1948, 92.

¹⁸Sondages, 1954, 16.

¹⁹*Eurobarometer*, December 1990.

²⁰Annick Percheron, "Permis et interdits sociaux," in SOFRES, *L'Etat de l'Opinion en 1987* (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 95.

²¹Elisabeth Noelle and E.P. Neumann, *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung* (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1957), 295.

²²SOFRES, *L'Etat de l'Opinion 1990*, (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 145.

²³Doxa (Bollettino della), *Istituto per l'Analisi dell'Opinione* (1986), 164.

²⁴*Eurobarometer*, December 1990, A47.

²⁵*Eurobarometer*, December 1990, A47.

²⁶Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, *Le Moloch en Europe: Etatisation et Corporatisation* (Paris: Economica, 1987).

²⁷Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 412.

²⁸*Eurobarometer*, June 1983, 55-57.

²⁹*Eurobarometer*, June 1982, 28.

- ³⁰ Eurobarometer, December 1982, 87-90.
³¹ Eurobarometer, June 1983.
³² SOFRES. *Opinion Publique. Équipes et Commentaires* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 151-152.
³³ Alain Duhamel, "Le Consensus Français," in SOFRES, *L'Opinion Française en 1977* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 104.
³⁴ Jean Paul Blanchet and Joseph Daniel, "Les Jeunes et la France ou les enfants d'après mai," in SOFRES *L'Opinion Française en 1977* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 138.
³⁵ Blanchet and Daniel, 1978, 138.
³⁶ Blanchet and Daniel, 1978, 139.
³⁷ *Index to International Public Opinion* (Westport, CN: 1987), 478.
³⁸ *Index to International Public Opinion* (Westport, CN: 1987 and 1988), section on "Symbols."
³⁹ Michael Fogarty, Liam Ryan, and Joseph Lee, *Irish Values and Attitudes* (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1984), 161 and 251.
⁴⁰ Rose, 89.

Selected Bibliography

- Blanchet, Jean Paul and Joseph Daniel. "Les Jeunes et la France ou les enfants d'après mai." In SOFRES *L'Opinion Française en 1977*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978.
 Csepeli, Gyorgy. "Negative Identity in Hungary," *Social Research*, 4 (1984) (Quarterly published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Hungarian): 27-38.
 Dogan, Mattei and Dominique Pelassy. *Le Moloch en Europe: Etatisme et Corporatisme*. Paris: Economica, 1987.
 Doxa (Bollettino della). *Istituto per l'Analisi dell'Opinione* (1946 and onward).
 Duhamel, Alain. "Le Consensus Français." In SOFRES *L'Opinion Française en 1977*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978, 87-116.
 Eurobarometer: *Public Opinion in the European Community* (1971-1990). Commission of the European Community, issues 1 to 33.
 European Value Systems Study Group, 1980, 1981, 1982.
 Fogarty, Michael, Liam Ryan, and Joseph Lee. *Irish Values and Attitudes*. Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1984.
 Harding, Stephen, David Phillips, and Michael Fogarty. *Contrasting Values in Western Europe*. London: MacMillan, 1986.
 Index to International Public Opinion Westport, CN: Greenwood Press. 1981, 1982, 1987.
 Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
 Kohn, Hans. "Nationalism." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: MacMillan and Free Press, 1968.
 Ladd, Everett Carl. *Examining the American Idea of Nation*. Paper presented to the Congress of the International Political Science Association in Paris, 1985.
 Lepsius, M. Rainer. "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany." *Social Research* 52, no. 1, 43-64.
 Martinussen, Willy. *Nationalism as Self Defense? The Case of Norway*. Paper presented to the World Congress of Political Science in Paris, 1985.
 Nishihara, Sigeki. *Les Japonais face aux problèmes de défense*. Paper presented in Wiesbaden to the World Association for Public Opinion Research, 1985.
 Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. *National Identity and Self Esteem*. Paper presented to the World Congress of Political Science in Paris, 1985.
 Noelle, Elizabeth and E.P. Neumann. *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung*. Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1957.
 Percheron, Annick. "Permis et interdits sociaux." In SOFRES *L'Etat de l'Opinion en 1987*. Paris: Seuil, 1987: 87-116.
 Rose, Richard. "National Pride in Cross-National Perspective." *International Social Science Journal* 37 (1985): 85-96.
 Rosecrance, Richard. *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
 SOFRES, *Opinion Publique, Equipes et Commentaires*. Paris: Gallimard, 1984.
 SOFRES, *L'Etat de l'Opinion 1990*. Paris: Seuil, 1990.
 Sondages, *Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique*. Paris: IFOP, 1944-1978.
 Stoetzel, Jean. "Defeatism in Western Europe: Reluctance to Fight for the Country." In *Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy*, ed. Mattei Dogan, 169-180. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.
 Turner, C. Frederick and Everett Carl Ladd. "Nationalism, Leadership and the American Creed." *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 13, no. 2 (1986): 118-198.

Interaction of Political and Economic Change in the Soviet Union: Implications for Foreign Policy

Hannes Adomeit

**Tufts University
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy**

Summary

1. The failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union has given a new impetus to developments in that country, as well as to European and world history. In the wake of the putsch, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formally dissolved. The legality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the former territory of the USSR was suspended; in some republics the party has been outlawed. In conjunction with the decline in fortune of the party, Marxist-Leninist ideology significantly receded in importance, and today can no longer be considered a motivating or mobilizing force.

The free fall of the economy has accelerated. Social tensions are mounting. Ethnic conflicts and claims for independence are proliferating, not only in the republics, but also in autonomous regions and some large administrative districts. The military in the attempted coup turned out to be just as internally divided and rife with the very same social and ethnic conflicts existing in society at large.

2. The withering away of the central state as a result of the failed putsch has forcefully interacted with the erosion of Soviet power and influence abroad. Even prior to the coup, the Soviet role in Europe had drastically declined. East Germany, formerly one of the main strategic bastions of the Soviet empire in Europe, collapsed and merged with West Germany and, except for some minor modifications, was integrated into

NATO. The other communist regimes in East Central and Southeastern Europe fell apart. As a result, the political, military, ideological, and economic instruments of Soviet control in the area, including the Warsaw Pact, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, and an extensive secret police network have all been abolished.

3. To the extent that a central foreign policy exists today after the failed coup, it is more often than not directed at further curtailment of the far-flung commitments and involvements of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The contraction of globalism, furthermore, is often directly connected with attempts to improve the country's chances for large-scale economic assistance from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the major Western international lending agencies.

4. Thus, the course of events ever since Gorbachev's accession to power in March 1985 has confirmed the validity of a dual set of close interrelationships. One is the validity of Milovan Djilas's observation that in communist systems there can be no economic reform, only political reform with economic consequences. The obverse is also true: failures in the socio-economic sphere inevitably lead to changes in domestic politics. The second set of interrelationships is that between internal change and external policies. Erosion of the domestic base of Soviet foreign policy continues to affect the international position of the successor states to the FSU.

The main questions of interest for this paper are derived from these two interactions and can be formulated as follows:

What are the current directions of change in the *socio-economic and political spheres* in the new

Union, its constituent republics, and associated independent entities?

What are the current and likely future *relations between the various autonomous and formally independent entities of the FSU* on the one hand, and *between these entities and the central institutions of the new Union* on the other?

What are the implications of the internal developments for *international affairs*?

Prior to dealing with these questions, a brief overview of the main lines of development between Gorbachev's accession to power and the failed coup may be appropriate.

Trends Before the Coup

Probably the single most important trend before the attempted coup was the acute contradiction between rapid transformations in social, political, and nationality affairs on one hand, and continued economic decline on the other. By 1987 or 1988, a painfully obvious paradox had evolved. The serious economic deficiencies which had provided the main rationale for perestroika required extension of the reformist effort to the social and political spheres. However, whereas the changes in the latter dimensions accelerated, they fell short of the stated goals in the former realm. A serious gap evolved between politics and economics.

After Gorbachev came to power, he spelled out many times that growth rates had been falling and the quality of labor and its output had declined. Incompetence, inefficiency, inertia, corruption, fraud, waste, lack of initiative, and resistance to innovation had become characteristic of economic processes. There had been an abysmal failure to achieve the necessary and often-demanded transition from mobilization to modernization, from quantitative to qualitative growth, and from extensive to intensive development. Science and technology were too far removed from the production process. As a result, Gorbachev correctly observed, the USSR had fallen behind its capitalist competitors, particularly in high technology.¹

For about three years, from March 1985 until the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, there was little evidence that Gorbachev's "restructuring" would soon include setting new priorities away from military industry toward agriculture and consumer goods production. *Uskorenie* (acceleration) and

modernizatsiia (modernization) rather than major structural reform were the main directions set out. One of the most noteworthy features of the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan, for instance, was the planned average annual growth of investment in the machine-building sector of no less than 12.5 percent. This pointed to a key element of the plan: "modernization" was to focus on the sector where the bulk of investment goods, consumer durables, and defense material was manufactured. Thus, priority was to be given to the production of investment goods in order to modernize the equipment within the machine-building sector.²

It was only in Spring 1988 that Gorbachev became convinced that the fate of perestroika depended on better provision of agricultural products, consumer goods, and services to the population. At the 19th Party Conference and subsequently, at the July 1988 plenary meeting of the Central Committee, more emphasis was put on the expansion of private economic activity in the service sector, as well as the establishment of cooperatives (*kooperativy*) and the leasing of property and equipment (*arenda*) in both agriculture and industry. Realization was gaining ground that major improvements in overall performance of the Soviet economy would not be successful without a major transfer of resources from military to civilian pursuits.

Another realization had been gaining ground. In order to improve efficiency, enhance innovation, and raise quality of production, it was necessary thoroughly to transform the work ethos of the workforce. Andropov had been the first to officially discover this when he emphasized the importance of the "human factor" (*chelovecheskii faktor*) in the production process. Gorbachev had this discovery in common with Andropov. He resumed the campaigns against alcoholism and corruption and fired incompetent party and state officials.

He also went an important step further than his predecessor. He introduced the slogan and policy of glasnost, opened new areas of information and comment, lifted (after the Chernobyl accident in April 1986) taboos on media coverage of natural and human catastrophes as well as social phenomena (illness, crime, divorce, abortion, drug addiction), and declassified some statistics. Glasnost also meant discussing social issues and extending the scope of targets open to criticism, eventually including the Party, the military, and the KGB.

This had considerable political significance in the Soviet Union. Party and society, after all, were supposed to be monolithic. Open discussion of the ills of Soviet economics, society and politics, therefore, had the effect of undermining the authority and preeminent role of the Communist Party. It helped legitimize pluralist tendencies and the move toward a multi-party system. Big leaps in that very direction took place in the fall of 1986 and early 1987, and above all at the January and June 1987 plenary meetings of the Central Committee.³

Glasnost in turn significantly affected another sphere of Soviet politics: nationality affairs. Initially, Gorbachev continued to adhere to the repressive practices of the Brezhnev era, moving cadres from one Soviet republic to another. Russians continued to be put in positions of leadership in non-Slavic areas. The more objective approach to history in the era of glasnost stimulated national intellectuals to question the policy of repression and forced assimilation under Stalin and after. Similarly, trends towards diversity and pluralism at the center greatly encouraged ethnic self-awareness and assertiveness and claims first for autonomy, then outright independence.

The first major harbingers of the impending disintegration of the internal empire occurred in Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan in December 1986, the Crimean Tartar protests at the beginning 1987, and most importantly, large demonstrations in the Baltic republics in August 1987. By that time, Soviet foreign policy, both past and present, had still largely been exempt from criticism.

In 1987 and 1988, however, old slogans took on entirely new meaning, and completely new conceptual approaches were developed. The conceptual innovations were threefold. They included, (1) the idea of Europe as a "common house" (*nash obshchii dom*) in his approach to Western Europe and the United States; (2) the "new thinking" (*noveoe myshlenie*) in international security affairs, with its subcomponents of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense" in military doctrine; and (3) the "freedom of choice" (*svoboda vybora*) to be granted to the countries and peoples of East Central and South Eastern Europe. The conceptual rethinking had practical consequences which, in an astonishingly short time span, were to lead to the dissolution of the external Soviet empire in Europe.

To return to the main point, increasingly throughout the period from the mid-1980s to the end of the decade, the damaging imbalance between the rapid transformations in politics, society and nationality relations on the one hand, and the slow pace of change in the economy on the other, was widening. Gorbachev evidently lacked support among the main established institutions of the Soviet system: the Party, armed forces, KGB, "military-industrial complex," and state bureaucracy. The fate of perestroika thus depended very much on support "from below," which in turn was a function of popular perceptions of progress in the economy.

In 1987 and 1988, perhaps even in 1989, Gorbachev still would have had the kind of support needed for the adoption of the tough decisions necessary to radically alter the economy, rid the country of a cumbersome bureaucratic command system, and introduce a market economy. It is the tragedy of Gorbachev as a person and statesman that until the very first day after the August 1991 coup he remained wedded to the idea of reform from above, with a reformed Communist Party to be instrumental in implementing it.

The result of Gorbachev's procrastination, hesitation, and ultimately, in the fall of 1990, his shift to the right, was a spectacular drop in his popularity. From an overall approval rating of more than 50 percent at the beginning of his tenure in office, he dropped to about four percent after the coup, while that of Yeltsin, his closest rival, rose to more than 70 percent. In fact, it seems that by 1990, the population had begun to scorn Gorbachev and despise him for the lack of popular legitimacy. Cynical attitudes prevailed: "The only thing that's moving in the Soviet Union are Gorbachev's lips," was one of the characterizations mentioned to this writer on his frequent trips to the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era.

The discrepancy between economics and politics was most vividly demonstrated in the acrimonious controversy over the Shatalin plan in the summer and fall of 1990. The plan was drafted by Gorbachev's then closest economic advisers and provided for the rapid creation of a market, legalization of private property, privatization of state property, and devolution of economic decision making to the republics. In the summer, the plan appeared to have Gorbachev's support. But, by

mid-September (some observers say earlier), the Soviet party chief had begun to back away from it, insisting that it be merged with the ideas of Ryzhkov, his head of government.

The consequence of this illogical insistence on merging the plan and the market was, in the economic realm, further deterioration and disruption. Rather than now committing himself to radical economic reform and popular backing, however, Gorbachev attempted to narrow the gap by tightening the reins. Citing a "serious crisis of executive power" in late September 1990, Gorbachev urged the national parliament to grant him authority to issue emergency orders affecting wages, prices, budgets and "the strengthening of law and order." If the situation deteriorated further, he told the Supreme Soviet, "we may have to introduce and impose" presidential rule and "halt the activity of all institutions, including elected ones."⁴ The course for Gorbachev's fateful reliance and, therefore, dependency on the traditional institutions of Soviet power had been set.

The main markers on the road to the right are quickly recounted. In mid-November 1990, Gorbachev introduced a plan for the reorganization of executive power. The plan provided for the creation of: (1) a federative council, made up of the leaders of the 15 republics, to become the country's chief executive agency; (2) a new security council, reporting to the President, to coordinate the activities of the armed forces, police, and KGB; (3) abolition of the post of prime minister and demotion of the then huge cabinet to the role of a "working apparatus" for the president; and (4) presidential representatives to enforce orders from the center.⁵

Although impressive on paper and immediately endorsed by the Supreme Soviet, the reorganization achieved nothing. The power of the federative council was severely curtailed by the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) at the end of December when it voted to include the 20 autonomous republics in that body and refused to endorse Gorbachev's idea of presidential representatives.

To fill the somewhat greater scope of executive power, Gorbachev appointed personnel either of the unimaginative, bureaucratic, compliant variety, or the politically hard-line ilk. Such appointments included, in the first category, vice president Yanaev, who told the CDP, "I'm a normal guy, I assure you," but also admitted to being "a

communist, to the depth of my soul."⁶ They also included Valentin Pavlov, a veteran of the state bureaucracy, former finance minister and an aide who helped draft several of the economic decrees issued by Gorbachev.⁷ In the second category, some of the personnel changes provided for the replacement of the liberal-minded minister of the interior, Vadim Bakatin, by Boris Pugo, a former head of the CPSU control commission and Latvian KGB chief, and the appointment of General Boris Gromov, former commander of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, as first deputy minister of the interior.⁸

In protest against such changes and as a warning against "reactionaries" and an "approaching dictatorship," foreign minister Shevardnadze resigned on 20 December 1990. In the ensuing months, most of the more radical reformers either stepped down from office or were removed from their posts. Obscure figures moved in. Valery Boldin, who became Gorbachev's chief of staff, for years had been nothing but an agricultural editor at the Communist Party daily *Pravda*. In August 1991, he was one of the key figures in the plot.

In mid-January 1991, with the support of Pugo's Interior Ministry black berets and the military, the attempt was made to overthrow the constitutionally elected governments in Lithuania and Latvia and replace them by so-called "committees of national salvation." In the violent attempt, 14 persons were killed in Vilnius and four in Riga; more than 100 persons were wounded. The attacks, however, stopped short of an outright takeover of the parliament and the arrest of Baltic government and parliamentary leaders. In retrospect, it appears odd that this dress rehearsal in the Baltics in January did not provide the lesson for the leaders of the August putsch that, if any future move was to be successful, force would have to be used and arrests made immediately to prevent the rallying of public support around the constitutionally elected representatives.

The shift to the right in the period from fall 1990 to spring 1991 also had several repercussions in Soviet foreign policy. The Vienna treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) appeared at risk as the Soviet Union relabeled motorized rifle divisions to be naval forces, thereby trying to exempt their equipment from the treaty cuts. Simultaneously, Soviet generals declared their skepticism that it would be feasible to complete the

withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany on schedule by the end of 1993. In accordance with a hard line CPSU Central Committee policy paper of January 1991 on Soviet relations with "Eastern Europe,"⁹ Soviet diplomats sought (successfully in the Romanian case) to incorporate language in bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation that would have had the effect of again limiting the new democracies' sovereignty. And in February 1991, close cooperation with the United States in the Persian Gulf crisis was suddenly put under threat as Moscow became active diplomatically to prevent the destruction of the then still more or less intact Iraqi ground forces.

The shift to the right had disastrous consequences for Gorbachev personally and politically. In international affairs, his credibility suffered, and briefly after the crackdown in the Baltics, prospects for any substantial Western aid receded. In the domestic political game, rather than being king and able to maneuver and mediate between "left" and "right," the Soviet president was becoming more of a pawn of the conservative forces. The support he still had among reformers and the population was eroding even further.

In March 1991, defying a ban on demonstrations in Moscow and confronting troops sent to keep order in the capital, more than 100,000 people turned out in support of Yeltsin and calling for Gorbachev's resignation, thus helping to defeat an attempt by the latter's adherents in the Russian Republic Parliament to oust Yeltsin from the position of president.¹⁰ Gorbachev's standing (and the Soviet economy) diminished also as a consequence of the large-scale miners's strikes for changes in pay, for better living and working conditions, and in support of Yeltsin.

Apparently realizing the turn to the right would lead nowhere except to a further deterioration of the economy, an increase in nationality conflicts, and international isolation of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev began to mend fences with the reformers. Manifestations of the new tack became visible on 23 April 1991 in the "nine-plus-one" agreement on power sharing between the Union and the republics; Gorbachev's expressed willingness to cooperate with Yeltsin; and the president's apparent endorsement, in the following month, of Grigory Yavlinsky's efforts to launch a joint program of action with Western governments to put the Soviet

Union firmly on the track toward democracy and free enterprise.

It was most likely this "betrayal" by Gorbachev that galvanized the mood and moves of the coup plotters to take action. Yet another dress rehearsal took place. On 17 June 1991, shortly after the election of Yeltsin to the post of president of the Russian Federation, Prime Minister Pavlov proposed that Parliament grant him a range of new powers, effectively inviting the legislators to undercut Gorbachev's responsibilities and authority. In a closed session of the Supreme Soviet, the details of which later became known, the chiefs of the armed forces (Yazov), police (Pugo), and KGB (Kryuchkov) harshly attacked Gorbachev's revived reformist course. They decried his indecision, the unbalanced reductions and dismantling of the armed forces, the slide of the country into anarchy, the rise in crime, and economic collapse, all of which conformed with an alleged CIA plan, uncovered in 1977, in which the American intelligence agency was said to have trained agents to gain important positions in the Soviet government and then undermine it.

The right wing attempt at outmaneuvering and neutralizing Gorbachev was easily defeated in the Supreme Soviet. A pattern of action had been established which the four main *dramatis personae* of the June plot were to repeat in August outside the parliamentary framework.

Trends After the Coup: Intensification of the Internal Crisis

The failed coup acted like a strong gale. It dispersed the dark clouds which had constantly hung over any attempt at radical economic reform and devolution of power to the individual republics. The fresh breeze held the promise that the damaging discrepancy between fast moving social and political change on the one hand, and paralysis in economic affairs on the other, would finally disappear. In detail, the following favorable preconditions for the introduction of comprehensive, market-oriented reform seemed to be present.

1. The authority and power of the CPSU suffered a major shock from which it was unlikely to recover. The suspicions (completely

founded as it turned out) of criminal complicity of the Communist Party in the preparation and execution of the coup spelled the beginning of the end of that organization. The series of legislative and executive measures adopted in the wake of the failed putsch, first at the Russian Federation level and then for the whole country, culminated in the "suspension" of the activities of the Party and the freezing of its assets. The legal basis for these measures was dubious. Their rationale, however, was undeniable: proceedings against the party legally could only have been initiated by the state prosecution, which traditionally was controlled by the Party. The Party, in essence, would have been passing judgment on itself.

2. The attempted coup brought to light deep divisions and demoralization in the police (MVD), KGB, and armed forces. Because of the internal divisions in these three institutions, the events of 19-21 August 1991 cannot be classified as a military coup. They can, more appropriately, be called an attempt by a hard-line Communist Party faction, in conjunction with a small, selected circle of top leaders from various party-controlled institutions, to utilize these institutions for the overthrow of the constitutional order. In the process, it turned out that these institutions are rife with the same political, social, and ethnic conflicts and subject to the same economic deprivations as the rest of society. Any future "emergency committee" would thus need to take into account the necessity of acting on the basis of political consensus rather than clandestinely trying to involve the instruments of force.

3. The collapse of the coup broke a centuries old vicious cycle of attempted reform and repression. The pattern was established under Czarism but continued under Soviet rule. After the 1917 Revolution, all hopes for political and economic liberalization (the "withering away of the state"), democratization, and national emancipation were shattered when Lenin and Stalin established a totalitarian, one-party system. The rallying of popular support around the Russian Federation parliament building and the popularly elected president of the RSFSR conveyed the notion that it was the active resistance of "the people" that brought down the counter-reformation. Exaggerated

as this notion may have been, it had the effect of instilling a great degree of self-confidence in the liberal, democratic forces of Soviet society. Never before in Russian and Soviet history had ordinary people had so much reason to believe their activity made any difference in the life and historical evolution of their country.

4. The failed putsch improved prospects for the amalgamation of the many reformist groups, groupings, and movements into one major political party. It was to a considerable degree Gorbachev's ill-fated determination to keep the Communist Party together and nudge it in a reformist direction which had prevented an open split and thus the merger of the party's progressive wing with radical, non-communist forces. The "suspension" of Communist Party activities had created an ideological and power vacuum that could be filled by non-communist parties.

5. The collapse of the "center," the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states, and the devolution of power to the republics created chances for the establishment of a voluntary union. The centralized, bureaucratic command economy had obviously outlived its usefulness. Hence, the task of rebuilding the economy was clearly going to be easier if it were to take place in the various republics. The success of economic revival, however, would most likely be achieved only if the reality of interdependence was to be recognized. Political independence or autonomy, the new actors had to realize, should not interfere with economic cooperation and coordination.

The actual degree of cooperation thus far, however, has been completely inadequate. All the opportunities for a breakthrough in socio-economic and political reform until now have failed to become reality. In fact, it is difficult to evade the conclusion that the centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet internal empire, the processes of disintegration, anarchy, and chaos are far stronger than the centripetal forces.

The elation and optimism about the future that was so widespread immediately after the failed putsch dissipated. This is apparent, among others, in a report compiled by academic institutes and the KGB for a parliamentary commission to deal with reforms in the Soviet security system.¹¹ The report, entitled "Threats to Security and the Necessity of Joint

Actions by the Republics," aptly describes the state of affairs in the fall of 1991. The following factors are listed as constituting a threat to internal security:

The process of disintegration of the structure of economic controls and the progressive decline in production is being intensified by the critical state of the system of credit and finance, the exhaustion of gold reserves and the dislocation of the balance of payments through the huge foreign debt.

There has been a weakening of government and the authority of the law which in turn has fostered an increase in crime, corruption and terrorism.

Although extensive personnel changes have taken place at the top, many regional officials are still those who supported the hard-line coup.

Democratic controls over the military remain "weak and ineffective," and there are signs of a dissipation of "controls over nuclear installations."

Various ethnic clashes are certain to create extensive internal migration and thus exacerbate social conflicts and economic hardships.

Military industry faces collapse, threatening loss of jobs and experts, and "explosive" social tensions.

The report concludes that intensification of crisis in internal affairs could "lead to anarchy and either a return of the forces standing behind the coup, or the development in the republics of national regimes of a populist, semi-fascist type." Both scenarios were "rife with tragic consequences, with fanning of the flames of civil war."

There is little to add to this survey of factors that impinge on future developments in internal affairs. The intensification of the domestic crisis, however, not only has negative consequences for internal stability but also complicates foreign policy and international security.

Trends After the Coup: Strategic Withdrawal in Soviet Foreign Policy

The most important trends in foreign policy emanating from the area of what was the Soviet Union are in all likelihood going to be fivefold.

1. The dissolution of the FSU's external empire, strategic withdrawals, and the termination of overextension, overinvolvement, and overcommitment will in all likelihood continue.

The underlying reason for this process is the very same that explains the exacerbation of domestic political and nationality conflicts: acceleration of the economic decline. The successor entities of the USSR as a result are likely to look for international assistance to rebuild their moribund economies. This is bound to enhance proclivity for compromise in international political and security matters.

2. The military instrument as a means with which to exert influence in world affairs will in all probability continue to decline further in importance. This raises an objective problem. As the Soviet system has collapsed as a model of development both in the Western industrialized countries and the Third World, ideology has withered away. Successor entities of the Soviet Union find themselves in the unpleasant role of having to beg for both long-term development funds and short-term emergency assistance. It is not altogether clear, therefore, what the basis of Soviet influence abroad is going to be.

3. As the power and authority of central government weaken, the political basis for the "center" to conduct a coordinated (Union) foreign policy will become smaller. It is probable, therefore, that the central foreign policy apparatus, notably the foreign ministry, will significantly contract in size.

4. The Russian Federation as the by far largest of all the republics will be the main successor entity of the Soviet Union and assume many or most of the functions which the USSR previously played in world affairs.

5. Many different actors will embark on foreign policies in accordance with their own newly to be defined "national" interests. This applies first and foremost to the Baltic states, whose independence has already been recognized fully under international law. However, it also pertains to Ukraine and the Caucasian and Central Asian republics.

As a result of these trends, the international community is going to be faced with a multiplicity of states and a complex interaction of policies both by and among the Union, the Russian Federation, and the newly independent states of the FSU.

Economics, Military Power, and Political Influence

Lenin was right at least in one important respect. As he pointed out in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, political power and influence are basically functions of economic power. Uneven economic development would eventually lead to a redistribution of political power in world politics. Even though applied to the capitalist system, Lenin's observation fully applies to the historic competition since 1917 between the two opposing socio-economic systems.

Fundamentally, the post-Brezhnev leaders have drawn the necessary conclusions from what in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the West was called the "giant on clay feet" and the "paradox of superpower;" that is, global overextension and overcommitment by a country with enormous military power but a weak and, relative to its competitors, declining socio-economic base.

In the Third World, the abolition of the Soviet military presence and commitments by and large was orderly; in cooperation with the United States, regional conflicts were successfully being defused. In what used to be called "Eastern Europe," however, the retreat turned into a rout. The planned, phased adjustment process and gradual restructuring of relationships within the Warsaw Pact and Council of Mutual Economic Assistance turned into a precipitous collapse which spilled over into the internal empire.

Interaction between economic decline, disruption, nationality conflicts, the increased need for international economic assistance, and dismantling of globalism is bound to continue. In many instances today, Moscow's foreign policy decisions seem to be connected with attempts to improve chances for the "center" and the successor entities of the Soviet Union to receive economic and financial assistance and for the Union to become a full member of the G-7, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other economic institutions of the Western industrialized world. Certainly, the cooperative stance has continued to outweigh competitive, let alone confrontational, policies. The following examples may serve to demonstrate the point.

Nuclear Weapons. Gorbachev has responded favorably to President Bush's initiative for the

further dismantling of nuclear arsenal and has agreed to the elimination of all nuclear artillery and nuclear warheads on short-range missiles. This and other agreements are still part of the implementation of "new thinking" and the reduction of the threat to the Soviet Union's European neighbors. At the same time, however, they serve to alleviate concern in the West about the danger that thousands of nuclear weapons stationed inside and outside the RSFSR may fall "into the wrong hands."

Strategic Defense. Ever since President Reagan's March 1983 "Star Wars" initiative to build a strategic defense system in space, the Soviets have opposed such a system. The war in the Persian Gulf and the further strengthening of the radical reformist tendencies in security affairs after the failed Moscow coup have changed the Soviet approach. Union and Russian Federation political and military leaders have expressed interest in strategic defense, renegotiating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and even exploring with the United States the possibility of a "joint defense in space."¹²

Cuba. Gorbachev has offered soon "to begin negotiations with the Cuban leadership about the withdrawal of a Soviet training brigade," a euphemism for the Soviet military presence on the island. He clarified that the pullback would involve about 11,000 men (a figure higher than most Western estimates of the number of Soviet personnel on the island), and that talks about the withdrawal would begin in the "immediate future."¹³

In conjunction with the planned abolition of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, the subsidization of the Cuban economy is severely being curtailed. Both the Soviet military presence and the economic subsidies were among the many arguments used by American government officials and conservative-minded legislators to oppose large-scale aid to the Soviet Union.

The Kurile Islands. Russian Federation and Union officials have now acknowledged that there is a territorial problem to be solved in Russian-Japanese relations. Gorbachev's senior advisor, Pavel Palshenko, has stated that the problem of the Kurile Islands has been turned over to the RSFSR. During a trip to Japan in early

September 1991, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov stated the RSFSR would eliminate all obstacles to concluding a peace treaty with Japan, including resolving the territorial dispute.¹⁴ This change of mind, too, appears to be directly related to the desire to improve chances for economic assistance by Japan.

Afghanistan. Union officials have indicated that they are no longer committed to unwavering support of the Najibullah regime in Kabul. Immediately after the failure of the coup, Soviet supplies of weapons, food, and fuel to Afghanistan came to a halt. While Moscow rejected any suggestion that it would default on existing agreements to provide economic and military assistance to Kabul, an agreement nevertheless was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union to end all arms shipments.¹⁵

Southeast Asia. The Soviet military withdrawal from Southeast Asia has continued. Vietnamese General Hoang Minh Thao, director of the Military Strategy Institute at the Vietnamese Defense Ministry, claimed at the beginning of September 1991 that "Soviet forces have recently changed their strategy, and they do not use foreign bases as before." Soviet ambassador to Thailand Oleg Bostorin confirmed such interpretations by saying on 14 September 1991 that the Soviet Union is likely to abandon completely its military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.¹⁶ By that time, the Vietnamese forces had been fully withdrawn from Cambodia, not least because of Soviet pressures. In October 1991, the cooperation of the USSR with the US and China on the Cambodian conflict culminated in the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement, providing for a cessation of hostilities and a coalition government in Phnom Penh.¹⁷

Independent Foreign and Defense Policies of the Soviet Successor Entities

The above mentioned transfer of responsibility to the Russian Federation to negotiate an agreement with Japan is a harbinger of a new era in Soviet foreign policy. It is no longer, or at least no longer exclusively, the Union that is conducting business on the international stage. The new successor entities are now beginning to claim an important

share of the action. This raises complex issues of interaction and distribution of authority between the Union and the newly independent states.

Probably the most troublesome and difficult issue is that of defense and international security as exemplified in the controversies between the USSR and the RSFSR, Ukraine, and other republics over conventional and nuclear weapons. As for nuclear weapons, while the bulk of the Soviet land-based strategic missile force is based in the Russian Federation, there are also important intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fields as well as long-range and medium-range bomber bases in Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan. The territory of the former USSR, including that of these four republics, is ringed with a defensive perimeter of dual-capable surface-to-air missiles, which means they can fire either conventional or nuclear weapons. Finally, there is the plethora of short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery integral to the armory of almost every tank, motorized rifle, and artillery division of the Soviet Ground Forces. There is a total of 86 such divisions based in the non-Russian republics, with some 40 in Ukraine alone and 14 in Byelarus.¹⁸

The initial indications after the failed coup were that a proliferation of nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet Union would not be a problem. The presidents of Ukraine (Kravchuk) and Kazakhstan (Nazarbaev) gave assurances that they wanted their territories to be free of nuclear weapons. RSFSR president Boris Yeltsin quickly announced that Ukrainian officials had agreed to the transfer of all of these weapons to the territory of the Russian Federation.¹⁹ The current RSFSR and Soviet defense ministry position still is, as stated by Soviet chief of staff Vladimir Lobov:

*To prevent nuclear proliferation and the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, all the nuclear missiles of the country should be concentrated on the territory of only one republic, the one with the largest territory, population, economic and strategic potential.*²⁰

It is unclear whether Yeltsin earlier had correctly represented the Ukrainian position. Whatever the case may be, Ukrainian leaders have subsequently clarified that they do not agree to the idea of a simple redeployment of nuclear weapons to the RSFSR. They may also not agree to the notion that cuts in

strategic nuclear weapons mandated by the START agreement should fall on Ukraine (and Byelarus and Kazakhstan) and leave largely intact the strategic nuclear potential of the RSFSR. Officially, the Ukrainian government, while reiterating its commitment to becoming a nuclear-free zone, at the same time advocates joint control of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for a transitory period. As the chief Ukrainian representative in Moscow, Vladimir Kryshanskii, said: this could "be a long process and it can take a long time."²¹

In the process, it is not altogether impossible that the claims for joint control may change to demands for unilateral control. In fact, depending on the make-up of the government and its relations with the RSFSR and the emasculated "center," Ukrainian officials may eventually end up asking the question as to why nuclear weapons are supposedly not a good thing for Ukraine but are for countries such as Britain and France, which are both smaller in size than Ukraine and have roughly the same number of inhabitants. Resolution of nuclear (and conventional military) issues has not been helped by Yeltsin's initial post-coup reaction to the Ukrainian declaration of independence and the announcement that the RSFSR would present territorial claims for the Crimea and the Donbass. It also has been set back by Yeltsin's acknowledgment that he had discussed with Soviet military leaders the idea of a "preventive nuclear strike" against Ukraine but had ruled it out because this was "not technically feasible."²²

For the time being, the parliament in Kiev apparently still adheres to the ideas of a nuclear-free Ukraine and joint control until that end is achieved. If so (according to Kryshanskii), the 176 SS-18 and SS-19 strategic nuclear missiles based in Ukraine and the undisclosed but fairly small number of mobile SS-24 missiles on trains in that republic are easily accounted for and perhaps equally easily dismantled. This, however, does not necessarily apply to the close to 2,000 short-range nuclear missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons in that republic. The ultimate fate of the latter category of weapons may hinge on a resolution of the claims put forward by Ukraine to be given control over the 1.2 million Soviet soldiers stationed on its soil, to receive a share of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and to be put in charge of the military-industrial complexes on Ukrainian soil.

The issue of dismantling and maintaining control over the nuclear weapons that are an integral part of the Soviet divisions in Ukraine may perhaps also be connected with the plans, endorsed by the Ukrainian parliament on 22 October 1991, for the creation of Ukrainian armed forces consisting of a 450,000 men (400,000 men in the regular armed forces, 30,000 men as part of a state militia, and the rest as border troops).²³

It is entirely unclear for what purposes and in response to what perceived threats Ukraine may need such a huge force. Germany apparently is planning for different contingencies and has agreed to limit the size of its armed forces to a maximum of 370,000 men. The answer may perhaps lie in Ukraine's desire to become a militarily strong European power. If so, it may condemn itself to the very same mistakes Soviet leaders from Brezhnev to Chernenko had committed: to fuel an arms race by raising the threat perceptions of its European neighbors while failing to address the question as to whether the country is really able to afford it.

The above cited Soviet report on "Threats to Security and the Necessity of Joint Actions by the Republics" also contains a warning that many of the factors, including the interaction of economic degradation and nationality conflicts, were present. This raised the specter of the Soviet Union rapidly "following the path of Yugoslavia." Considering the encirclement and isolation of the Yugoslav armed forces in barracks located on Croatian territory, there is at least one important parallel to the situation in the FSU: unless there is a resolution of the defense and military-industrial issues between the various republics and the "center," the Soviet armed forces could find themselves in a similar isolation on the territory of the former republics. The current Union stance, as expressed most recently by Gorbachev at the delayed opening session of the new Supreme Soviet on 21 October 1991 still is that the formation of separate republican armies is "dangerous, irresponsible and illegal."²⁴ Obviously, considering the presence of large Russian minorities in both Ukraine and Kazakhstan, any attempt to force the issue by either the independent-to-be states or the "center" can prove to be disastrous. What is to be hoped, however, is that it will precisely be the Yugoslav example that may prove to be a deterrent and an inducement to attempting to solve the problems by political rather than military means.

Endnotes

¹As, for instance, described at length in his book, M.S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), 3-20.

²This summary draws on the submission by Phil Hanson to *The Gorbachev Challenge and European Security, Report by the European Strategy Group (ESG)* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1988), 56-69.

³Michel Tatu, his section on domestic affairs, in *The Gorbachev Challenge and European Security, Report by the European Strategy Group (ESG)*.

⁴*Pravda*, 22 September 1990. See also Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev Seeks Sweeping Powers to Meet a 'Crisis,'" *New York Times*, 22 September 1990.

⁵*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 18 November 1990.

⁶Gorbachev nominated Yanayev to the CDP on 26 December; the nominee made the remarks quoted to that body on that very occasion; see *Pravda*, 27 December 1990.

⁷The appointment took place in January 1991.

⁸The personnel change took place on 2 December 1990.

⁹For the text of the extraordinary policy prescriptions by the Central Committee see "O razvitiu obstanovki v Vostochnoi Evrope i nashei politike v etom regione," *Izvestia TsK KPSS*, no. 3, (January 1991).

¹⁰At that time, Yeltsin was not yet popularly elected but held this position as a result of a parliamentary vote.

¹¹The authorship is under dispute. It is signed "KGB USSR," but a report in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* said it was a draft analysis

prepared by academic institutes in conjunction with (presumably reformist) KGB members. Quotes below are from Serge Schmemmann, "A Moscow Report Expresses Fear of Following 'Path of Yugoslavia,'" *New York Times*, 4 October 1991.

¹²Maj. Gen. Alexander Vladimirov and Maj. Gen. Viktor Samoilov at a conference in Washington, DC in mid-October 1991, as quoted by *Wall Street Journal*, 22 October 1991.

¹³Central Television, 6 September 1991; TASS, 11 September 1991; Associated Press, 12 September 1991; see the discussion of these issues by Suzanne Crow, "Strategic Withdrawal Resumes," *Report on the USSR (Radio Liberty, Munich)* 3, no. 39 (1991): 7-9.

¹⁴Crow, 8.

¹⁵Crow, 8.

¹⁶Crow, 8.

¹⁷*New York Times*, 23 October 1991.

¹⁸All of the above information as compiled by Douglas L. Clarke, "Concern about Soviet Nuclear Weapons," *Report on the USSR (Radio Liberty, Munich)* 3, no. 37 (1991): 3-8.

¹⁹Clarke, 3-8.

²⁰Associated Press report from Moscow, 23 October 1991.

²¹Associated Press report from Moscow, 23 October 1991.

²²As revealed by Konstantin Masik, deputy premier of Ukraine, in an interview with the Moscow daily *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 October 1991.

²³See Francis X. Clines, "Parliament Backs Ukrainian Army," *New York Times*, 23 October 1991.

²⁴Central Television, 21 October 1991.

Rival Nationalisms in the USSR: Reviving Political Discourse

Martha Brill Olcott

**Colgate University
Fellow, East-West Center, Duke University**

The current state of inter-ethnic relations in the post-coup USSR raises two fundamental questions. Can the USSR survive? Can the various republics singly or in regional groupings make it on their own? Unfortunately, the answer to both questions appears to be no.

A Dying Center

While there are almost as many theories circulating about who was responsible for the August coup and the resulting "democratic" counter coup as there are FAX machines in Moscow, one thing is clear: the coup caught most of the Communist Party leaders in the Soviet republics by surprise.

Moreover, not by accident, the coup disrupted preparations for the signing of the Union Treaty which had been drawn up in accordance with the Novo-Ogarevo Nine Plus One agreement of April 1991.¹ The preparation of this union treaty had been a laborious process, with the final details of the taxation system reportedly worked out only days before the treaty was scheduled to be signed.²

Taxation was the thorniest issue from the point of view of the republics, as they had demanded the right to collect taxes and forward a fixed percentage to the center. Finally, Gorbachev yielded this key right to the republics, making the center's financial solvency dependent upon the good will of the republics. Many coup scenarios hold that this concession was key in making party conservatives decide that the signing of the treaty had to be stopped.

Nonetheless, the draft treaty that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev planned to have ceremoniously signed on August 20 still preserved a great deal of power with the center, including the coordination of defense policy and foreign relations, the supervision of a single financial and tariff system, and the control of energy resources. Eight of the nine Novo-Ogarevo signatories were prepared to sign the treaty. Only Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had refused, pending a recommendation from Ukraine's Supreme Soviet which was in adjournment until September.³

However, in the post-coup world, the Union Treaty became a dead letter. Three of the republics immediately left the Soviet arena, and the Baltic republics were able almost instantly to secure diplomatic recognition for their independence bid. On 4 September 1991, their right to complete independence was recognized by USSR authorities as well.

USSR officials as well as representatives from a number of Soviet republics still urged the Baltic republic leadership to participate in drawing up an agreement for a new economic and political union between the former Soviet republics. Within days of the coup, Ukraine, Byelarus, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan declared independence, as did Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Moldova.

Viewing events from any distance at all, it was hard to know which republics were seriously staking out claims to leave the USSR and which were simply jockeying for political position, either by trying to trivialize genuine demands for independence by producing a crowd effect of newly independent states, or by trying to stake out internationally recognizable claims for independent status in the event that the USSR would in fact cease to exist.

Nursultan Nazarbaev came to serve as a kind of bell weather. In the confusing days just after Gorbachev was restored to power, he called for a

loose confederation of independent states. Very soon after, however, he began once again talking about the need to preserve the USSR as a single political entity and federation of a new type, a position he continues to maintain.

Moreover it was Nazarbaev, and not Gorbachev, who opened the special session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which was convened in late August, and it was he who announced the Ten Plus One eleventh-hour agreement to preserve a union. Once this and the following Congress of People's Deputies concluded their work, delegates from the remaining 12 republics continued to meet in nearly constant session to hammer out a new union agreement.

The final negotiations for this agreement, termed a "Treaty on an Economic Community," were agreed upon when leaders from 13 republics (the Prime Minister of Latvia came as an observer) met in Alma Ata at Nazarbaev's invitation on 2 October 1991. By previous agreement, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev did not attend the meeting. His omission from the proceedings was designed to emphasize that the republics were drawing up a newly agreed upon status without participation of the center. In reality, he and his advisors seem to have maintained close watch over the proceedings.

The published version of the treaty is a far different document than was what intended to have been signed in August. It provides for a coordinated economic policy across republics and calls for the continuation of a single currency zone with a unified banking structure. The republics also pledge themselves to not pass laws which restrict the free movement of trade and people across their borders and call for a single tariff and customs system. The agreement is almost skeletal in its published form, with the signatories pledging themselves to work out an elaborate set of supporting agreements and plans for a political confederation as well.⁴

Even the vague talk of a possible political union was enough to keep Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk from signing the agreement, and when Prime Minister Vitold Fokin said in a public statement that Ukraine should and would sign the agreement, there were immediate calls for his resignation by members of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet.

The treaty's call for a single financial system had become out-dated even before the signing

ceremonies took place, although one faction of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet called for Russia to refuse to sign the treaty if these provisions were not included.

Nonetheless, even with these modifications, in the end, only eight republics attended the signing of the agreement on 18 October 1991: Russia, Byelarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. The Azerbaijanis, who had been expected to sign, simply gave no explanation of their absence. However, on 29 October 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he expected all 12 of the remaining republics to eventually initial the treaty.⁵

The formation of a new USSR legislature was equally rocky. When the new reduced legislature of the USSR was finally convened on 21 October 1991 after three delays, only seven republics sent official delegations. Kyrgyzstan, joined several others in preferring only observer status.

The disarray over the terms of the economic treaty and the inability of the new legislative body to come into being as anything resembling a representative body for the nation as a whole, really are symptomatic of the collapse of the center that has occurred over the last several months. Many attribute this collapse to the demise of the USSR's administrative structure. While this has certainly helped aggravate the economic downturn that the USSR is experiencing, this does not seem to be a sufficient explanation. The demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself is at least as cogent an explanation for the speed with which republics are trying to dissolve or dramatically redefine their ties to one another. The party also linked up the nation, providing a parallel hierarchy to the ministerial system.

The latter was dissolving gradually, but in some parts of the country at least, the former disappeared overnight. In other republics, the party networks did not disappear but were renamed and thus made fully independent of Moscow's control. Regardless of whether or not the Communist Party disappeared or simply "changed its outer garments," the nature of elite politics changed in each of the republics.

The official ideology of the CPSU was designed to legitimize the existence of the USSR, and the presence of KGB, MVD, and Red Army troops all "gave life" to this legitimacy. Now, the political legitimacy of the USSR as a single nation-state has

been challenged, and even the capacity of the military to forcibly hold the nation together has been called into question. Moreover, as new democrats, the "unionists" do not want to make a case for unity which is based on "rule of force" arguments.

Instead, they prefer to argue on pragmatic grounds, defending the political rebirth of the USSR as in the Soviet people's own economic interests and in the interests of international security more generally. The USSR, they maintain, can make the transition from a totalitarian state to a multi-national "rule by law" system in which minority rights are protected and citizens enjoy full equality before the law regardless of their national or ethnic origin.

The Case For the Republics

Not everyone in the USSR is willing to grant the wisdom of those Soviet and Western economists who are using models of economic rationality to argue for the "indissolvability of the union." In interviews the author has held in Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan over the past seven months, there has been a similar argument forwarded in each locale.

Economic rationality is not the exclusive property of "economic unitarians," many republic planners argue. The preservation of a single market is logical to the unitarian because it will allow for the creation of an all-Soviet union-wide market quickly, and in the process, the economic reintegration of the nation will be achieved.

Republic-based economists argue that their conception of self-contained republic economies is also rational. Economic recovery, they grant, will be slower to obtain but less fragile. Republics will determine what to specialize in, who to trade with, and will not be forced to accept new free market relations which are simply new names for an old dependency based relationship.

As it was most articulately explained to me by the President and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, why should that republic export raw materials to Russia and import finished products from Russia, if the real revenue value is accrued only on the finished goods? It would be better for Azerbaijan to learn to process its own raw materials, trade with neighboring states as well as republics, and have local firms earn the higher profits and the republic government the higher revenue.⁶

It is difficult to weigh the competing claims of unionists and separatists in large part because members of each group base their conclusions on diametrically opposite assumptions. To the unionists, of whom Mikhail Gorbachev is of course the most prominent spokesman, the USSR is a multi-national state, and as such has rights of political preeminence over its various constituent parts. Thus, republics should be expected to develop economically in ways that best serve the good of the whole, even if the argument can be made that their own "independent" economic good is consequently somewhat diminished.

However, over the past several years it has become increasingly more common to hear republic politicians, including even former leaders of republic communist parties, argue that the USSR is not a multi-national state but a set of colonized republics. According to this argument,⁷ the republics should not have to relinquish the service of their best interests in response to the common needs of the whole.

Though the new economic treaty does not say the USSR was a former empire, it accepts many of the assumptions of the "colonized." It assumes that not only is the USSR composed of a group of sovereign republics (this was the assumption of earlier versions of the union treaty and of the Soviet constitution itself), but that these sovereign bodies are not surrendering their sovereignty to a duly constituted central body. Instead, for the first time, it allows them to try and exercise this sovereignty in concert, for the first time seeing the best interests of the whole as the sum of its parts and not as something unique.

This new conception of sovereignty allows for secessionist and unionist republics to initial a single agreement. For some republics, like Ukraine (if they in fact sign the treaty), Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Moldova, this accord is seen as the bridge to independence, a way to untangle wholly intertwined economic relations, leaving in their stead a European-style common market. For other republics, like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Byelarus, it is an effort to find a workable common ground that must be attained if the union they would like to see preserved is to be revitalized. For Russia, it is an effort to define a set of relationships that will allow it to usurp much of the USSR's economic potential while losing many of its liabilities.

However, the success of the new agreement is dependent upon many of the same factors that a successful secession attempt depends upon. A Soviet republic must now be able to define its own national interests if it wants to survive as a viable economic entity either inside or outside of the USSR. Moreover, each republic now must be able to develop coherent, gradual, and interconnected strategies to advance these interests.

Those republics serious about secession must in addition gain international recognition of their right to exist independently, either directly in some international forum, or indirectly by so fully mirroring the functions of an independent sovereign state they are awarded that status.

These are highly complex tasks, and the ideal solution in one republic often differs dramatically from what seems best in another. They are oftentimes further complicated by the overriding commitment of some republic leaders to retain power regardless of cost at least until the spoils of the CPSU have been "properly" divided.

The Baltic Republics

The Baltic republics are no longer considered formally part of the Soviet Union, but their "departure" from the USSR has not yet been fully executed. The Baltic republics have already begun asserting many of the prerogatives of fully independent states, including the physical supervision of their own borders. There are innumerable problems that must be worked out between now and 1 January 1992, when they plan to assert full and exclusive sovereignty over their territory.

The most serious issue is one of citizenship. What country are the residents of the three Baltic republics citizens of? To date, only Lithuania has passed a law on citizenship, granting citizenship to all permanent residents of Lithuania who choose to request it by 2 November 1991. After that time, Lithuanian citizenship will be automatic only for those who are descended from those resident in the republic at the time of "annexation" in 1940. All others will have to meet stiff residency and competency requirements, including the need to demonstrate proficiency in the Lithuanian language.

Neither Latvia nor Estonia is considering citizenship legislation in which only descendants of

the residents of the earlier independent regimes will be given automatic citizenship. Many expect that Estonia will also grant citizenship to those who have lived in the republic five or ten years. The debate is fiercest in Latvia, where it is unclear whether or not a similar provision will be introduced into the law, and if it is, a 20 year period of residence may be required.⁸

There is a real question about how many local non-Balts will adopt their respective republic's citizenship. One recent estimate which appeared in *Izvestia* predicted that of the 2.7 million residents of the republic, one million will remain citizens of the USSR. For many, it will not be easy to fully maintain their USSR citizenship. Latvian banks are already refusing to pay Soviet military pensions and honor Soviet money orders. As early as 1990, Baltic residents in these republics were having difficulty getting their children admitted to RSFSR institutions of higher education, which have been handled on an exchange basis over the past several years. These problems will only grow worse when the republics are independent countries.

There are also a host of seemingly mundane problems that have the capacity to wreak havoc for Soviet residents in the Baltic republics and those who live just over the border. Starting 1 January 1992, all citizens of the USSR will need visas to cross into these republics, which will exist as a single customs zone. Each republic already has its own customs services and plans to create national guards, staffed in Lithuania and Latvia's cases through mandatory state service. Latvia has even completed its first conscription drive, which was said to fall 1500 men short.⁹

Estonia and Russia are in the process of trying to work out some sort of looser exchange agreement for the Narva border area. In turn, Russia is demanding of the USSR the right to enforce this border with its own customs officials. One thing that has fortunately not surfaced as a major issue is the question of redefining the borders of these three republics, between themselves, with the neighboring Soviet republics, or with Poland. Nonetheless, many fear that the border issue may have only temporarily disappeared.

The leadership of the Baltic republics spent 18 months vigorously preparing for their own independence, and no matter how severe the economic, social, and political problems they face,

they still have a better understanding of their local problems than the leaders of other republics do. Moreover, the Baltic leaders are committed to working in concert; they meet regularly and have worked out coordinated economic development plans which preserve republic discretion on laws governing property relations, but minimize intra-regional duplication. Whether they will be able to see these programs through is another question, but they are much further along in developing programs of regional cooperation than either the Caucasian or Central Asian republics.

Two of the three men in charge, Ruutel and Gorbunovs, are experienced administrators from the Soviet period; only Lansbergis lacks an appropriate background for running a modern small polity. Moreover, Lansbergis is further handicapped by the political enemies he made in trying to maintain an "independence at all costs" strategy through his first 15 months in power. Whether Lithuania's current parliament will be able to maintain a majority capable of governing remains to be seen.

One advantage that Lithuania does have, is a titular nationality that is in a clear majority. About 80 percent of the population is Lithuanian, although the Poles, at under 10 percent are a particularly vocal minority. Lithuania's ethnic makeup is one reason for Lansbergis' preference for a developmental strategy that looks outward toward Central Europe and tries to minimize multi-lateral ties with the USSR and even bilateral ties with the republics. His own feelings about the USSR undoubtedly play a role as well.

The leaders of the other two Baltic republics are more content to remain a part of the "Soviet orbit," although on the basis of bilateral agreements signed as fully independent states. Estonia and Russia are currently negotiating a series of economic agreements, and the Estonian government also plans on bilateral arrangements on a lesser scale with a number of other republics. Estonia also hopes to turn its long-term close ties with Finland into a back door arrangement for close ties with the rest of the Nordic Council.

Like Estonia, Latvia also plans to maintain close ties with the Soviet republics. Prime Minister Godmanis attended the Alma Ata meeting, though politely declined to sign the agreement, saying instead that Latvia would create its own parallel ties as an independent state.¹⁰

Events in the Baltic republics are being watched with keen interest throughout the USSR. Unionists secretly, or not so secretly, hope these republics will fail in their break-away bid and be forced to ask for readmission to the union once their economies fail to take off. Separatists wish them success, and are timing their own moves in conjunction with how they see events playing out in these three newly independent republics.

The Western Border Republics

Events in Byelarus, Moldova, and Ukraine have been shaped by developments in the Baltics since Lithuania's 11 March 1990 declaration of independence. All three republics declared their independence from the USSR after the August coup. If all three were ever to depart, Russia's border with the "outside" European world would only be Kaliningrad Oblast. The departure of these republics is clearly untenable for Russian nationalists, defense specialists, and economists, not to mention ordinary Russian citizens.

The threat of secession differs from republic to republic, as does the potential cost to Russia and the USSR. Of the three, Byelarus is the republic least likely to leave the USSR. The Popular Front has been a proscribed organization for almost all of its nearly four years in existence, getting its brochures and newspapers printed in neighboring Lithuania until recently. The economic situation has been the major politicizing factor in the republic, and deteriorating local conditions fueled the Minsk strikes of winter and spring 1991. Though the strikers issued a long list of political demands, the strike was broken relatively quickly with promises of economic concessions, and the Communist Party elite was able to remain in firm control through the period with only a minimal amount of hat shuffling at the top.

That is what made the Byelarus declaration of independence so interesting (a renaming occurred in summer 1991 as well). To date, there is no alternative political elite of any size or strength to counter the influence of the Communist Party. If political officials felt the need to "secede," then there were simply no defenders of a center left in the republics. Moreover, obviously in the post-coup world, even the presence of a small and not terrible visible opposition made the Communist Party

leadership feel vulnerable. Hence, the declaration of secession, and the communist-dominated Supreme Soviet of Byelarus decision to replace the unpopular President Nikolai Dementei with a less tainted party-succored political figure.

Moldavia, officially Moldova for nearly a year, is far more serious about its secession bid. Moldova's departure from the USSR is the least costly in terms of the long-term security and economic interests of the rest of the nation. Moldova's president Mircha Snegur has tried to define policies supportive of Moldovan national aims without further exacerbating the republic's already volatile inter-ethnic tensions. Many, if not most, Moldovans appear to want to live in an independent country, and many of these wish to unify with Romania. Snegur, a former Communist Party official who was the first Soviet republic official (outside the Baltic republics) to give up his party post, supports independence but not unification with Romania.¹¹ Because of this stand, Moldova's popular front now opposes his election as president.

However, Snegur's support of independence (after a transition period in which Moldova will participate in the economic life of the USSR) was sufficient to convince the Russian-Ukrainian communities in the Niestr region and the Turkic-Christian Gagauz that they would be oppressed minorities in the new state. Each has demanded its own republic independent of Moldova but part of the USSR.

The Gagauz are one of the small ethnographic communities unlikely to be favored by any political outcome which may develop in the USSR. Outside support is unlikely to be forthcoming, and without it, their claims seem certain to be overshadowed by Moldovan ones. The fate of the new and unsanctioned "Niestr Republic" is far more important, as it could serve as a model for other compact dissatisfied communities of Russians (or any other nationality) living outside of the RSFSR (or their indigenous republic).

Unlike the other current well-publicized border disputes, such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh, or between the Georgians and southern Ossetians, the population of the Niestr region did not have a "national" territory of its own. The Russians and Ukrainians of Moldova live in oblasts of Moldova, not in an autonomous oblast or republic, and thus lack a legal entity which would have grounds to demand a further upgrade of their national status.

If the Niestr republic continues to defy Moldova's laws, and they have already elected their own parliament, then a model has been created that other "foreign" Russians could follow. Moreover, the Russians who live in northern Kazakhstan could find themselves in an analogous situation. Although the leadership of Kazakhstan has no current plans to leave the union, at least a part of Kazakhstan's Russian population is toying with plans to leave the republic, and they are closely watching developments in Moldova.

Recently a new wrinkle has been added. Following Ukraine's declaration of independence, some Ukrainian leaders have been making overtures to get the Niestr Republic to join on to Ukraine, the republic which it borders; Moldova has no contiguous border with the RSFSR. Ukraine's efforts to woo the Niestr parallel Russia's own efforts to annex the Crimea, formerly an oblast of Ukraine, and now an autonomous republic.

Ukrainian secession poses the greatest potential threat to the political and economic security of the future union. Yet it is also a real possibility, despite the best efforts of Russian politicians and economists, to belittle the economic and political viability of this neighboring and long rival republic.

The 1 December 1991 vote on independence by the residents of Ukraine will be the deciding factor, not the question of whether or not Fokin's government initials the new economic treaty, which allows signatories to leave the union with a year's notice. If current indications are at all accurate predictors, then Ukraine will try to become an independent state, and Russia will grudgingly let her go. On this question, Russia's national chauvinism is so blinding that they may not wake up until it is too late to stop Ukraine's move to independence. To many Russians, it is simply unthinkable that Ukraine could exist on its own; after all they have not for hundreds of years. What Russians tend to forget is this is precisely the goal of national self-determination throughout the twentieth century: to allow usually large, and almost always long-suppressed national communities to become fully independent.

From a Ukrainian point of view, they fit this bill. Their republic is large (roughly the size of France), populous (with as many people as Poland), and for that part of the world at least, relatively ethnically homogenous (Russians account for only about a

quarter of the population). Even without the Crimea they have a port, good rail links, a long border with Europe, coal, some energy resources, food enough to feed the population, and a capacity for the development of both light and heavy industry. In fact, according to a study done by Lithuanian economists in 1990, Ukraine was judged the single most viable of all the Soviet republics to survive as an independent state, even more so than Russia.

Possibly the only thing Ukrainian politicians all share is their commitment to seeing their republic become an independent nation. Furthermore, not all the Russian politicians of the republic are opposed to this, and the Russian mayor of Odessa has backed the independence strategy as in the best interests of his port city.

Obviously there are serious divisions within Ukraine as to how quickly and by what means the republic should achieve independence, and who should lead the newly independent republic. Current President Leonid Kravchuk, a politico from the old Sherbitsky entourage, is certainly sensitive to the direction of the political winds in his republic. He left the party and declared himself for independence in advance of the coup, and he appears to recognize that the only hope that the old has to participate in the division of ownership of the republic's economic spoils is if they back independence.

But Kravchuk is also a difficult figure for his political opponents to trap. Kravchuk's reluctance to privatize quickly may benefit party functionaries in the short run, but it has also kept them from gaining ownership of key economic enterprises, unlike their newly "democratized" counterparts in parts of the Russian republic. Moreover, his refusal to raise free prices combined with his introduction of a script system to be used with rubles for purchases in state stores have kept inflation lower and the standard of living higher here than in other Soviet republics. It has also helped the economy function as a *de facto* independent unit.

Kravchuk seems to be trying the same strategy internationally. Ukraine, is after all, a member of the UN, even if it got its seat through a historical accident. Kravchuk has travelled around the world warning Western leaders that Ukraine plans to use its membership.¹² Only time will demonstrate whether or not he is serious about this. Should Chornovil, the Rukh candidate from Lvov, win the presidency, one might anticipate an even earlier test.

More important are the Ukrainian government leaders calling for the creation of a national army of up to 450,000 men.¹³ This is a figure that exceeds Rukh's demand of a 350,000 man force.¹⁴ Konstantin Morozov, an army air commander who now serves as Ukraine's Minister of Defense, has formally requested that all Soviet military installations on Ukraine's soil be turned over to his control, and some reports indicate that many of these installations are now under his jurisdiction.¹⁵

No one expects a Ukrainian military force to be formed overnight. The process of sorting out the Red Army, if it does in fact occur, will be a slow one. But for all the same reasons, those who talk about an "instant Yugoslavia" on the Russo-Ukrainian border are also probably making a major miscalculation. Russia does not yet control the Red Army, which has certainly shown itself ill-disposed to become a sectarian force. So, if Ukraine imitates an independent state long enough, it may well get to be one. This would change the nature of the remaining union, making it appear to many as little more than an extended Russian state with a number of Asian semi-colonies.

The Caucasus

This is certainly the region where ethnic rivalries have been the most pronounced and where the loss of human life has been, comparatively at least, highest. All three republics have been "in again, out again." Georgia and Armenia made serious bids for independence before the August coup, Azerbaijan only afterwards. All three republics are hedging their bets on independence to see what happens in the USSR more generally. Each dreams of independence but would probably be satisfied with a status approximating independence but falling just short of it.

If the region could ever solve its inter-ethnic conflicts, then it might possibly survive as a quasi-independent regional confederative entity. Azerbaijan is most committed to the idea of a "common Caucasian home," and leading Azerbaijani officials have travelled repeatedly to both Iran and Turkey to try and get outside backing for the idea. Azerbaijani Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov, has actively pursued this strategy for the past several years.¹⁶

Oftentimes, it has seemed that the Caucasian

leaders can only agree on one thing: that Moscow's meddling in local politics has exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in the region. Azerbaijani nationalists, and even some leading party officials, believe that the January 1990 "Red Army defense" of Baku was a Moscow-ordered provocation.¹⁷

Georgians make a similar claim about the heating up of tensions with southern Ossetians, and this was true even before Gamsakhurdia came to power, and the tensions between the two communities were not as openly war-like as they are today. All of the conflicts in the region are very difficult to adjudicate, for the area was simultaneously the homeland to many disparate ethnic groups. None were Russian initially, weakening the argument that all problems will be solved if the region remains a part of the USSR.

Each of the three nationalities formed independent states at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, was crushed by Moscow between 1920-1922, and has nurtured the dream of restored independence for more than 70 years. This is even true of the Azerbaijanis, whose current independence drive Westerners generally do not take seriously.¹⁸

Though fearing their Turkic neighbors, Armenia also long hankered after independence, and even during the Brezhnev years, Armenian film-makers shot movies which secretly glorified the Civil War period Dashnak independence movement.¹⁹ Nonetheless, Georgians have probably been the most vocal defender of their right to live in an independent Georgian state. Even today, most of Gamsakhurdia's critics disagree with how he is executing authority but do not differ with him on his commitment to attain an independent state. It is precisely the fervor of Georgian nationalism which accounts for their intolerance towards the Abkhaz, Adzhars, and Ossetians who live among them. Georgians believe themselves to be the dominant nationality in the region, with these smaller peoples subordinate to them, much akin to the attitude of Russians in the USSR.

In the long run, however, events unfolding in Azerbaijan are probably of the greatest import for developments in the USSR. Only Azerbaijan has pretensions to be a regional leader, not just in the Caucasus, but to play a leading role in community with the USSR's other five Muslim republics. Azerbaijani leaders speak of a Black Sea and a Caspian regional network, which links up Soviet

republics with the foreign states on their borders, and dream of dominating both these loose unions.

Azerbaijan is the only one of these republics in which the authority of the Communist Party was seriously compromised prior to the August coup. Appointed as both Party First Secretary and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in the midst of the January 1990 disturbances, Ayaz Mütalipov has always emphasized the importance of his governmental post. He used the party, though, to execute the decisions he made as head of state, even after he assumed the post of President and created a "presidential apparat."

The decision to fully eliminate Azerbaijan's Communist Party helped defuse the public appeal of the national front. This same decision stripped party officials of the authority to ensure this year's harvest is gathered. In the end, Mütalipov has improved his image, but has severely handicapped his ability to see his republic through the coming winter. Even his improved image has not kept angry crowds from gathering daily around Azerbaijan's parliament, demanding more rapid economic reforms and elections for a new parliament.²⁰

If Mütalipov falls, popular opposition leaders like Ektibar Mamedov say they would be willing to adopt a more explicitly religious agenda in order to get assistance from Iran which would enable them achieve full independence.²¹ Iran is already a visible presence in the republic, running a large bookstore on one of Baku's main streets.

Central Asia

For all its seeming stability, Soviet Central Asia is currently going through enormous changes. The legitimacy of the CPSU has been completely destroyed, and the institutional structures which bound Central Asia to Moscow are crumbling as well. Representatives of the old Central Asian elite are struggling to remain in control, but to do so, they must find new bases of political legitimacy. Communism has failed, nationalism is a possible but potentially tainted option, and Islam an untried and potentially volatile formula.

The current political situation varies some from republic to republic, but the outlines are similar everywhere in Central Asia. The party elite in each of the Central Asian republics has always mirrored the clan or regional divisions that were

characteristic of traditional society.

While the Communist Party was the only legal political organization, it served as the mechanism in which intra-group conflict was regulated. Now that its control has broken or been severely threatened, these intra-elite struggles have been sharply stimulated, and in the process, new groups have been able to assert their right to participate in the political process.

Kyrgyzstan's "democratic revolution" of autumn 1990 is a model for the types of struggles that are developing elsewhere in the region. The Osh riots in June-July 1990 gave Kyrgyz first secretary Absamat Masaliev's political opposition a theme around which to unify. Masaliev, who had spent his career in Talas, displaced the Naryn-anchored political organization of Turdakun Usubaliev, when the latter was removed from office in 1985.

The Naryn group constituted themselves as a Democratic Bloc within the legislature. They further demonstrated their credentials as democrats by championing the political rights of the non-communist Democratic Movement for Kyrgyzstan, a loose collection of disaffected intellectuals and Muslim moderates whose goal was to break the CPSU's monopoly on power. Working in concert, by October 1990 they had pushed Masaliev out, replacing him with Askar Akaev, a hitherto relatively apolitical representative of the Naryn group.

There is a similar pattern in Tajikistan, where the Leninabad group suffered a serious defeat 1985 when Rakhmat Nabiev was deposed as Communist Party First Secretary and replaced by Khakar Makhkamov. In 1990, Nabiev reappeared as Makhkamov's main parliamentary opponent and began to court the political opposition of the republic. Three major non-party opposition groups existed: a secular democratic movement, the Rastokhez (Muslim moderate) movement, and the Islamic Renaissance (Muslim fundamentalist) movement.²² The latter two groups were not legally sanctioned until October 1991.²³ Although originally rurally based, both draw much of their intellectual and financial support from Afghanistan.

Nabiev hoped to use support from these groups to defeat Makhkamov in popular balloting for the republic presidency, but the August coup made Nabiev seem superfluous to the non-party reformers. Taking to the streets just after the failed

coup, they succeeded in overthrowing Makhkamov, only to be have Nabiev lead a palace coup against interim president Kaddrin Aslanov on 22 September 1991, after Aslanov demanded the nationalization of Communist Party property.²⁴ The Nabiev regime lasted just over two weeks. On 8 October 1991, Tajik demonstrators, led by fasting *kazis* (Muslim judges), agreed on a truce negotiated by St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, which temporarily got Nabiev to step down pending the outcome of a 24 November 1991 presidential election.

Who will be elected is unclear. As heir to the Brezhnev-era Communist Party, Nabiev's ties reach into every community in better than half the republic. "Free-lance" clerics have convincingly demonstrated their ability to mobilize the population, especially youth. Young people, nearly half of whom are unemployed, make up more than half the republic's population. The republic's political moderates (who in any case are few in number) supported the clerics in an effort to break the hold of the old party elite; now they must choose between supporting a weakened partocracy and an unpredictable group of Muslim activists in their bid to take control.

The situation in Uzbekistan is like Tajikistan, but even more complicated. Sherif Rashidov, the Brezhnev-era party boss was from Dzhizak, but his support came from throughout the republic. After his death in 1983, those tied to the cotton economy came under republic-wide attack. The "cotton mafia" from the Fergana valley suffered disproportionately, leaving the party organization in the region relatively "headless."

The Fergana Valley (not Tashkent) was always the real spiritual center of Uzbekistan, and the power vacuum there further stimulated the development and politicization of Islamic fundamentalist groups. By 1991, these groups were already having a perceptible influence among young people in Tashkent as well. Non-party political moderates grouped around the political movement *Birlik* (Unity), which was declining in popularity, in large part because they were illegal and so banned from a public role in political life. The Islamic groups were not as troubled by their illegal status, because they were able to meet in mosques during the course of religious services.

The party elite was split even before the August 1991 coup, divided between supporters of President

Islam Karimov and the Bukhara group of Vice President Shakhruddin Mir-Saidov. After the coup, the need to "ban" the Communist Party heightened the conflict between the two men, both of whom were keeping close watch on events in Tajikistan.

It would seem almost impossible for Karimov to reach an accommodation with either his secular (which includes *Erk*, a democratic group within the parliament) or his religious opposition. First efforts to bring down Karimov, made in early October 1991, were unsuccessful.²⁵

Even if Mir-Saidov is able to come to power, he might find himself facing opposition which in the long run could prove to be politically crippling. In addition to the political groupings already enumerated, there is also a pro-Tajik secession movement developing in Samarkand, which is sure to become more politically powerful as the power of the Communist Party erodes in both republics. Moreover, Uzbekistan's government must also find a way to placate the republic's Russian population, nervous about finding a place in this increasingly more nationalistic Muslim republic.²⁶

The situation in Kazakhstan is also extremely complicated, in large part because of the republic's peculiar demographic situation; it is the only republic in the union in which the titular nationality is a minority in their republic. Although Kazakhs slightly outnumber Russians (38 percent to 36 percent) native Russian speakers make up about 60 percent of the population.

Ironically, though seemingly the least effected by the coup, in the long run, Kazakhstan could wind up facing the gravest problems of all. The Communist Party was the republic's most skilled political arbiter, able to balance the interests of Kazakhs and Russians in a way that left the Kazakhs getting somewhat more than their fair share, but where Russians enjoyed a higher standard of living than the Kazakhs (as well as the Siberian Russians to their north).

Though current economic plans clearly favor the interests of the industrialized and Russian-dominated north over those of the agriculture and Kazakh-dominated south, secessionist fervor has increased among the Russians since the coup. These briefly came to a head in mid-September when Kazakh nationalists clashed with Cossacks over a canceled anniversary celebration in Uralsk.²⁷

Despite the fact that Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbaev is far and away the most popular political figure in the republic, it quickly became apparent that the successor Socialist Party which he organized was going to become a predominantly Russian organization. Thus, as a counterbalance, he helped form a National Congress of Kazakhstan, headed by prominent poets Olzhas Suleimenov and Mukhtar Shakhmanov, which is likely to be overwhelmingly Kazakh in composition.²⁸

Nazarbaev appears to be hoping that through the predominantly Russian Socialist Party he can create a rift between the Ural Cossack secessionists and the remainder of the Russian speaking population. Similarly, his hope is that a Kazakh national party dominated by establishment nationalists would help defuse the growing appeal of the legally recognized non-communist *Azat* (freedom) party (which is not well represented in the Supreme Soviet), and that of the illegal Muslim secessionist group of *Alash*. However, the creation of these two parties seems likely to further exacerbate existing ethnic divisions, and neither will be able to develop the political clout of the former Communist Party.

It now seems inevitable that advocates of democracy will raise the issue of a referendum on secession in the northern oblasts, some of which are up to 80 percent Russian in composition. Even though Kazakhs generally have only a weak religious identification, it seems unlikely they will remain indefinitely isolated from events in Uzbekistan, particularly since those in the three southern republics are far more closely integrated economically with Tashkent than they are with Alma Ata. Secessionist groups are already said to be forming in Chimkent Oblast.

Everyone in Central Asia knows that the stability of the a given political regime will depend upon its capacity to begin remedying local economic problems. Though everyone agrees there are no quick fix solutions for these, no one quite knows where to look for answers. For the moment, at least, each of the major republics are orienting themselves in different directions. Tajikistan seems to be looking to its Islamic roots, Uzbekistan to its numerous Muslim neighbors, Turkmenistan to Iran, and Kazakhstan to the West for technological assistance and a union with Russia for survival.

In June 1990, there was considerable optimism

among Central Asians and their leaders that the region might be on the verge of a new prosperity. There was talk of republic sovereignty, but Moscow had not withdrawn its economic and political support services. Joint initiatives of Karimov and Nazarbaev seemed likely to bring the republics together in a loose form of regional confederation.²⁹ Eighteen months later, the political leadership of the region has been largely abandoned to its own devices by Moscow, losing what little cooperative spirit which had survived the troubled year from the Central Asian summit in Alma Ata in June 1990 to the second summit of August 1991.

Conclusion

Only someone truly graced with supernatural powers would feel comfortable predicting what lies ahead for the USSR. For those of us with the normal limitations, little more seems predetermined other than the obvious reflection that the old Soviet Union is gone and cannot be reconstituted in its old form. Even Russia's continued existence, as a single juridical entity seems questionable.

Precise historical parallels are hard to find. The argument that we are now witnessing a repeat of the *Articles of Confederation* period of US history seems ill-conceived. The parallel most useful is the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, which went on by some accounts for almost 200 years.

Political time moves more quickly in the modern era. Even still, we can expect a process which could take two or more decades to evolve. If the Ottoman Empire is a useful example, then what we should expect to see in the USSR is a process in which states may form and then reform, with interims in which they linger in political twilight worlds between independence and quasi-independence.

Endnotes

¹*Izvestia*, 24 April 1991.

²For a late version of the text see *Moskovskaia pravda*, 28 June 1991.

³Kravchuk was the only republic president to absent himself from the Novo-Ogarevo proceedings. Prime Minister Vitold Fokin initialed the document in his stead.

⁴*Izvestia*, 4 October 1991.

⁵Gorbachev-Bush news conference, 29 October 1991.

⁶Meetings with Gasan Gasanov, Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, April and September 1991. Meeting with Ayaz Mutaipov, President of Azerbaijan, September 1991.

⁷For an early and particularly eloquent version of it, see Olzhas Suleimenov's address to the first session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 9 June 1989.

⁸For details on the proposed laws see *Report on the USSR*, 27 September 1991, 21-25.

⁹*Izvestia*, 14 October 1991.

¹⁰*Izvestia*, 4 October 1991.

¹¹*Izvestia*, 15 October 1991.

¹²*Izvestia*, 30 September 1991.

¹³*FBIS Daily Report Soviet Union*, 2 October 1991. (FBIS-SOV-91-191; 64.)

¹⁴*Izvestia*, 6 September 1991.

¹⁵*FBIS Daily Report Soviet Union*, 4 September 1991. (FBIS-SOV-91-171.)

¹⁶Gasan Gasanov, *Izbrannye vystuplenii*, 1990.

¹⁷*Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 25 November 1990.

¹⁸See *Literaturnaia gazeta* no. 40, 1991, for a recent Azerbaijani defense of independence, written by Anar, head of the republic's union of writers.

¹⁹This was an unstated theme in April.

²⁰*Vremya*, 4 October 1991.

²¹Interview in Baku with author, September 1991.

²²*Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 4 October 1991.

²³*Vremya*, 2 October 1991.

²⁴*Izvestia*, 23 September 1991.

²⁵*FBIS Daily Report Soviet Union*, 4 October 1991. (FBIS-SOV-91-193.)

²⁶There were 1.6 million Russians in Uzbekistan at the time of the 1989 census. However, nearly 270,000 of them left the republic over the next two years. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 40, 1991.

²⁷*Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 15 September 1991.

²⁸*Izvestia*, 7 October 1991.

²⁹*Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 24 June 1990.

Eastern Central Europe: Social and Economic Consequences of Political Change

Joseph S. Gordon

Defense Intelligence College

Introduction

The euphoria phase of revolution in Eastern Central Europe is over. The collapse of communist regimes and their replacement by new governments determined to establish parliamentary democracy and market economies initially prompted a celebration of great joy and optimism. Now comes the hangover as people begin to grasp the enormity of the task.

Most observers realize expectations that political emancipation, economic progress, and social modernization can be attained to an equal extent or at the same time were unrealistic. Although political institutions could be set up in a relatively short period, it will take several years before any noticeably positive effects of economic transformation are felt. And it may take decades if not generations before a new civil society can develop.

The inconclusive results of the Polish election of 27 October 1991 were another sign for Eastern Europe that the euphoria of 1989 has given way to disillusionment. Most observers predict that Warsaw's program of economic reform, widely regarded as the boldest in the region, will have to slow down.

This paper will discuss the economic, political, and social difficulties facing Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland two years after the fall of the Wall. It will address how these countries face similar problems, yet differ in their ways of solving them. Because building a healthy economy will be crucial to

success in the political and social arenas, this paper concentrates on the economic situation.

Economic Transformation

It has become clear that economic vitalization in Eastern Europe will be a long, painful, and arduous process. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have taken the lead in economic reform among the former Soviet bloc nations to begin constructing a market economy from the wreckage of central planning. They have made a strong start, having freed most prices, made their currencies convertible for most businesses (Poland's zloty is the only fully convertible currency in the region), opened their doors to foreign investors, and lowered trade barriers. One can see the results. The shops are full of Western goods, street vendors are everywhere, hundreds of thousands of local entrepreneurs have started small businesses, scores of Western law firms, consultants, and accountants are setting up offices.¹

While business may appear to be booming, the economies' vital signs necessitate grave concern for the patient. Both GDP and industrial output have declined significantly during the last two years; inflation remains high, unemployment is rising rapidly. East European economies have suffered greatly from the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union and the former German Democratic Republic, in addition to a sharp rise in energy costs as the Soviet Union began demanding world prices for its oil.²

Underlying these vital indicators are two fundamental deficiencies in East European economies that may take many years to solve. First, the countries have hardly begun to think about setting up the institutions and rules which have had

to evolve in the West over the last century and are so necessary to the proper functioning of a modern economy. One takes for granted the array of measures in place to govern the typical capitalist economy: property and contract laws and the courts to enforce them, accounting and bankruptcy rules, tax codes, pension and unemployment systems, labor laws, and supervision of banks and financial markets. Creating the required institutions and rules has been slow due in large part to legislative inexperience and inefficiency. Even if the governments had worked faster, implementation of a "true institutional revolution" remain hindered by shortages of trained personnel, including lawyers, accountants, bankers, and businessmen.³

The other deficiency of Eastern European economies involves the disposition of the "dinosaurs," the huge government-owned industrial enterprises, virtually all inefficient except for the great capacity to pollute the environment. *The Economist* has described the problem vividly: "Every day millions of people trudge to the wrong job in the wrong place to produce the wrong goods."

Most of these industries suffer from too many workers, lack of hard currency to purchase raw materials and modernize outdated equipment, not to mention too many layers of often corrupt and inept managers. These giant firms muddled through under the old regime nurtured by government subsidies, cheap energy from the Soviet Union, and a captive market either at home or in the other Eastern European countries.

Many companies may be doomed even if they cut wages or reduce the size of the workforce. According to a recent study, 20 to 25 percent of manufacturing industries in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary may never be able to make a profit. These include Czechoslovakia's leather and tobacco companies as well as its food industry, Hungary's iron and steel, and Poland's basic chemical, cement, and non-ferrous metallurgy industries.⁴

It is hard to imagine how such companies can avoid some kind of bankruptcy which would leave millions of workers unemployed. To ward off economic catastrophe, the various countries of Eastern Europe have attempted or plan to soon begin transfer of ownership from government to private hands, not only to deal with the industrial dinosaurs but also to transform the economy in general.

The initial expectations that property could be simply and swiftly privatized have been disappointing. Eastern Europeans have devised a variety of approaches for privatization: converting large state enterprises to joint stock companies and selling the shares to private investors or employees; breaking up large enterprises and selling or leasing the small units; selling or leasing small shops and service facilities; the reprivatization or return of land, buildings, and companies to the previous private owners; and allowing the formation of new small and medium-sized enterprises by individuals, private companies, or authentic cooperatives.

The collapse of industry in East Germany, once considered the most industrially advanced country in Eastern Europe, has had a sobering effect on advocates of reform. Reformers hope for success with plans soon to be implemented to create instant "people's capitalism" by issuing or selling vouchers that can be exchanged for ownership shares.⁵

The small agencies established for privatization are stretched to the limits in addressing the large number of state-owned firms: Poland has about 7,500, Hungary 2,300, and Czechoslovakia 4,800. Poland's Ministry for Ownership Changes has only 200 employees, Hungary's State Property Agency has 120, and Czechoslovakia's Ministry of Privatization only 60. Compare these figures to Germany's *Treuhandanstalt* with 3,000 employees backed up by more than 40,000 West German businessmen sitting on management boards. Even with these vastly superior assets, Germany has only been able to sell off about 1,200 of between 8,000 and 10,000 former East German state enterprises.⁶

Nevertheless, most Western analysts of the economic situation in Eastern Europe seem to agree that reform must come swiftly, and they urge the leaders of the region to resist the temptation to seek a painless route to a market economy. The road to reform will not be easy, as we see from a brief summary of Poland's, Czechoslovakia's, and Hungary's efforts to date.

Poland

Poland attracted wide attention with its plan to go "cold turkey," i.e. rapid dismantling of the old system and conversion to the new, beginning in January 1990. The Poles chose to follow a plan formulated by the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs,

whose concept envisioned four simultaneous parts to a program of rapid market transformation. First, let prices find "market clearing levels" in part based on free trade with the West. Second, set the private sector free by removing bureaucratic restrictions. Third, bring the state sector under control by privatization and imposing tougher disciplines on such state firms as remain. Fourth, maintain overall macroeconomic stability through restrictive credit and balanced budgets.⁷

Poland's reform has made considerable progress. According to *The Economist*, by the end of 1991, the private sector is expected to comprise perhaps 40 percent of GDP thanks to the sale or lease of approximately 60,000 state shops, mostly in retailing, distribution, and transportation. Most restrictions on foreign investment have been abolished. Warsaw's stock exchange began weekly trading in April 1991 and now has seven companies listed.⁸

Privatization of manufacturing, however, through such measures as liquidations, management buyouts, joint ventures, and sales to foreigners has been going more slowly than expected. As of March 1991, Poland had privatized only about 100 to 150 large enterprises out of more than 3,500. In order to speed up the process, the Polish government announced an ambitious voucher plan in which every Pole would be given free shares in the national patrimony some time in 1992 to be invested in "privatization funds." With this plan, Poland hopes to push between 400 and 700 of the biggest companies through a mass conversion program in 1992.⁹

The financial picture of the Polish government looks bleak. Although Western governments wrote off half of Poland's \$33 billion debt in April 1991, and the IMF granted a \$1.7 billion adjustment loan, the government is strapped to fulfill its international debt obligations. Efforts to combat inflation were able to reduce the rate from approximately 800 percent in 1990 to a predicted 80 percent in 1991 instead of the hoped for 36 percent. This was not enough to ease pressure on the government to allow bigger pay raises in state-owned companies. In part because of inflation, the government's budget deficit is out of control. Financial scandals set off political and economic shock waves on the eve of the 27 October 1991 elections that further undermined public confidence in the government's

reform programs.¹⁰

The highly fragmented results of the October election, most observers agree, increased the pressure to slow down the pace of economic reform, if it had not already ground to a halt as some have concluded. As expected, President Walesa announced his intention to replace Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, who for two years had led Poland's "shock therapy" march toward capitalism and had reportedly won the confidence of Western financial institutions. At the same time, Walesa vowed to continue free market reforms despite the election, offering among other suggestions to become prime minister himself.¹¹

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia has lagged well behind Poland in carrying out far-reaching economic changes. Although the Communist Party fell from power in Prague only a few months after it did in Warsaw, the new Czechoslovak government debated for a year how to dismantle the old planned economy. In the end, the more radical reformers, led by Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, won out, but the plan adopted in Prague was more gradual than Poland's. Czechoslovak officials argued that the country's substantially better economic standing justified a less radical approach. More importantly, Prague purposely tried to avoid the shock treatment of the Polish experience, while preparing the population for hard times. President Havel warned his country in his New Year's address in 1991: "the legacy we inherited is worse than we expected...What a year ago seemed to be a dilapidated house is, in fact a ruin."¹²

Thus, Czechoslovakia has embarked on a course of rather slow and modest measures beginning in January 1991, one year after Poland launched its plan. Prague raised prices on about 85 percent of goods in January 1991, and more have been "freed" since, but in a restrained manner compared to Poland. At the same time, the government partially compensated consumers with higher wages.

Businesses planning investments or overseas trade were permitted to exchange crowns for hard currency, but individual access to "real money" is restricted. Trade barriers have been lowered, but high tariffs still protect some local manufacturers from foreign competition. Conversion to private

ownership has hardly begun; today private businesses account for less than 2 percent of GDP, as only 6,000 of approximately 100,000 state-owned restaurants, stores, and small businesses have been sold at auction.

The conversion of large-scale enterprises is furthermore barely underway. Their privatization through a much-heralded coupon distribution system was scheduled to begin in October 1991 and be completed in mid-1992. In contrast to Poland's scheme of free distribution of shares to citizens, Czechoslovakia plans to sell vouchers at a modest price that can be traded in auctions for shares in companies. Implementation of this plan seems to have been delayed, in part because the country has not yet set up a stock market.¹³ Unfortunately, Finance Minister Klaus' announcement in May 1991, "we definitely want to privatize the economy within two years" already seems overly optimistic.¹⁴

Hungary

Hungary stands out among the three countries discussed for having made notable economic reforms under communism, a process of trial and error that began in 1968 as the New Economic Mechanism fostered by Janos Kadar. This "goulash communism" eventually developed a large number of small private businesses, a rudimentary stock exchange, and state-owned commercial banks before the old regime fell in 1989.

Today, the private sector contributes about one-third of GDP. Probably because of its past economic achievements and its long-standing openness to the West, Hungary has attracted some \$1.2 billion in foreign investments, which is more than half of the total foreign capital that has entered all of Eastern Europe thus far. These investments have created approximately 5,000 joint ventures, 40 percent of which have come from the United States. Such interest emanating from foreign private enterprise is interpreted as a clear indication of Hungary's bright long-term prospects, despite the fact that the country is also the most heavily indebted in Eastern Europe.¹⁵

In other areas however, Hungary has been moving toward economic reform about as slowly as Czechoslovakia. The currency is convertible for most businesses but not for individuals. Trade barriers were also lowered, but tariffs still protect

certain products from foreign competition. Although private enterprise was already well established before 1989 in Hungary, Budapest has not made much progress toward privatization since. As of August 1991, only 8 to 10 percent (approximately 330 of 2,200 large state enterprises) had been privatized. Conversion of small enterprises has also proceeded slowly. Parliament was bogged down trying to pass a compensation law for property, for which it does not have adequate funds. Ownership has proven to be difficult to determine in many cases. A number of small enterprise employees have shown reluctance to go into business for themselves. Part of this reluctance to privatize may derive from disappointment that the European Community turned a cold shoulder to Hungary's application to become a full member, a status that many Hungarians expected would give the economy a major boost.¹⁶

The immense economic problems facing Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have placed great pressure on the fledgling political systems that, like the economy itself, are only beginning to take shape.

Political Transformation

In many respects, the development of political culture may not be any easier than the formulation and application of the appropriate new rules and institutions required for economic transformation in Eastern Europe. As in the economy, it will take more than imitation of Western models of democracy. These models must be adapted to the circumstances of each country, and the procedures that make government work, never a clean process in any democracy, need to evolve and be digested. As Adam Michnik observed in a speech delivered in Vienna in February 1991:

*In all these countries dictatorship has lost and freedom has won ... But that does not mean that democracy has won. Democracy means the institutionalization of freedom. We do not yet have a democratic order, and that is why our freedom is so fragile and shaky.*¹⁷

These countries may have had a parliament under the old regime, but the body hardly functioned as a genuine legislature in a one-party system. The communist party worked out the legislation,

presenting it to a parliament that usually only met briefly about once a year merely as a rubber stamp. The post-revolutionary legislatures seem rather inexperienced and unaccustomed to the role they play in a real democracy. Old habits, such as deferring to the executive for leadership and information, persist. Ironically, the new parliaments tend not to trust the executive for information, a holdover of the old days of cooked or skewed data, nor are they equipped to gather their own information to formulate legislation; both branches of government suffer from the general inadequacy of data-gathering structures inherited from the communist past.

Building a multi-party system from the ruins of 45 years of single party rule cannot happen overnight either. Watching the new political parties evolve is painful for Western observers who fear that the process of political development will slow down the progress of economic reform. They correctly point out that economic success achieved as rapidly as possible is critical to political stability, yet one is stymied by the realization that political frustration can also impede progress of the economy.

The fragmentation of politics taking place today was certainly inevitable, especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Both countries toppled communism with the aid of a single opposition movement, Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia. The two movements have divided into two or three new parties largely because of differences that developed over the pace and methods of economic transformation. Politicians will have to learn to form coalitions in order to govern effectively, either before an election with a minimal threshold for parliamentary representation as in the Czechoslovakia, or possibly after the election as in Poland, without such a limiting rule that resulted in 30 parties gaining seats in the 27 October 1991 election.¹⁸

Those who had pinned their hopes on Poland leading Eastern Europe out of the ruins of communism must be apprehensive today. The political possibilities for the near future run from elections held again in a few months, to Solidarity's divided elements reuniting, to Walesa taking charge either as a Gaullist-like president or perhaps a Pilzudski-style dictator. A disturbing aspect of the October election was the high rate of voter apathy; nearly 60 percent of the voters stayed home. One

speculated as to their reasons: disillusionment with democracy or frustration with the economic situation. Could voter apathy lead to some kind of dictatorship or even a return of the old regime with its security of employment and prices?

In contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary has made a somewhat smoother political transition from communism toward democracy. This can be explained perhaps by Budapest having had a head start, as movement toward a multi-party system had already begun before 1989 with the fragmentation of the communist party into factions. In the wake of this phenomenon, new opposition parties sprung up in addition to the revival of some older parties that returned as if from mothballs. The communist party abolished itself in October 1989, but its successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party, lost the subsequent elections in the Spring of 1990. As of late 1991, opinion differs as to the future political development of Hungary. Some argue that its eight parties in parliament will ultimately consolidate into two American-style parties, while others argue that popular discontent, as evidenced in recent polls, may lead to further fragmentation or realignment of loyalties.

Finally, political transformation of Eastern Europe will undoubtedly hinge on the success of reeducating society. As Germans soon came to realize after November 1989, destroying the Berlin Wall may well have seemed like child's play compared to the challenge of dismantling the wall in people's minds. Learning to participate in a modern, market-oriented democracy could take many years, if not even generations.

Social Transformation

In addition to the physical degradation in Eastern Europe left in the wake of Soviet communism, Peter Frank wrote recently, "a pall of spiritual pollution and moral corruption hangs over the new society." The Soviet system imposed on the region had long given up Marxist idealism in an effort to merely maintain power. Under these conditions, Frank continues in a similarly blunt vein:

*Society, as conventionally understood, ceases to exist. Its vitality is drained away. Culture, art, and language become impoverished; history is not merely rewritten, it is erased.*¹⁹

One can dismantle communism by abolishing the old institutions and creating new ones. But the new society cannot abolish its people who are lasting products of 45 years of a certain way of life. The almost stillborn attempts to bring key communist leaders to trial and to screen former communists from influential positions bear witness to the difficulty of the task. Without people groomed to step in, thousands of managers, bureaucrats, military and police officers, teachers, and the like may be of necessity retained. One asks who will educate the next generation, and who will write the textbooks for their classes.

Tops on the agenda of reforming attitudes in Eastern Europe will certainly be to forge a new work ethic. The communist system of guaranteed jobs let people shirk work as well as avoid innovation and still get paid. Whether workers will readily shift gears to become willing productive workers is not yet clear and cannot be tested until better economic circumstances pertain. Workers may not have much patience, however, with economic reform under the new regime, which assures them that things are going to get worse before they get better; they heard such assurances often from the previous management.

Social tensions are bound to increase with economic transformation. Already, those who have seized the moment to embark on private enterprise have engendered resentment. Outbursts of anti-semitism and attacks on gypsies may well reflect initial churnings of social ferment that remind many of the unpleasant experiences that took place between the two World Wars. One can expect more such tensions in society given general predictions of continued unemployment, long-term poverty, and the inevitable inequities of economic reform.

Outlook

To paraphrase a former Carter administration official, if one is not highly depressed about the economic, political, and social prospects of Eastern Europe, one is not thinking clearly. It is hard to imagine that Eastern Europeans do not face a prolonged time of troubles. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that democratic governments will take hold and somehow muddle through.

Yet, circumstances since the revolutions of 1989

should allow the newly established democracies several years of breathing space. This should grant the three countries discussed here, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, at least some chance of surviving difficult times. Their leaders all have legitimacy as internationally respected members of the anti-communist opposition. They have demonstrated considerable leadership and political ability. The people will remain supportive of their leaders at least for a while to buy them a certain period of grace. This support is based on solidarity, having gotten rid of communism and sharing economic privation in a transition period, and the recognition that many things have already improved. People may not have much money, but at least there is something to buy, and they do not have to spend so much of their lives standing in line.

Furthermore, in contrast to the depression years of the 1930s with the popular appeal of fascism and communism, there exists today no such competing ideologies to undermine the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe. The 1990s also contrasts with the 1930s in that the relatively prosperous states of the West have the economic strength to substantially assist their neighbors to the East in the difficult transition from communism to capitalism. Finally, the fact that Eastern Europe faces no external threat in the near future should give the governments some time to launch their programs of reform.

Endnotes

¹For an excellent survey of the economic situation from which much of this discussion is drawn see "A Survey of Business in Eastern Europe," *The Economist*, 21 September 1991.

²Patrice Dabrowski, "East European Trade (Part I): The Loss of the Soviet Market," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 4 October 1991, 28-37; John M. Kramer, "Eastern Europe and the 'Energy Shock' of 1990-91," *Problems of Communism*, May/June 1991, 85-96; Jim Hoagland, "In Eastern Europe, Fearing the Fall," *Washington Post*, 13 June 1991; and Stephen Engelberg, "Eastern Europe's Hardships Grow as Trade with Soviets Dries Up," *New York Times* 6 May 1991.

³Marvin Jackson, "The Progress of Privatization," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 2 August 1991, 40-45. For an excellent overview of the tasks confronting Eastern Europe see Alan H. Gelb and Cheryl Gray, *The Transformation of Economies in Central and Eastern Europe: Issues, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, June 1991).

⁴"Business in Eastern Europe," 4-13. The study cited is Paul Hare and Gordon Huges, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London; discussion paper 543.

⁵Jackson, "Progress of Privatization," 40.

⁶Jackson, "Progress of Privatization," 43 and "One Year After

German Economic Union," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 28 June 1991, 38-43.

⁷Jeffrey Sachs, "Eastern Europe's Economies: What is to be Done?" *The Economist*, 13 January 1990, 21-26.

⁸For extensive studies of the Polish economy see World Bank, *Poland: Economic Management for a New Era* (Washington, DC: August 1990); Polish-European Community-World Bank Task Force, *An Agricultural Strategy for Poland* (Washington, DC: World Bank, December 1990).

⁹"Creating the Invisible Hand," *The Economist*, 11 May 1991, 63-66, provides a good description of the voucher plans in Poland and Czechoslovakia. See also Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "The New Government and Privatization," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 22 March 1991, 11-16; and Thomas Wybraniec, "Die Polen muessen zwischen Marktwirtschaft und staatlichem Dirigismus entscheiden," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 October 1991.

¹⁰Ben Slay, "The Economy: Perceptions and Reality," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 4 October 1991, 16-22; and, "Financial Scandals and the Evolution of the Banking System," *Report on Eastern Europe* (27 September 1991, 21-27).

¹¹Stephen Engelberg, "In Polish Vote, a Clear Slap at Reform," *New York Times*, 29 October 1991; Blaine Harden and Mary Battiata, "Walesa to Replace Finance Minister," *Washington Post*, 1 November 1991; Blaine Harden, "Walesa Promises to Continue Free Market Despite Vote," *Washington Post*, 29 October 1991; and, "Walesa Offers to Head Government," *Washington Post*, 30 October 1991.

¹²Quoted in Stephen Engelberg, "Czech Conversion to a Free Market Brings the Expected Pain and More," *New York Times*, 4 January 1991.

¹³Jackson, "Progress of Privatization," 43: Peter Martin, "Privatization: A Balance Sheet," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 1

February 1991, 7-11. For fundamental analysis of Czechoslovakia's economy see World Bank, *Czechoslovakia: Transition to a Market Economy* (Washington, DC: May 1991); The Atlantic Council of the United States, *Czechoslovakia on the Road To Reform: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy* (Washington, DC: February 1991).

¹⁴Quoted in Andrew Borowiec, "Czechoslovakia Prints Vouchers to Let Citizens Buy into Business," *Washington Times*, 15 May 1991.

¹⁵Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Joint Ventures Begin to Have a Significant Impact on the Economy," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 24 May 1991, 23-26. For fundamental analysis on Hungary see The Atlantic Council of the United States, *Hungary on the Road to Reform: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy* (Washington, DC: 1990); OECD Economic Surveys, *Hungary* (Paris: July 1991).

¹⁶Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Relations with the European Community," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 26 July 1991, 33-35; and, "Compensation Law Finally Approved," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 6 September 1991, 22-24; Peter Maass, "For Many Hungarians, Promise of Compensation Proves Hollow," *Washington Post*, 26 October 1991; and "Hungary's Outdated Industries Learn to Search for Markets," *Washington Post*, 25 May 1991.

¹⁷Quoted in Peter Frank, "Deconstructing Communist Systems," *World Today*, May 1991, 82. For a discussion of the problems facing Eastern Europe see Magarditsch Hatschikjan, "Eastern Europe: Nationalist Pandemonium," *Aussenpolitik* 42 (Third Quarter 1991): 211-220.

¹⁸"Champagner fuer die Linke," *Der Spiegel*, 5 November 1991, 197-199.

¹⁹Frank, "Deconstructing Communist Systems," 82.

Social and Economic Change, the Transformation of the Balkans, and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

William Zimmerman

University of Michigan

The fundamental features of Balkan politics in the 1990s differ markedly from those which have defined our understanding of politics in that region during the first 45 years after the end of World War II. Just as such verities in the overall political firmament of Europe as a divided Germany and a united Soviet Union have disappeared, so too have many of the elements that seemed constants in the equation of Balkan politics.

For more than a generation, Albania presented a picture of placid and repressive unanimity. Bulgaria gave concrete meaning to the notions of derivative regime and satellite. After Stalin broke with Tito, Yugoslavia for a long while seemed to constitute a promising alternative to Soviet-style socialism symbolized by the terms "market socialism" and "workers' self-management," and characterized by open borders, relatively open (albeit authoritarian) politics, a burgeoning consumer-oriented economy, and a non-alignment policy that rendered it a net beneficiary of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

More generally, the borders of all the states in the Balkans seemed to have been stabilized, if only because the United States and the Soviet Union would not tolerate changes in them. The extent to which the fates of the various states were inter-connected diminished when compared with prior periods of Balkan history.

How times have changed! In Albania, of all places, fundamental changes in the direction of democratization have occurred over the last year. These changes make one wonder about the current

faddish explanations linking the global upsurge of democracy to broad notions of development. Similarly, it may yet transpire that Bulgaria, of all places in the Balkans, will come closest to emulating the democratic transformations that took place in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1989. Once again, impressions formed in almost 45 years of communist rule contrast starkly with much of contemporary Bulgarian practice. The "second" communist Yugoslavia has collapsed into an ugly and searing civil war, the ultimate outcome of which is uncertain. What is certain, though, is the second Yugoslavia is gone forever.

In the process, constant borders in the Balkans have also disappeared. With the passage of that expectation, the world has returned to a situation where the fates of the various Balkan countries are likely to be more inter-connected than they were during the period when the US-Soviet relationship represented the main contradiction in Europe.

This paper discusses Yugoslavia's disintegration. My focus is on the structure of social and economic cleavages within Yugoslavia. These lay very close to the surface throughout most of the post World War II period. They have now surfaced in a way which is utterly destroying what for a long time had seemed a promising alternative to Soviet-style socialism. Three arguments are presented. First, there is a now greater connectivity between the behaviors of the various Balkan states than obtained in the first 45 years after World War II. Second, in order to understand how Yugoslavia disintegrated, it is not necessary to factor in the behavior of such key political leaders as Milosevic and Tudjman; attention to the social and economic cleavages that characterize the country are quite sufficient. Third, the situation resulting from these objective cleavages is exacerbated by fundamentally different

goals and perspectives on the part of the key players within Yugoslavia.

Part I

While my focus is on Yugoslavia *per se*, it is essential to stress that the other states of the region may quite possibly become relevant players in this ongoing drama in ways that would have been inconceivable before the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of communist power in Europe. There is the real possibility that the transformations occurring in other Balkan countries may contribute to those states' involvement in the Yugoslav conflict to degrees, and in some instances in ways, that would not have happened when the US-Soviet clash was the central, international cleavage shaping the contours of politics in Europe, including the Balkans.

Albania, for instance, has now become a genuine attraction for Albanian Kosovars. After all the years of Serbian hyperbole about the schemes of Albanians in Kosovo to unite with Albania, years when it was inconceivable that more than a handful of Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity would have wished to unite with Albania, unification with Albania must now seem enormously attractive to ethnic Albanians in comparison with their present situation in a Serbia which has eliminated almost all vestiges of self-government in Kosovo.

Bulgaria's persistent interest in Macedonia and Macedonians could become a factor of increased importance in the event, which seems increasingly likely, that Macedonia becomes independent. Hungarian officials have already expressed a territorial interest in the Vojvodina now that, as one Hungarian official indelicately stated in the summer 1991, Yugoslavia no longer exists. A right wing party in Italy has asserted an Italian claim to Istria.

Part II

One way to begin to answer why Yugoslavia disintegrated is to ask what held Yugoslavia together throughout the post-World War II years. (It bears remembering that regimes come and go with some regularity. T. Robert Gurr ascertained that the average regime life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been 31 years.) By posing that question, we quickly appreciate that what transpired

over the course of the 1980s was the disappearance or failure of each element, with the exception of the Yugoslav Army, that had served to deter disintegration of Yugoslavia. In the meantime, the cleavages that always threatened to divide Yugoslavia either persisted, or in most instances intensified, in the course of the 1980s.

Moreover, addressing that question in the context of the changes in Europe in the 1980s also suggests there were more factors contributing to Yugoslav stability than most conventional accounts imply.

The conventional explanation of the factors which made Yugoslav cohesiveness is straightforward. The key elements that held the country together in the standard account were Tito himself, the communist party (renamed the League of Yugoslav Communists [LCY] in 1952), and the army. Each of these doubtless made a substantial contribution to holding the country together. Tito's personal role is perhaps best illustrated by his intervention in Croatian and Serbian politics in the early 1970s at the time of the Croatian national movement (*pokret*). In Croatia, a burgeoning national awareness occurred in the early 1970s; much of it was inspired and endorsed by the communist leadership of Croatia. The most strident demands for change directly paralleled those being made in Croatia 20 years later and included calls for Croatian membership in the United Nations and IMF and assertions that an independent Croatia would catch up with Sweden in 10 or 15 years. Tito managed to stifle the nationalist impulse through the arrest and incarceration of hundreds of Croatian nationalists and a thorough purge of the Croatian communist leadership. He then proceeded to purge the Serbian party as well, whose leader Marko Nikesic had insisted that democratization was the condition of Yugoslav unity.

Tito, by contrast, insisted at that juncture that the proper path to unity was that of the traditional Leninist model: democratic centralism, intolerance of "views and political conduct that are at variance with the ideology and policy of the League of Communists,"¹ and a traditionally communist cadres policy.

Certainly, a strong case can be made that the Communist Party, indeed in its Leninist mode, had contributed substantially to the formation of a unified Yugoslavia during and after World War II, and in thwarting Stalin's efforts to accomplish

Tito's overthrow by means short of direct military intervention. The Soviet failure to overthrow Tito was in no small measure a product of the fact that at that juncture the Yugoslavs were aping the Soviet model with a vengeance. Traditional Leninist systems are particularly well structured to resist the pressures of imperialist states, even when that state is the Motherland of Socialism herself.

What also needs to be stressed throughout are two other points about the LCY. First, in practice, the overall trend of the Tito period was in directions away from the Leninist model and toward what this author² and others have termed consociational authoritarianism. Consociational authoritarianism is premised on the assumption that the LCY could most effectively contribute to keeping the country together by modifying many of the traditional Leninist dicta. Instead, power was devolved to the republic party organizations, and the leaders of each of the six or eight (and that was a crucial ambiguity) constituted themselves as a kind of cartel made up of people who it was assumed had "an overarching commitment to the survival of the arena" within which their groups competed and enforced, "within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises."³

It was on this basis that the 1974 constitution, the delegate system, and the collective State Presidency were all premised. It was also the basis for resource allocation decisions. Rather than make hard choices, the leaders of the LCY determinedly set out to avoid economic rationality. Much of the story of Yugoslav politics during the decade before and after Tito's death is one of attaching priority to the "political factor." The result was a string of decisions to create or seek to create multiple electronics industries, shipbuilding facilities, airlines, etc., without regard to economies of scale in order to keep peace in the family. Paying off the players in this way works much better in conditions where the pie is increasing than when it is contracting.

Second, the LCY was as much the problem as the solution. Devolving power to the republics contributed to the growth of intra-Yugoslav national communism. The incentive structure that resulted increased the probability that republic leaders would attempt to mobilize local support by making appeals based on nationalist grounds; in this respect the Milosevic and Tudjman phenomena are not at all idiosyncratic. In addition, the devolution of power

to the republics meant that citizens in the various republics not only had a cultural basis for their attachment to republic symbols, they also saw the republic as the source of governmental funds.

Furthermore, because the departures from such traditional Leninist notions as democratic centralism took place at the center but not in the republics, the reality was that the "market" in market socialism was minimized; key investment decisions made locally were made by republic party officials in general disregard of market considerations. This contributed in no small way to the country's declining economic performance in the 1980s. (This was not, of course, the only reason for the decline; the global energy shocks, for instance, had profound impact on the Yugoslav economy but were phenomena almost entirely exogenous to Yugoslavia.)

As for the army, it doubtless contributed to holding the country together. It was widely trumpeted as the ultimate guarantor of Yugoslavia's cohesion. It was one place where *edinstvo i bratsvo* could be cultivated vigorously, and it was in several respects a genuinely all Yugoslav institution. Like the LCY, however, it also turned out to contribute to the problem, even while playing an integrative role. In particular, the overwhelmingly Serbian and Montenegrin cast to the officer core represented fuel for those who saw an integrated Yugoslavia as a fig leaf for Great Serbian unitarist aspirations and rendered plausible claims that the army were "occupiers," especially, but not only, in Kosovo.

Tito, the LCY, and the army, I would argue, do not exhaust the forces that held Yugoslavia together for more 45 years. An important additional contributor to cohesion, surely, was the decision to manifest trust in the citizenry through policies that marked Yugoslavia off from the traditional Soviet model. This was reciprocated by some, though scarcely all, Yugoslav citizens.

These policies included the decision to abandon coercive collectivization; to encourage consumerism through the elimination of obligatory, rather than indicative, planning; and to open the country's borders to the outmigration of workers and the immigration of Western tourism and goods.

These acts gave Yugoslavs far greater control over their own destinies than the citizens of other socialist states and contributed to economic growth rates for almost 30 years that were at or above the levels of

the Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea in their most tempestuous periods of growth. Table 1 shows the rapidity of Yugoslav growth rates in the years 1953-1980 and what happened in the 1980s.

Table 1: Average Growth Rate, Gross Domestic Product	
1953-56	6.6 %
1957-60	11.3 %
1961-65	6.8 %
1966-70	5.8 %
1971-75	5.9 %
1976-80	5.6 %
1981-88	0.5 %

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije, 1990* (Belgrade: 1990), 99.

Unlike the Soviet Union, moreover, Yugoslavs in these years did not suffer deferred gratification. Rather, the regime encouraged consumerism with a vengeance, and it worked. There were less than 13,000 registered automobiles in 1955 and more than 3.3 million cars (one for every seven Yugoslavs) in 1989⁴. The regime attempted with considerable success to associate itself with the growing prosperity of the Yugoslav citizens; the only problem was when the economy turned sour for a combination of reasons in the 1980s, many of the same citizens wondered whether the place they resided would be better off, not just without the communists, but outside Yugoslavia.

To the above I would suggest a final factor to be considered in explaining what held Yugoslavia together in the period from 1948 to 1989. I refer to the US-Soviet rivalry in Europe. To use an old Bolshevik phrase, it was not accidental that the demise of Yugoslavia occurred after the transformation of the US-Soviet relationship and the turmoil in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. My suspicion is that given the US-Soviet rivalry, a widespread expectation existed in Yugoslavia that either the US or the USSR would always prefer the given borders in Europe to a some alteration thereof, and that one or the other had the capacity to preserve the *status quo*. Whatever else Soviet power in Eastern Europe implied or accomplished, it did serve to deter the small states of Eastern Europe from fighting each other. By a similar token, US-Soviet tension did ensure borders were not changed; it kept the peace.

From a purely predictive perspective, the events of the 1980s proved to be overdetermined. Tito died in 1980. A decade later, the LCY came to an end when, after the Slovenes had walked out of a congress, the session simply adjourned. This was in some respects an entirely fitting way for the LCY to end, given the paucity of youths in the northern republics who indicated they would join the party. (In a 1986 survey, four percent of a sample of Slovene youth and 17 percent of the Croatian respondents said they were interested in joining the party.)⁵

Throughout the 1980s, Serbs systematically went about undermining the arrangements put in during the last years of Tito's life. The cartel features of consociational authoritarianism with their implication of agreed-upon turf were disrupted, first by reversing the substantial empowerment of the Albanians in Kosovo, and then by engineering a coup in Montenegro.

Simultaneously, the Yugoslav economic miracle ended abruptly. In one respect, evidence for the incipient end of the miracle was in place long before growth rates declined. Primarily as a consequence of enormously uneven birth rates across the country, efforts to achieve regional equality had been a notorious failure for a long while. Table 2 shows 1947's gross social product per capita for Kosovo was half the Yugoslav mean, whereas that of Slovenia, the most affluent republic, was a bit more than half again (162 percent) that of the Yugoslav mean. By 1975, Kosovo's GDP per capita had decreased to one-third the Yugoslav mean, and Slovenia's had increased to over twice the mean, a level it basically maintained until the outbreak of civil war in 1991. Kosovo's relative status, however, decreased even further in the 1980s to one quarter (24 percent) of the Yugoslav mean in 1988.

By other indicators, however, the evidence was much more apparent in the 1980s. Table 1 revealed the dramatic decrease in the economic growth rates in the 1980s. This translated into a decrease in real personal income per worker in the early 1980s. At no time during the 1980s was the average real personal income as high as in 1980.⁶ While the number of persons employed continued to grow in the 1980s, the number unemployed grew even faster. Those employed rose from 4.8 million in 1975 to 6.9 million in 1989. Unemployment grew from slightly more than half a million in 1975 to 1.2 million in 1989, and the number of unemployed with

Table 2: Yugoslav Social Product per Capita in Percentages (Yugoslavia = 100 %)				
Republic	Year			
Bosnia	1947	1965	1975	1988
Hercegovina	86 %	72 %	66 %	65 %
Croatia	105	120	126	120
Macedonia	70	67	66	60
Montenegro	94	77	78	71
Slovenia	162	183	196	200
S R Serbia				
Serbia proper	101	96	97	100
Kosovo	49	37	28	24
Vojvodina	100	113	115	118

Source: Data for 1947 and 1965 reported in Zimmerman, 66; for 1988 in *Statistiki godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1990* (Belgrade: 1990), 405.

higher education went from under 100 thousand to 450 thousand by 1989.⁷

Meanwhile, peace was breaking out between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s, Soviet power in Eastern Europe crumbled with scarcely a whimper. Demands for border changes arose in several Soviet republics, and it became clear that the Soviet government would be hard pressed to prevent even that from happening. By extension, it was a rather easy inference to draw that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would prevent efforts by one or more of the constituent parts of Yugoslavia to separate themselves, especially if the leaders of those constituent parts had a plausible claim to democratic legitimacy.

The researcher finds himself with Hercule Poirot's dilemma in *Murder on the Orient Express*, fittingly located at Vincovci in Yugoslavia. Many wounds were on the body, and most would have been quite sufficient alone or in combination with any one other to bring about the victim's demise.

Part III

At the same time, it would be a mistake to view the collapse of Yugoslavia only in terms of economic failures or changes in either or both the structure of the international system or Yugoslav political institutions. Rather, a major part of the change has to be understood in terms of changed cognitions, which in turn often had an objective basis.

Table 3, based on a survey done by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, reveals the huge discrepancy between the values of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and their Serbian counterparts in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Despite the tendency in most surveys for Albanians to reveal themselves as fundamentally authoritarian,⁸ ten times more Serbs living in Kosovo rated a strong state as their first priority than did the Albanians living there. Serbs in Kosovo were also much more inclined to rate a strong state highest among the four values than Serbs in Serbia, whose central preoccupation seems to have been with the state of the economy.

Table 3: Value Priorities in S R Serbia, 1990: A Comparison of Albanian and Serb Responses			
First preference ¹ from among the following:	Albanians in Kosovo	Serbs in Kosovo	Serbs in Serbia proper
Growth of the economy	34 %	16 %	46 %
A strong state	6 %	59 %	34 %
Implementation of the will of the people	48 %	16 %	12 %
Beautiful cities	7 %	3 %	4 %

1. "Don't know" and "undecided" omitted.

Source: Institut društvenih nauka, *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici* (Belgrade: 1991), 211.

The links between social cleavage and perception are sharply brought out by a study of ethnic distance in Yugoslavia by Dragomir Pantic. Table 4 presents the results of that research: the numbers reported represent the proportion of persons, expressed in percentages, from each republic who asserted they would not marry a person of a particular nationality. Thus in the upper left cell, respondents from Croatia (generally but not necessarily ethnic Croats) were roughly twice as likely to state flat out that they would not marry an Albanian in 1990 than they had been a quarter of a century ago in 1966.

cities of Slovenia, Ljubljana, and Kranj.)

In the other republics, ethnic distance has grown overall. The proportion of respondents from Croatia who responded they would not marry Albanians, Hungarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs was at or above the indicator of ethnic distance between residents of Croatia and Albania reported in 1966. Many more residents of Croatia said they would not marry a Muslim or Albanian in 1990 than in 1966. (It should be emphasized, especially in light of the current civil war, that while the proportion of respondents from Croatia saying they would not

Table 4: Social Distance Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia, 1966 and 1990								
	Albanians	Croats	Hungarians	Macedonians	Montenegrins	Muslims	Serbs	Slovenes
Croatia: 1966	22	-	15	18	14	15	10	12
1990	43	4	26	27	27	37	24	8
Macedonia: 1966	49	16	36	-	17	48	13	17
1990	60	34	39	11	29	54	22	34
Montenegro: 1966	29	16	30	15	-	27	9	13
1990	42	29	20	22	7	35	8	31
Serbia proper: 1966	39	26	31	25	22	31	-	25
1990	58	35	29	23	14	48	3	39
Slovenia: 1966	45	45	46	49	48	47	45	-
1990	52	36	49	49	53	58	52	2

Source: Institut društvenih nauka, *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici*, (Belgrade: 1991), 174.

Note: In the 1990 survey, respondents were asked whether they would marry a person from any of the listed nationalities, so it was possible for someone from Serbia, not a Serb, to answer they would not marry a Serb.

In microcosm, the data elegantly capture the ethnic cleavages dividing Yugoslavia, indicating rather dramatically that the social distance between most pairs of nationalities has grown over the last quarter century. One republic where that has not happened is Slovenia. It is easy to appreciate why Slovenia was the first part of Yugoslavia to extricate itself from the Federation. It was the most insular republic in 1966, and it remains so today.⁹ It is ethnically homogeneous (90 percent Slovene) and relatively affluent; citizens had little interest in marrying a non-Slovene in 1966 and 1990. (There does seem to be a slightly reduced reluctance to marry a Croat, offset by a discernibly greater hostility to Muslims, very likely as a consequence of contact with Bosnian *gastarbeiter*, who perform manual labor in the major

marry a Serb has increased, it was nowhere near the number saying they would not marry an Albanian.)

Social tensions in Macedonia are strikingly evident in the data concerning social distance. According to the 1981 census, 20 percent of the citizenry of Macedonia were Albanians. High levels of opposition to marrying Albanians and Muslims are reported in both 1966 and 1990. Residents of Macedonia were clearly more unwilling to marry Montenegrins, Croats, Slovenes, and probably Serbs than they were in 1966.

The burgeoning of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s is evidenced by the responses reported in Table 4 by residents of Montenegro and Serbia proper. Montenegrins were much less willing to marry Albanians, Croats, and Slovenes than they

were in 1966. By comparison, the social distance between Montenegrins and Serbs remained constant and low.

The survey also reveals that the relationships at the level of high politics between SR Serbia and the other parts of Yugoslavia found a counterpart in 1990 mass attitudes toward the titular nationalities of the various republics. Respondents from Serbia proper were somewhat less likely than in 1966 to assert they would not marry a Montenegrin. By contrast, they were appreciably more likely to say they would not marry an Albanian, a Muslim, a Slovene, or a Croat in 1990 than they had been in 1966.

Another source for insights into contemporary perception of social cleavage in Yugoslavia stems from a 1990 survey administered in Croatia by a group of researchers at the University of Zagreb. These data bring home vividly the role of perception in coloring the dispute between Serbs and Croats within Croatia, they emphasize the extent to which their perceptions and goals are radically discrepant, and they italicize the high congruence between the views of the Serbian and Croatian leaders and their respective ethnic constituents. Objective differences exist between Serbs and Croats, to be sure, but it is the way these differences in circumstances are exacerbated by perceptions that provide a basis for understanding the contemporary cleavages that divide Yugoslavia.

Persons from various ethnic groups in Croatia were asked whether they thought Croats and Serbs were treated equally, whether Serbs were advantaged, whether Croats were advantaged, or

whether both Serbs and Croats were repressed. As illustrated in Table 5, practically everyone (92 percent) the survey researchers interviewed¹⁰ who termed himself or herself "Yugoslav" told the interviewers in 1990 that Serbs and Croats were equally well treated in Croatia. (In 1981, more than 1.2 million persons in Yugoslavia elected to identify themselves as Yugoslavs in the census. These were largely persons who were not members of the particular titular nationality in a given republic. In Croatia, 380,000 persons identified themselves as Yugoslavs. By way of comparison, 510,000 persons identified themselves as Serbs, and slightly less than 3.5 million as Croats.)

Croat and Serb respondents saw things quite differently from the ethnic Yugoslavs and from each other. Among Croats, more than a third (34 percent) of the respondents thought that Serbs were advantaged and only one percent viewed Croats as advantaged.

Predictably, almost two-fifths (39 percent) of the Serbian respondents thought the Croats advantaged, and one percent identified Serbs as being the more advantaged. Clearly, Serbs and Croats live in different cognitive worlds in Croatia, a world where for both the other is relatively advantaged even though relatively neutral observers fail to report any discrimination in either direction.

Differences in perceptions are paralleled by differences in goals. Table 6 shows that ethnic Yugoslavs in Croatia in 1990 agreed on little about the direction they would like to see relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia take, except that they had no enthusiasm for a Croatia outside Yugoslavia. Serbs overwhelmingly supported a relatively centralized Yugoslavia. Practically no ethnic Serb in Croatia endorsed an independent Croatia, and only 11 percent favored a loose confederation. Almost one-third preferred the *status quo*, whereas three-fifths (58 percent) supported a more unified entity.

Croatian responses were even more intensely skewed, but in the opposite direction. Only 13 percent would favor a more cohesive Yugoslavia, and eight percent supported the *status quo*. Four-fifths (79 percent) expressed preference for a confederation of independent (*samostalni*) states or for a Croatia outside Yugoslavia entirely.

The same kind of pattern may be seen in responses to questions concerning key symbolic issues, noted

Table 5: National Identity and Perception of National Inequality in Croatia			
	Croats	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Croats and Serbs are equal	51 %	48 %	81 %
Serbs are advantaged	34 %	1 %	1 %
Croats are advantaged	1 %	39 %	7 %
Both Croats and Serbs are repressed	14 %	12 %	11 %

Source: Ivan Grdesic and others, *Hrvatska u izborima '90* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991), 108.

Table 6: National Identity in Croatia and Attitudes Toward Change in the Yugoslav Political System			
Nature of State	Croats	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Unitary state without republics	6 %	23 %	24 %
Federation with strong federal powers	7 %	35 %	24 %
Maintenance of <i>status quo</i>	8 %	31 %	21 %
Confederation of independent states	64 %	11 %	31 %
Croatia outside Yugoslavia	15 %	0.5 %	0.5 %

Source: Ivan Grdesic and others, *Hrvatska u izborima '90* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991), 111.

in Table 7. Respondents in the same survey were asked whether they thought "socialist" should be removed from the name for Yugoslavia and Croatia and whether the traditional red star should be removed from the flag.

Persons characterizing themselves as Yugoslavs ethnically were not much disposed to these two propositions: 27 percent responded favorably to the removal of "socialist" and only 12 percent favored deletion of the traditional red star (Table 7). Serbs in Croatia were even less enthusiastic about these notions. Less than one-fifth of the Serbian respondents (18 percent) favored removal of the word "socialist" from the name of the country and the republic. Almost no (six percent) Serbian respondent answered that the red star should be removed.

Croatian respondents answered quite differently. Seven out of ten (69 percent) ethnic Croatians were prepared to remove the word. Somewhat fewer (55 percent) favored the elimination of the red star from the flag. That contrasted sharply with the responses of Serbs, of whom, as we have seen, only six percent said they favored the elimination of the red star from the flag.

Tables 6 and 7 provide enormous purchase on the pattern of cleavages in Yugoslavia. Symbolic issues such as the number of fingers by which one signs the cross, flag burning, or whether or not the red star should be a part of the flag are enormously conflicting. Likewise, issues that pertain to the very nature of the political system in question, such as independence, confederation, or a unified

Table 7: National Identity and Attitude Toward Key Yugoslav Symbols in Croatia			
Agree that	Croats	Serbs	Yugoslavs
Should eliminate Socialist from title of Yugoslavia and Croatia	69 %	18 %	27 %
Should eliminate (red) star from state flag	55 %	6 %	12 %

Source: Ivan Grdesic and others, *Hrvatska u izborima '90* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991), 111.

Yugoslavia, are profoundly symbolic and relate to intensely held beliefs. Symbols are very difficult to compromise. Persons committed to Croatian independence are not likely to accept the *status quo* in order to accommodate Serbs whose preference is for a unitary Yugoslavia. Persons who favor the removal of the red star are very likely not going to be assuaged by a governmental policy that removes the red star from the flag flown over state buildings, but allow it when that is someone's preference. Disagreements over such matters produce the kinds of politics Theodore Lowi and others have characterized as redistributive politics: politics in which key tangible and intangible political goods are taken from one side and given to another. In such circumstances, whether the issues is flag burning and abortion in the United States, or the red star and confederation in Croatia, the actors in the political drama are going to be large, politically mobilized movements, not the individuals or interest groups of everyday politics. Such politics need not be violent and certainly need not lead to civil war. They are the stuff, however, of which great social dramas are made.

Conclusions

And, of course, such a great and tragic social drama is now taking place in Yugoslavia. This discussion has provided some answers to how that occurred. It has not devoted any attention to the policies of individual leaders, an account of which would be necessary to explain how the civil war began. Nor have we tried to analyze the circumstances under which the Yugoslav conflict could become a more general Balkan War. Three points, however, have been made with this text.

First, it provides some indication of the cleavages that divide Yugoslavia. These are real. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo want to be empowered. Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper want to ensure a strong state implements majority decisions throughout Serbia even if they entail preventing freedom of expression and political empowerment by Albanians. Croats have had it with communist institutions and with the symbols of Tito's Yugoslavia. Even before the current crisis, consensus among Croats in Croatia was to favor a very loose confederation. Serbs in Croatia see Yugoslav institutions as providing protection for them in Croatia, endorse Yugoslav symbols, and on the whole would prefer a more unitary Yugoslavia.

Second, we have shown how objectively induced cleavages are exacerbated by important disputes over goals and by enormous perceptual differences. Serbs and Croats in Croatia, even though they live side by side, do not live in the same perceptual universe.

Finally, the text has adverted to the more general transformations in the Balkans that have been a part of the collapse of communist power throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the dissipation of the Soviet-American rivalry in Europe. It would

require another paper to detail these broader changes. What can be said, though, is that these changes are precisely the kind that make it likely that the internecine conflict in Yugoslavia, should it intensify, may ultimately become a broader Balkan war. Unlike the Balkan wars at the outset of the century, however, such a war will not even threaten to involve the major powers on opposite sides.

Endnotes

¹As cited by TANYUG in FBIS, 18 October 1972, I3-I12.

²*Open Borders, Non-alignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

³Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3, 325-344 at 328.

⁴Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1990* (Belgrade: 1990), 309.

⁵*NIN*, 18 May 1986, 10.

⁶Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1990* (Belgrade: 1990), 151.

⁷Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1990* (Belgrade: 1990), 149.

⁸Zimmerman, *Politics and Culture in Yugoslavia* (Ann Arbor: 1987), 17.

⁹The survey does not report data from Kosovo.

¹⁰Ivan Grdesic, et al. *Hrvatska u izborima '90* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991).

Sensitivity and Vulnerability: European-North African Relations in the 1990s

Dirk Vandewalle

Department of Government,
Dartmouth College

Abstract

The resurgence of a powerful Europe and the potential for a New World Order raise perplexing questions for so-called peripheral areas that largely depend on access to western markets for economic well-being, survival, or goods and imports of capital. North Africa, as an area with close but highly unequal links to the European Community (EC), is vulnerable to this growing closure of the Continent. This is perhaps symbolically best expressed by the ongoing immigration debate in several European countries and the new sense of security among the Europeans.

The economic reconstruction (liberalization and privatization) North African countries have embarked upon necessitates both increased access to international capital and a form of local political renewal that will allow the state in each country to recapture and then to reshape its traditional role as arbiter among competing socio-economic groups. Although both sides perceive that in their long-term interest (and self-interest) North Africa emerge as a more self-sufficient, regional economic bloc with access to greater European aid and technology, their positions as "providers" and "consumers" of that aid color their respective solutions to the dilemma.

Europeans increasingly argue that aid alone is highly unlikely to resolve lingering economic problems in North Africa and point out that a series of profound political restructuring efforts must parallel Community efforts. While the North

African countries have gone some length to (at least temporarily) meet European expectations, they have to some extent attempted to separate economic and political reform. More important, however, is the fact that economic reconstruction in North Africa has led to a number of paradoxes, making it more difficult to synchronize political and economic reform. Finally, although the relationship between the two sides is highly unequal, the growing vulnerability and disarray of the Maghreb increasingly provides the region with an unexpected means of leverage by increasing Europe's stake in its southern neighbor's economic survival and growth.

Introduction

The dizzying speed of political developments in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the challenges and opportunities they present for western Europe have left the EC more determined than ever to forge ahead and, to paraphrase President Mitterand, "win... [the] race against history."¹ The creation of the European Economic Area (October 1991) will include 19 countries and 380 million consumers, and the conclusion of the Maastricht agreements in December 1991 point toward a Europe more self-confident than at any point in its recent history since the heyday of colonialism.

Attempts to expand the Community's tasks beyond those of an already existing economic coalition are still meeting the objections of lonely holdout, Britain but seem inevitable in the long run. Euro-pessimism has receded. With the Cold War at an end, and with purely military concerns receding in importance, Europe has already started to broadly redefine its new sense of security. Mitterand's insistence on a revival of the long-moribund

Western European Union was dutifully but rather unenthusiastically adopted at the Maastricht meeting; but the central debate at Maastricht was clearly about the European Monetary Union, a common foreign policy, and the procedures and institutions necessary to promote and implement both.

If European economic and political unity in the long run promise substantial pay-offs, the individual Community countries have also realized that in the short term, monetary union will impose on virtually all European countries a number of wrenching adjustments that will necessitate even greater economic efficiency during already difficult economic times. If British Prime Minister John Major embodies a sense of nationalism no longer shared by his counterparts across the Community, it is also clear that some of his comments about the potential threat to "British uniqueness" reverberate (in a much exaggerated fashion in some cases verging on hysteria) among a growing number of European political parties where "threats" to "national integrity" are now regularly voiced. Europeans and their leaders have become increasingly worried about what rightist politicians like France's Jean-Marie Le Pen refer to as "dangers" to a unified continent: not only the sporadic violence, but also the expense of maintenance, the cultural impact of large immigrant populations, and the growth of radicalism (some religious, some secular) among those immigrants.² Polls indicate that across the Continent people are overwhelmingly in favor of tougher immigration legislation.³ As recent political discourse across the Continent indicates, in the New Europe, the growing perception of security is no longer a physical threat from the East, but "is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile."⁴

If the implications of this newfound sense of strength within the Community, which is sometimes referred to as the "fortress Europe" phenomenon, are worrisome to Washington and Tokyo who interact with the Continent on more or less equal terms, they are even more so to the weak "periphery" countries discussed in this paper: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.⁵ Even worse is that two years after a bevy of initiatives to promote the renewal of the so-called

Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, relations between the European Community and North Africa are strained once more.⁶ Bilateral agreements have been revised, trade fairs canceled, and immigration policies scrutinized. The recent riots in Brussels and Paris of second-generation Maghreb immigrants and the pro-Iraqi stance of opposition groups in Algeria and Tunisia during the Gulf War have added to this new climate of suspicion and apprehension at a time when Europe stands poised at a unique position in its post-World War II history. The Maghreb needs major support to sustain the economic privatization and liberalization programs all local countries except Libya have engaged upon.

Since their independence in the 1950s and early 1960s, all three North African countries, once considered showcases for Third World development, have developed or maintained intricate links with the EC covering immigration policies, trade and aid relations, technology exchange codes, and remittance flows. The interaction between the two "blocs" remains highly unequal: in all areas mentioned above and particularly in manufactured goods and food, North Africa is far more dependent on access to Europe than the Continent is vis-à-vis the Maghreb.⁷ For example, North Africa traditionally accounts for less than one percent of all Community exports; Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco rely for 57 to 74 percent of their foreign trade on access to European Community (EC) markets.⁸

Complicating this unequal relationship are a number of factors influencing the perceptions each side holds of the other. Within the Community, the optimism described above is tempered by a number of potential problems emanating from areas at Europe's periphery. Community officials acknowledge that the emergence of a powerful, rich Europe provides a number of new and unexpected challenges Europe must face. Among those, relations with a North Africa that has the potential for deepening poverty and growing political turmoil are rapidly assuming a new urgency, even if they remain less important in comparison with other areas like Eastern Europe.

The riots in Brussels and Paris in 1991 amply demonstrated, however, how permeable the boundaries between immigrant populations in the Community and those in the Maghreb have become, and how immigrant groups are increasingly restive.

Their restiveness is fueled by events on both sides of the Mediterranean: discrimination, deteriorating economies in North Africa, and the growth of Islamist groups both within the host countries and in the Maghreb. Perhaps even more important and insidious is the impact these developments have within European politics where they are increasingly serving as fuel for right wing party platforms that now routinely include calls for a halt or reduction of Maghreb immigrants in the Community. The spectacle of Albanians crossing massively and illegally into Italian ports added to this summer's feeling of unrest in Europe and elevated the building of the planned bridge (or tunnel) between Spain and Morocco across the Mediterranean (the thin, physical barrier between the Community and the Maghreb) to more than symbolic and passing importance.

Community officials are quick to point out, however, that solving immigrant problems within Europe alone will not suffice: the Maghreb countries need to halt, with increased European and other aid if necessary, their economic decline, political exclusion, lack of legitimacy, and loss of the symbolic value of the state in North Africa. Europeans realize that although the Maghreb forms no direct threat to the interests of their continent, it is not in the economic, political, or cultural interests of the Community to face a long-term period of instability at its southern edge. It is this sensitivity rather than an outright vulnerability that has prompted the EC to take a closer look at the Maghreb since 1986, and to attempt the formulation of a more coherent policy.

At a time when both sides have arrived at an important junction in their history with the promise of a more powerful, unified Europe and the first serious questioning of the authority of the state in North Africa since independence, they have realized that increased cooperation on a range of issues is a *sine qua non* despite the lingering suspicion fueled by, among other things, the Gulf War. EC officials are not particularly optimistic at this time about dramatically improved relations. Indeed, there is throughout Europe some "battle fatigue" in trying to sort out the Maghreb's problems when faced with other, equally important challenges from Eastern Europe.

If the EC has become more sensitive to developments in North Africa, what precisely is the

nature of the crisis in the Maghreb as the Europeans view it? Part I summarizes what many EC policy-makers perceive as a "Maghrebian malaise:" a profound crisis of the state and of state-society relations in North Africa that must be solved if the larger issue of economic development is to be attempted. Rather than provide a case-by-case description of state-society interaction in the individual countries, Part I looks at the changing parameters of state-society interaction in North Africa in the last decade and attempts to make clear the possibilities and constraints that face reform movements in the region.

Part II contrasts the challenges described earlier to European concerns about the region, locating a number of paradoxes North Africa faces as it attempts to reform both politically and economically. The underlying argument is that while an increase in financial flows and other aid to the region is almost unavoidable if Europe wants to help stabilize North Africa, the more important reforms must be internal and fall outside the direct influence of the EC. It is this paradox of strength at home but marginal control over developments in a peripheral area like North Africa that will fuel the dynamics of the interaction between Europe and the Maghreb in the decade ahead.

Crisis in the Maghreb

The problems now faced by the state in each Maghreb country are only marginally and indirectly related to the rapid change in the rest of the world, although undoubtedly the crumbling of the USSR and Eastern Europe has had some impact hardening the resolve of opposition forces to the North African regimes. However, changing dynamics within the Maghreb have little to do with the end of the Cold War and the recent Gulf War: socialism was discredited in Tunisia in 1969 and in Algeria by the end of the 1970s; all Maghreb countries had economic privatization and liberalization strategies in place at least two years before the recent crumbling of the communist regimes.

It is perhaps indicative of the extent and nature of the current crisis, however, that in the last four years the region has witnessed more economic and political change than at any period since independence. A few recent events point out these developments. Normally immune from economic or

internal political desiderata, the Qadhafi government in 1987 and 1988 felt obliged to relax its injunctions on private trade, once one of the cornerstones of the regime's "revolution," and engage in some political liberalization ultimately resulting in publication of a document that, in the Libyan context, can only be termed highly unusual: the Great Green Charter of Human Rights.⁹ If in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya some of the old rhetoric with its hackneyed references to the struggle for independence and the imperative to preserve *dirigisme* persists, a number of new words have crept into public discourse these last years. References to "austerity," "economic efficiency," and "productivity" linked to "personal responsibility," "human rights" and calls for "a new political consensus" now punctuate the political vocabulary of each of the North African leaders.

In Algeria, after almost three decades of monolithic one-party rule, the government suddenly called upon "civil society" to behave responsibly during the June 1990 local and municipal elections. A few months earlier, Algeria's new constitution had pointedly dropped any reference to socialism and, after castigating multinational companies for years in several international forums, allowed direct foreign investment.

Tunisia's new president Ben Ali in November 1988 proposed a National Pact giving all organized groups in the country a chance to help elaborate the future. This was a change from the period of personal rule under Habib Bourguiba which had seen the virtual evisceration of any form of opposition.

In Morocco, a certain amount of political pluralism, a more market-oriented economy, and the extraordinary religious and charismatic link between ruler and ruled has seemingly muted the growing bifurcation between state and society found in other Maghreb countries. In the kingdom, political difficulties have been less the result of friction between the population and its ruler than of the conflict between monarchy and political elites over how the state should be managed. Even so, the 1981 and 1984 upheavals in the kingdom's major cities showed to some extent how fragile this carefully calibrated system remains. In all cases, the state in the 1980s has more often than not emerged as the focus rather than the mediator of conflict.

This relative weakness of the state stands in stark

contrast to the role it played and the prerogatives it assumed after independence, when all across the Maghreb, organized groups within society were systematically eviscerated. The legitimacy of the state during the first period of statebuilding in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria originated and was sustained by the dual roles assumed after independence: the guardian of a strong and carefully nurtured symbolic bond between state and subjects, and the unique position of the state as arbiter and broker of economic patronage. The breakdown of this earlier monopoly of power manifested by the increased and open confrontation of recent years must, in my estimation, be traced to three major events that had taken place by roughly 1980:

(a) The role of the state in economic development was challenged both by internal events and by developments in the international economy, reducing its ability to provide patronage.

(b) The state proved unable to reform the political institutions that had sustained its power.

(c) The strong symbolic link that had been established during the struggles for independence between ruler and ruled in North Africa evaporated.

The Politics of Economic Stagnation and Adjustment¹⁰

Economic liberalization strategies in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria emerged at roughly the same time in the early 1980s. In each case, the redefinition of the role of the state in economic development has been fostered not only by an emerging reconceptualization of the role of the state in economic development noted below, but also by a rapidly changing international economic environment and a global logic that has progressively narrowed the scope of intervention left to local governments. As in most other areas of the world, the new economic sensibility in North Africa is both part of an international phenomenon and a reflection of objective conditions inside each country and within the region. The rethinking of what is now considered the development orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s has been a powerful reality in the 1970s and in the current decade, stimulated in part by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. There is little doubt that as John Lewis has

recently remarked in a broader setting, in the Maghreb also "attitudes about the centrality and the capacities of governments as promoters of development have changed dramatically."¹¹ The ambitious efforts made at independence to prove that the state could be the initiator, regulator, and enforcer of irreversible social and economic reforms (the state as a Leviathan) were scaled back.

In all Maghreb countries, but most importantly in Algeria and Tunisia, the story of development since independence had been one of active state intervention in all sectors of the economy. With the exception of Libya until the 1969 coup, each country's legal system, fiscal and monetary policy instruments, and a tangle of regulatory mechanisms were meant to protect internal markets from undue interference. Thus, the state occupied not only the traditional commanding heights of the respective economies but had penetrated the lowest levels of economic interaction as well. It was hoped that this pervasiveness would dilute the persistence of factions and regional differences, the existence of institutions for implementing economic policy that were weak, the presence of underdeveloped markets or trade structures oriented toward the former metropole and, finally, the fact that the private sector remained suspect in its ability or willingness to shoulder part of the burden of development. Running through much of Algeria's and Tunisia's economic literature of that early period was the strong conviction that markets could only bring incremental change, and not the wholesale restructuring necessary to bring about the desired strategy. Second, planners judged that in the absence of administrative fiat, markets were incapable of fine tuning the country's economy, a fiat that would allow the countries to forego the chaos of the market economy by intervening early and consistently.

In Tunisia and Algeria, the transfer of authority at independence led to an important rupture with the political and economic legacy of the colonial past. Both opted for one-party systems and some form of socialism (rescinded in Tunisia in 1969) that replaced a large part of the old economic and cultural elite and produced a consensus for intensive reform and an extension of the state's administrative capacities throughout each country. Although both countries managed impressive economic growth during most of the two decades following their independence, by the end of the 1970s, much of the

earlier optimism about the ability of the state to manage and direct economic development had dissipated. The questioning of economic paradigms and their appropriateness was fueled and accelerated by the realization that despite the economic growth, a number of severe structural problems marked their economies. These difficulties were further exacerbated by a decade of uncertainty and crisis which started in the mid-1970s and by growing political contestation.

At least three major objective economic conditions now seemed to make the *dirigist* strategy of the first period less desirable or appropriate. The first, most important factor that caused abandonment of the earlier economic strategies was unquestionably the performance of each economy. Here, despite the differing approaches, a number of standard economic indicators reveal structural similarities. Each country's public sector was characterized by low productivity and bureaucratic redundancy. Investment codes in each country, particularly in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, presented formidable legal hurdles to the development of a private sector. Energy was channeled toward economic activities at the margins of the inefficient public sector or toward activities that contributed little to improving the productive capacity of the country. Agricultural production lagged substantially behind the needs of a rapidly growing population, placing not only greater pressures on tightly controlled markets but also making growing imports of food unavoidable. Most of those imports were paid for in hard currency, a scarce commodity in all the Maghreb countries. At the same time, pressure on official markets was exacerbated by a rapid monetary expansion particularly in Algeria and Libya that led to excess liquidity and growth of parallel markets where the real value of the country's currency was a fraction of its official price. The growing shortage of food and consumer goods, inflation (by the mid-1980s, stagflation) and the overall inefficient use of capital led to burgeoning debt burdens for all countries except Libya.

The second factor, closely linked to the first, concerned specifically the appropriateness in the 1980s of the strategy adopted in the aftermath of independence. In all countries, the first stage of economic development, in which the creation of a basic industrial structure figured prominently, had with varying degrees of success or failure been

completed. In the second stage, objectives for development subtly changed. While the creation of industrial infrastructure and industrial production remained important, the new exigencies that appeared in multi-year development plans in the late 1970s concerned agriculture and consumer goods production. These seemed less likely to be addressed in a satisfactory fashion by the closely coordinated processes that fueled production in the first stage. Creating an industrial infrastructure may necessitate economic *dirigisme*; but neither the production of agricultural goods nor the creation and marketing of consumer goods that now emerged as the real challenges for each government lend themselves very well to command-style economics. As the dismal record in each country demonstrated, *dirigisme* is unlikely to produce the amount of information needed. Only direct communication, channeled through the market, conveys this efficiently.

Crisis in the agricultural sector and need for improved consumer goods were indicative of a broader reality that has marked each country since its independence: the rapid growth of an urban population throughout the Maghreb. This was caused not only by a rural exodus of the poor, but also by the need for a highly educated managerial and bureaucratic class and the necessary physical concentration of decision making authority in the coastal cities of each country that were an unavoidable aspect of the central management adopted after independence. By 1980 each government would attempt without much success to decentralize its economy in an effort to relieve the unrelenting pressure on the cities. This pressure had not only the side effect of adding to the growing burden of maintaining the social contract, primarily subsidies on food and other necessities, but also led to the creation of a more vocal population with increasingly divergent views on what constituted the public interest.

The final factor linked economic and political concerns. The dismal performance of the local economies had an important and unintended political side effect. In all Maghreb countries, part of the earlier rhetoric, outspoken in Algeria and Libya and somewhat muted in Tunisia and Morocco, had been a claim made by the state that it took an active interest in the pursuance of equity and economic justice for its citizens. As economic

performance faltered, so did state claims to be the sole actors capable of promoting development, a claim further tarnished by charges of mismanagement and corruption that had overwhelmingly benefitted public sector managers, the party *apparatchiks* or the economic elites.

Institutional Decline and Renewal

Whether monarchist, military, or semi-democratic, by the late 1970s, the question of the state's role in economic development was matched and sometimes partly caused by the emergence of increasingly vocal and diverse groups in each country. Institutional crisis and debates about possible alternatives emerged first among an opposition, often deliberately left atomized, and in underground publications and speeches. It was later taken up, often willy-nilly and after a number of subterfuges that continue until today, by the representatives of the state where it then filtered into official debate.

In all Maghreb countries, including the Libyan *Jamahiriyah*, it is these new (or renewed) forms of opposition that have become arenas for political substitution throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. In Tunisia and Algeria, meaningful political discourse was for almost three decades suspended. Under Bourguiba, the discourse was sidetracked by the succession issue, taking almost 20 years before it eventually transpired. During that time, the growing bifurcation between the paternalistic pretensions of the party and state and the growing social and economic malaise led not only to the demoralization of the state's cadres, but brought the country to the brink of civil war.

In Algeria, the dramatic reversal of economic policy after Benjedid's assumption of power led to a lingering crisis even more profound than in neighboring Tunisia. The commitment to socialism under Houari Boumedienne had been an indelible part of the country's political discourse. Unable to isolate the opponents to the new economic strategy, as Bourguiba had quickly and effectively done after the country abandoned socialism in 1969, Benjedid was faced with a crisis that festered into a barely concealed struggle inside the Front de Liberation (FLN) with infighting that slowed the *infitah* (liberalization) perceptibly and fanned the flames of the struggle between the party and the growing

outside opposition. The pro and anti-*infatih* factions within the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the National Assembly remained unified on only one issue: to prevent the dispersal of power beyond the party. For that purpose, intimidation or outright violence during the 1988 riots had become acceptable. For a long time, the FLN's fortunes had mirrored those of the Neo-Destour: it had slowly become valued for what it could deliver rather than what it stood for. The symbolic value it once shared with the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) as the guarantor of national independence and egalitarianism had become severely tarnished.

The adverse economic conditions of the early 1980s and subsequent government austerity policies after 1983 furthermore proved that the party could also no longer provide its traditional patronage. Suddenly, what once looked like a strong state almost collapsed overnight when riots broke out. The symbolic role of the FLN and the ALN was irrevocably shattered when the "People's Army" started shooting at the young protesters who had systematically singled out FLN offices and state organizations in Algiers and other major cities.

Faced with this growing, increasingly vocal opposition, and with acute crises of legitimacy, Maghreb rulers have attempted to partly reconstruct some of the institutions and agencies that represent the state. Perhaps not surprising in light of each country's political history, the initial effort in both Algeria and Tunisia has focused on reforming the FLN and the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD, formerly the Destour) and on creating some form of political pluralism. Although the rejuvenation of the party in each country had been announced and timidly attempted on several occasions since the late 1970s, it took the removal of Bourguiba and the October 1988 riots in Algeria to make real reform possible. How far this reform or rejuvenation will go remains uncertain at this time. In each country, the party has been the victim of personal power and the object of infighting between clans. It stopped being a force of progress and produced among its members a feeling of detachment, indifference, and cynicism: such was the sclerotic nature of the FLN, for example, that on the eve of the first free local and municipal elections in June 1990, a sizeable minority of the party's *apparatchiks* defected when the party's fortune was clearly declining.

In attempting party reform, Ben Ali and Benjedid's alternatives were threefold: (1) to institute a radical restructuring to make the party more compatible with the new challenges it now faces; (2) to move toward a multi-party system, and (3) to disengage the party from the state. To some extent, all three alternatives have been attempted, with varying degrees of success. Much has been done in each country to restructure the party in terms of new people, new ideas and a new organization. Both the FLN and the RCD structures, from the local cells on up have been renewed. At the national congress of each party, new delegates have replaced old stalwarts and a certain amount of generational turnover has taken place. Clearly internal reform of the kind both Benjedid and Ben Ali envision will take a long time to accomplish: even now the Central Committee in Tunisia remains filled with designated members, and Algeria's National Assembly retains its party *apparatchiks* appointed, and not elected, before the 1988 riots, who continue to boycott any further political and economic reforms. In addition, each country now has four distinct groups that influence possible reform: mainstream party members, reformers within the party, a (largely powerless) secular opposition, and the Islamists. For tactical reasons, the first two must now engage occasionally in an unstable but almost unavoidable cooperation against the Islamists.

The search for political pluralism and a greater measure of public liberty in each country continues to show the deep scars left by the one-party system and by the systematic evisceration of all potential opposition during the 1960s and 1970s. At the surface at least, all Maghreb countries have made remarkable progress in setting the parameters for a renewed debate on the role of the state: each now has either a myriad of political parties or associations that until a few months would have been intolerable; human rights organizations are flourishing and new press codes have been announced. Special institutions that once served exclusively to judge dissenters, such as the State Security Court in Algeria and Tunisia and the Revolutionary Courts in Libya, have been abolished.¹²

There are, however, a number of important caveats to be noted. The emerging multi-party systems in Tunisia and Algeria have so far shown little promise for actual political contestation. Tunisia until now,

and Algeria before the June 1990 local and municipal elections, could only be described as "hegemonic party systems" where some opposition parties are legal, but in reality have little or no chance to compete for power against the party that dominates politics. The April 1989 legislative elections in Tunisia, in which no opposition party managed to win a single seat to Parliament, provided the first clear indication of the difficulties involved in moving away from a single-party system. In this regard, Morocco presents a slight variation. The local and municipal reform of 1976 did delegate real authority over local administration, backed by budgetary power, to elected officials, and elections, although certainly not free from interference, are periodically contested at the local and national levels. The June 1990 elections in Algeria in which the Islamists obtained a majority of the votes have been a significant exception to the trend noted above; but the disastrous result for the FLN of the elections and the threat they constitute for early national elections will undoubtedly not be lost on either Hassan II or Ben Ali!

In stepping back from its traditional *étatisme*, the state in the Maghreb has been offered two choices: to hand down authority to lower levels, or to hand decision making over to non-official actors. It is clear that in all countries, some form of subterfuge has taken place: each government in its own way has tried the former and ignored the latter, except for economic purposes. It is hard to avoid the perception that in the Maghreb an attempt has been made to reshape economic policies that would allow each country to meet some of the expectations of the new international economic context without upsetting local political arrangements.

There has been a growing concern with economic rationality, stimulated by international economic considerations, and a simultaneous attempt to ignore local political rationality or at least attempt to disconnect the two. It is this Machiavelian strategy of fusing authoritarian liberalism and attempts to reap the rewards of a new wave of development without any unpleasant side effects that Clifford Geertz has called "the rise of a combination of a Smithean idea of how to get rich with a Hobbesian idea of how to govern." In light of the recent riots in Algeria and the renewed battle between government and the Islamists in Tunisia, it is not clear how long this combination can last in the Maghreb.

Symbolism and Cultural Renewal: The Islamist Challenge

The recent contest has amply demonstrated the difficulties now faced by the state in maintaining its claim as sole legitimate representative of each country's political community. The most worrisome development is clearly that virtually all secular opposition has disappeared, leaving Benjedid, Ben Ali, and to a lesser extent, Morocco's Hassan II, in a precarious struggle against a rapidly growing Islamist movement which is at the same time imbued with a symbolic value both FLN and RCD have lost.

In all four Maghreb countries, the manipulation of this symbolic link between ruler, ruled, and the country's past has been at issue; and both state representatives as well as those contesting the state now brandish powerful symbols of national identity and legitimacy. The concept of cultural renewal and the extension of public liberties has invaded or, perhaps more accurately, been re-adopted into the political vocabulary by each side after a hiatus of almost three decades. And while some of the calls for this renewal have been expressed in secular terms (former Algerian president Ben Bella's offer to return to Algeria and profoundly reshape the country because he is "a revolutionary;" Hocine Ait Ahined's call for Kabyle cultural rejuvenation; Qadhafi's call at the 1 September 1989 twentieth anniversary celebration for *tawsi' ath-thawrah* or broadening of the revolution; Ben Ali's concept of a New Era after 7 November 1987) all clearly carry a religious undertone.

Indeed, if one single, common element has marked the recent election campaigns in Algeria and Tunisia, it is the claim by virtually all parties that they are the protectors of Islam in their societies. Not by coincidence, Tunisia's president Ben Ali pointedly visited a number of Arab countries and went on the *'umrah* (lesser pilgrimage) before embarking on a tour of western countries after he came to power. It was significant that in their pursuit of national development several Maghreb leaders, particularly Bourguiba who publicly drank orange juice during Ramadan and closed the Zitouna theological school, were more aggressive toward their country's cultural symbols than even the colonial power had been, a point often stressed by the Islamists.

Islamism in the Maghreb, as elsewhere, represents an enduring opposition to the form and content of the type of nationalism earlier used by the state. The symbols of solidarity, equity, equality, and arabization now invoked by Abdessalem Yassine in Morocco, Rachid Ghannouchi in Tunisia, Abassi al-Madani in Algeria, and underground Islamists in Libya are those of a first generation of Maghreb rulers skillfully manipulated in their own search for legitimacy and national unity.

There is, however, a substantial difference in *modus operandum* between the two: while in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia the state's representatives continue to pay at a minimum lip service to the western notion of popular sovereignty as a guarantee for responsible government, clearly the Islamists with their insistence on the immutability of religious law and the notion of divine right do not. Even if the election results of April 1989 in Tunisia and of June 1990 in Algeria do not precisely indicate what the strength of the Front du Salut Islamique and the *hizb al-Nahdhah* in Tunisia would be in a truly pluralist system, clearly a sizeable portion of each country's population is willing to consider an alteration, if perhaps not quite a full-fledged alternative, to the form of political community they lived in during the first stage of state building.

The link to independence invoked by the governments in power, a unique occurrence whose symbolic value will perhaps never be matched again, has now lost much of its appeal. Significantly, most of the recent confrontations against the state, and against those who claimed to represent it in North Africa, were initiated by a younger generation who do not share the historical memories or the ideological references that had been at the heart of the symbolic link between their elders and the state. In every country, the decline of state fortunes has been felt most acutely among the young, particularly among students at universities. The infighting at educational institutions has often been described as an ideological struggle between Islamists and leftists. Indeed, all Maghreb governments have at one point deliberately fostered that image and attempted to use one group against the other. The real struggle at the universities, however, is ultimately over a volatile mixture of symbolic and real power: in each country the educational system has emerged as the primary system of social

stratification.

To this extent, one can talk of the potential for an important intergenerational change taking place in the Maghreb, and of the potential for a new *dawlah* in the sense Ibn Khaldun assigned to the word: the emergence of a new state no longer based on the values that provided political cohesion until now, but marked by the search for a new consensus still largely inchoate and eagerly fought over on what its precise role should be. But, in trying to create this new consensus, promote a younger generation, and develop a new role for its institutions, the Maghreb state now faces formidable obstacles and opponents. Beside the subterfuges noted above, in essence the use of state institutions and the manipulation of electoral rules to postpone meaningful political reform, it now also inherits the legacy of earlier strategies: the growth of an Islamic movement that has in part proliferated because of the growing bifurcation between impotent opposition parties and state-controlled political parties.

Of all potential challenges, the rise and the possible coming to power of radical (as opposed to mainstream) Islamist groups in North Africa is seen in Europe as the most destructive for dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. The April 1989 legislative elections in Tunisia and the June 1990 municipal elections in Algeria were perceived by both sides as litmus tests of how well Islamist movements could adapt to local political culture. In the former case, a non-recognized Islamic party managed to receive 14 percent of the votes nationwide, despite lack of access to the government-controlled media. In the urban areas, including Tunis, they obtained between one-third and one-half of the popular vote. Except for Tunisia's majority voting system, the Islamists would have obtained at least 24 out of 141 seats in the National Assembly. In Algeria, the Islamic party, which was legalized in 1989, received 54 percent of the popular vote.

In either case, legal or not, the movement initially showed little inclination to play within the rules of the political game, then moderated itself and returned to a more confrontational posture after a period of frustration.¹³ Within two years after the removal of Bourguiba (his removal was directly linked to his increasingly repressive confrontation with the *hizb al-Nahdhah*), the Tunisian government and the Islamist movement were locked in the same

seemingly unending and increasingly violent battle. In Algeria, a general strike called for by the Islamists in May 1991 to protest electoral laws degenerated into an open confrontation leading to the imposition of martial law and curfews throughout the major cities.

If disturbances in both countries have shown the Islamists not strong enough to overturn the state, they have also indicated the power to be spoilers of major government policies. In the Algerian case, the Islamists were able to force president Benjedid to postpone legislative elections and call out the army, already tainted by participation in the October 1988 riots that brought the Islamists to prominence. Their effective recruitment among a deeply disillusioned mixture of the poor, the unemployed, and young intellectuals has been almost unavoidable, since they form for all practical purposes the only opposition group that in moral and organization terms survived official attempts to obliterate dissent.

Finally, it is perhaps not surprising, although certainly worrisome, that with the relative loss of the state's legitimacy and the diffusion of its symbolism, the focus of both those in power and those in opposition has fractionalized at the sub-state level (raising growing questions of ethnicity), or at the supra-national level, where Islam and the call for a Greater Maghreb Union are meant to reassert each country's position within a larger Maghreb cultural and religious community. In addition, the virtual disappearance of opposition parties leaves leaders dependent on official political parties whose elites have often perceived security as more important than real reform, a development that has sparked considerable speculation about the retention or potential for military influence in the politics of each country.

European Reactions and Concerns

It is against this background of a potential for increased instability and growing poverty that the European Community has, perhaps belatedly, tried to develop a more constructive and comprehensive Community-wide set of policies. To comprehend the causes of the malaise and to extend initial help where possible, the European Commission has in the last two years created a special Mediterranean Unit to deal with Maghreb affairs, and has attempted to upgrade the numerous bilateral association

agreements the EC has with each country. The EC established an informal Forum for Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean (including all members of the Arab Maghreb Union) to investigate and report on the economic, security, and "human dimension" problems between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Earlier this year, the Mediterranean University Project was designed to help prevent a brain drain that in 1990 alone saw 3,000 Algerian professionals leave their country.

The EC has negotiated with Maghreb officials over possible change within the Multifiber agreement and has sought to adapt the General System of Preferences for North Africa. At the same time, a number of governments, particularly those who border the Mediterranean, dramatically increased bilateral aid. France in 1990 extended more than \$1 billion to Algeria, the largest single amount since that country's independence in 1962. The attempt, followed shortly by Spain and Italy, was seen on both sides as a measure to promote economic growth in North Africa in an effort to stem further immigration into the EC. Despite this seeming largesse and the occasional references made by either side to a second Integrated Mediterranean Programme (IMP), it is now virtually certain that nothing approaching the scope and scale of the earlier IMPs will be attempted.¹⁴

Focusing on the economic dimension, the EC has consistently argued that there will be some kind of welfare spillover from EC 1992 for the Maghreb and other African countries based on trade creation effects and more stable macro-economic policies. The effect will at best be a mixed blessing whose potential advantages and disadvantages for the Maghreb can be summarized by Table 1.

Maghreb governments have strongly expressed their concerns that the impact of EC 1992 will be negative in virtually all categories. They see the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union as a possible, but perhaps inadequate, defense against the impact of European political and economic unification. In all except trade diversion, it is still too early to reach any conclusions; in terms of both immigration policy and investment diversion, for example, there is as yet no discernible picture. Christopher Stevens (1990) argues that in the case of trade of manufactured products, the loss of national NTBs as a result of community-wide rules will force Maghreb (and sub-Saharan) countries to face stiff

Table 1: EC 1992 and the Maghreb Countries	
Positive	Negative
Less Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)	More NTBs
Trade Creation	Trade Diversion
Increased Liberal Trade Policy	Decreased Liberal Trade Policy
Investment Creation	Investment Diversion
Easing of Migration Rules	Tougher Migration Rules
Increased, Cost-Effective Aid	Lowered Aid Package

competition from the newly industrialized countries (NICs), particularly in textiles. Overall, Steven's observation that the Maghreb has "less to fear from 'fortress Europe' than do the Asian and Latin American NICs...[but] they can also look forward to fewer potential gains" strikes perhaps the best balance in summarizing North Africa's future economic interaction with the EC. It does not augur particularly well, however, for Tunisia and Morocco, who have based part of their economic strategy on substantially increased exports of manufactured goods toward the Community in the future.¹⁵

Although the Europeans are in agreement that the Maghreb's economic problems must be solved, there remain significant differences concerning the extent of the preferences and aid to the Maghreb between the Community's southern and northern countries and within individual EC nations. Beyond the question of economic support and access to the European market looms even larger the until now almost unaddressed question of how to deal with the socio-political decay that is both feeding on and contributing to economic chaos in North Africa. It is against this background of a potential for greater and sustained instability, rather than an outright threat, that Europe's reactions must be understood. In addition to the Islamist challenge, with its spillover effect to migrant circles on the Continent, European officials clearly perceive the following phenomena within the Maghreb as particularly worrisome: the large and growing number of unemployed urban poor, often with prospects of lifelong unemployment; restive and increasingly vocal labor unions; and regional economic disparities that fuel migration toward the cities and toward Europe.

There are, furthermore, a number of paradoxes and caveats with regard to North Africa's current political and economic strategies. The first centers

on the fact that the structural reforms now embarked upon by each country except Libya will not have an immediate impact on the population. The liberalization strategies in each country will not have any tangible result for many poor Maghrebians. The rapid growth of those who have no stake in their country's growth or future, what Europeans and local officials alike are referring to as *développement à deux vitesses*, poses a severe threat to whatever political and economic experiments are attempted. This group has little to gain or lose by what is decided between the state and opposing forces in society. It is this particular group, the *mustadh'afen* (disinherited), that form a ready target for the Islamists.

Community officials dealing with the Maghreb also point out that even in Algeria, the most encouraging example of political and economic *ouverture*, a heavy dose of *dirigisme* remains. Most steps toward liberalization and pluralism are often matched by an increase in bureaucratic controls and further retrenchment of liberties. They reiterate that, almost paradoxically, the political liberalization now paid lip service to by all governments has also led to a substantial recentralization of power. Indeed, during the first lingering phase of Algeria's *infatih* that lasted until the October 1988 riots, it remained unclear whether the slow pace and restrictive scope concerning reform of the public sector was not simply an attempt by the state to postpone meaningful reform, but rather represented an attempt instead to impose a new division of economic tasks that shifted the burden of efficiency toward non-state actors while leaving the state ultimately in charge.

In Tunisia, Bourguiba had always been an ardent supporter of centralization, but had been forced because of his deteriorating health to give up part of his prerogatives. If Tunisians had not been quite accustomed to this diffuse character of power, they

had long observed its dilution in practice. The new Ben Ali government, led by a strong and motivated leader, has almost spontaneously started to halt this dispersal. As in Algeria, the creation of a strong presidency, with close and personal links to Politburo and Security Council members, has recentralized power to a high degree. In each country, ministers implement what has been decided elsewhere. In light of Tunisia's political culture and recent political history, this development risks compounding the difficulty in separating centralization from personal power, as amply demonstrated by the charges increasingly heard in Tunisia of "Ben Alisme" having replaced "Bourguibisme."

In all Maghreb countries, this recentralization of power has paradoxically also been linked in part to greater reliance on international capital needed for local development, making aid a double-edged sword once more. Relatively small groups of decision makers become allocative agents, using the "power of the purse" to pursue certain economic and political goals. As a *rentier* economy, the Libyan *Jamahiriyah* represents the most extreme example of this recentralization, or more accurately, continued centralization, of power that has taken place.

In Morocco, the impact of foreign capital has been more subtle, but perhaps as far-reaching. Particularly after the 1981 and 1984 riots, the maintenance of political order has become more dependent on international capital to buy food than upon the traditional power of rural notables. In all cases, this new power sometimes provided by European capital has been justified by the wish to reconstruct a state needed to confront the socio-economic challenges ahead, a barely veiled restating of the earlier strategy that has been shown severely flawed.

Europeans also worry that neither the *infatih* strategies, nor the institutional restructuring or the timid attempt at political pluralism will suffice to allow the state to recapture the loss of energy and of confidence it has suffered. Political reforms in the Maghreb remain an elite occupation; the needed economic reforms, however, are popular preoccupations. And here each state in the Maghreb faces a paradox: it is able, if not always willing, to move forward much more rapidly with political reforms than with improvement of living conditions

for most of its people.

A single basic economic question surrounding the role of the state now clearly sustains both the ongoing debate and the contestation it engenders as liberalization and privatization proceed across the region: who should pay for the state's extraction of resources in the dramatically different economic context of the 1980s, and how should these resources now be distributed? Obviously a number of different groups strongly disagree about these issues and have politicized this struggle for social control.

No government in North Africa seems likely to succeed in successfully reconstructing itself without recapturing one of the two pillars that once sustained its fortunes: that of providing patronage while maintaining at least partly its social contract. The state in the years ahead will have less room to manoeuvre and fewer resources at its disposal.

The economic dimension of Maghreb-European interaction, therefore, clearly remains one of the primary concerns of both North Africans and Europeans alike. Following the adoption of the Single European Act in 1987, Maghreb governments have repeatedly expressed concerns during the upgrading or renewal of economic protocols with community officials. As stated above, they clearly perceive that a number of their vital interests will be affected by the completion of the EC Internal Market by 1992, particularly issues of food, access to credits, and technology transfers. Until now, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco have also enjoyed some protection and special preferences for some of their goods in Europe. Textiles in France, for example, would disappear for the sake of "harmonization" if goods from outside the community freely compete with Maghreb imports in those countries.

Although the EC, despite the lingering current crisis, seems inclined to provide higher levels of bilateral and multilateral aid on more carefully scrutinized terms, there is an increased tendency to link economic aid to political reform. As yet, there is no evidence this linkage will produce the kind of result Europe would like to promote. At least one Middle Eastern country, Egypt, has successfully managed to attract increasing amounts of aid from the United States without substantially altering its internal policy. Nothing suggests at this time that Maghreb leaders will be less skillful at this game.

The retreat from earlier social and economic management and the attempt to reduce costs of government have led to a further number of paradoxes the state in North Africa and European aid providers must now deal with. Economic reconstruction can only be achieved if the logic of the social contract each country subscribed to an admittedly often minimalist cradle-to-grave welfare system is abandoned. To break this logic, however, will involve drastic measures that will unavoidably lead to difficulties with all levels of society which has known the state as provider. Only Libya until now has been cushioned, although not immune, from this clash between dreams and economic expectations of a previous generation, and reality as it now exists. When that inevitable moment arrives in the *Jamahiriyah*, the results will undoubtedly be traumatic: a political system with a low level of institutionalization, little sense of statehood and of the rights and duties of ruler and ruled, and little legitimacy beyond the charismatic leader, will almost inevitably be subject to longterm contestation and perhaps exacerbate European-Maghreb relations.

In the other Maghreb countries, this turning around of the old logic will perhaps be less dramatic but also involve a further paradox: if less will be demanded of the state, it will have no choice in the short run but to assume greater power to guarantee that this process can take place in a non-confrontational fashion. The dilemma, as Michael Roemer observed, can be summed up in the following fashion:

*If you accept the idea of less government, you are talking neither about less discipline nor less power. It probably takes greater discipline and greater power for government to step out of the market than to become more intimately involved... to allow markets to function is something that government do not want to do. If they try to do it, their constituents will stop them, so it is not a matter of giving up power. It is a matter of taking on more power in a way but with the object of ultimately giving it up.*¹⁶

It remains unclear, however, whether the state in the Maghreb can amass greater power to bring about change under the current climate of lingering contestation without each country's political elites simply solidifying their positions. Only a clear

spelling out of the rules of the game could prevent this, which is something the EC has vigorously encouraged. If in Algeria and Tunisia on at least two crucial occasions these rules were sufficiently clear and adhered to (the succession after Boumedienne and the take-over from Bourguiba along institutionalized procedures), there remain a number of gray areas not removed despite the spate of reforms in each country after the removal of Bourguiba or the 1988 riots. What worries Europeans above all is that in the end, it may well be the political imperative of stability (stability for stability's sake) that will determine which way Maghreb elites will move. And the side-by-side appearance of repression and concessions may well be matched by an attempt to contain the politically disturbing effects of development while emphasizing its welfare-creating effects.

Conclusion

European-Maghreb relations are at an important juncture. Each side is undergoing dramatic economic and political adjustments in a turbulent world economy that seems to hold great promise for the Continent while leaving North Africa more vulnerable than at any point since independence on access to Western finance, technology, and know-how. In addition, a profound internal crisis has taken hold. After three decades of relative passivity, societies across North Africa are reasserting values lost or held in abeyance after independence by a state that seemingly dominated all political, economic, social, and cultural expression. As in other parts of the world where central management is yielding to more localized decision making, this process in North Africa is chaotic, often undisciplined, and frequently violent.

EC members rightly argue that what ultimately fuels this crisis and the Islamist movement as its symbol are not only economic factors, but also the more profound problems of political legitimacy, political exclusion, and a general *malaise* within societies which have now acquired their first real taste of strength and independence. It is this transitory period, lasting perhaps for years, that Europeans perceive as a highly unstable one. It is in addition, they reiterate, a situation where the Continent has little leverage beyond advocacy: aid, advocating economic privatization, and urging

political pluralism cannot be substitutes for the restoration of political legitimacy that local governments must undertake. The dilemma the EC faces in North Africa is a familiar one: it views political and economic support as a necessity, but unless internal reforms within the Maghreb take place, local governments could turn even more repressive and exclusive, increasing further the pressure for migration, Islamic radicalism, and an already dangerously high brain drain.

Europe's sensitivity to events in the Maghreb is not lost to North African leaders who increasingly clamor for more aid, access, and support. But the dilemma and the paradoxes of (increasing amounts) of foreign aid are also apparent to EC officials who see a double-edged sword. There is, as yet, no evidence that economic support is yielding a political dividend, even if Europe and the Maghreb have been able to more closely monitor immigration into the Community. Internal Maghreb political reform, which Europeans consider a *sine qua non* for all other forms of change, has been slow; in virtually all cases a step toward greater pluralism has been matched by some recentralization of power or the implementation of formerly ignored bureaucratic guidelines. At the same time, the type of economic reform advocated by Europe and local governments is seen among a large part of Maghrebis as inimical to the interests of those who now make up the constituency of the Islamist movements.

It is in this context of uncertainty on both sides (fueled skillfully by the Islamists and other emerging opposition groups in the Maghreb) that by certain political parties within the Community, Europe and North Africa are attempting to recast their relations in the 1990s. Officials both in Europe and North Africa argue forcefully that dialogue between the two sides can prevail and lead to results beneficial to both, despite the growing difficulties and impact of "spoilers" in the process. Even if they are right, the road ahead will be difficult: the negotiators have multiplied, and the issues have become more diversified. While the basic positions of sensitivity and vulnerability have not changed in the relationship between the two sides, perceptions of what each constitutes have taken on different dimensions both within North Africa and among the Europeans. And more than ever, the economic reconstruction of North Africa will be subjected to

a logic outside local government control; a logic that is European if not global.

Endnotes

¹Mitterand's comment was made in an interview with Alan Riding of *New York Times*, 22 November 1990.

²In mid-November 1991, Jean-Claude Barreau, the head of France's immigration office, was dismissed for writing a book critical of Islam. Jean-Marie Le Pen's 50-point plan, presented in his National Front's official publication in mid-November 1991, called for among other things new laws on citizenship, a halt in immigrant visas, and the reduction of social welfare provisions. Although Le Pen's proposal was met with derision, all political parties in France have hardened their stance on migration issues to prevent the National Front from monopolizing what is emerging as a powerful election issue. Immigration is thus starting to assume the same political value in France that Islam is among North African political parties: an issue no party can safely ignore. See Alan Riding, "French Right Hits a Nerve with Immigration Plan," *New York Times*, 24 November 1991. For similar developments in Belgium, see Paul Montgomery, "Rightist and Ecology Parties Gain in Belgian Vote," *New York Times*, 25 November 1991.

³See, for example, the special edition *World Report* by *Los Angeles Times*, 17 September 1991. In Britain, 79 percent of those polled favored tighter restrictions on immigrants; 86 percent in France; 66 percent in Spain; 84 percent in Italy, 70 percent in Germany.

⁴Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* (London) 67, no. 3 (1991): 432.

⁵Libya will be treated marginally in this paper since it is in the unique position of having a relative abundance of financial resources and is less vulnerable, as the partial boycott of Libyan products has clearly indicated, to pressure from Europe and the United States than the other Maghreb countries. Politically, the most effective containment of the Libyan leader since 1986 has resulted from the global economic downturn and from cajoling by other North African leaders. In the coming struggle for jobs, equity, and political participation in North Africa, Qadhafi will be virtually irrelevant.

⁶Robert Aliboni in his "Le Maghreb et la Communauté Européenne: vers une nouvelle approche solidaire" concentrates on this earlier, more optimistic period of Euro-Maghreb relations. *Orient* (Hamburg, Germany) 3 (1990): 87-96.

⁷The only possible exception to this elementary fact is Libyan oil. Algeria's longstanding attempt to index the price of natural gas to that of oil was abandoned in the mid-1980s. The country was forced to renegotiate its gas contracts with all its European customers, and in all cases except the "political price" paid by France, settled for lower prices.

⁸The figures are for 1987; in *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1989* (New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1990), 110, 117, and 120.

⁹For more details on Qadhafi's attempt at liberalization, consult the author's "Qadhafi's 'Perestroika': Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya," *The Middle East Journal* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991), 216-231.

¹⁰A more detailed version of this part of the paper can be found in Elbaki Hermassi and Dirk Vandewalle, "The Second Stage of

State-Building in North Africa," in *State and Society in North Africa*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

¹¹John Lewis, "Government and National Economic Development," *Daedalus*, Winter 1989, 70.

¹²They have recently appeared in Tunisia.

¹³For Tunisia, consult Dirk Vandewalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 4 (Autumn 1988). For Algeria, "The Prospects for Algeria," *UFSI Field Staff Reports*, Africa/Middle East series, 1988-89, no.17.

¹⁴The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes were aimed at modernizing the economies of Greece and certain French and Italian Mediterranean regions through the European Investment Bank at a cost of approximately ECU 6.6 billion over a seven year period.

¹⁵Christopher Stevens, "The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 29, no. 2 (December 1990): 239-240.

¹⁶Michael Roemer comment on John Lewis' "Government and National Economic Development," *Daedalus*, Winter 1989: 88.

Bibliography

al-Ahnaf, M. "L'opposition maghrébine face à la crise du Golfe," *Maghreb-Machrek* 130 (1990).

Balta, Paul. *Le Grand Maghreb des indépendances à l'an 2000*. Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1990.

Bessis, Sophie. "Banque mondiale et FMI en Tunisie: Une évolution sur trente ans," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 26 (1987).

Bulletin of the European Communities. (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), Monthly.

Burgat, Francois. *L'Islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du Sud*. Paris: Karthala, 1988.

Claissé, Alain, and Gerard Conac, eds. *Le grand Maghreb*. Paris: Economica, 1988.

Coffey, Joseph I., and Gianni Bonvicini, eds. *The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

De Michelis, Gianni. "The Mediterranean After the Gulf War," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 1-8.

Jowitt, Ken. "A World Without Leninism." Paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College and Headquarters, United States European Command Conference, Stuttgart, Germany, 6-7 November 1991.

Kadmiri, Abdelghani. "Des équilibres économiques dans les pays arabes méditerranéens," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 24, 1985.

Luciani, Giacomo, ed. *The Mediterranean Region: Economic Interdependence and the Future of Society* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

Marcaillou, Laurent. "France-Maghreb: la fin d'une époque?" *Jeune Afrique* 1573 (20-26 Feb 1991).

al-Naggar, Said. *Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries*. (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1989).

Olson, Robert. "Europe Returns to the Middle East," *American-Arab Affairs* (Fall 1990).

Rosenthal, Glenda. *The Mediterranean Basin: Its Political Economy and Changing International Relations*. (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982).

Simon, Jeffrey, ed. *European Security Policy After The Revolutions of 1989* (Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1991).

Stevens, Christopher. "The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 29, no. 2 (December 1990): 217-241.

Tsoukalis, Loukas. *The European Community and Its Mediterranean Enlargement*. (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

Vandewalle, Dirk. "A Trojan Horse? Economic Privatization and Political Pluralism in Tunisia." In *Issues of Privatization in the Middle East*, ed. Henri Barkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Vandewalle, Dirk. "Breaking With Socialism: Economic Privatization and Liberalization in Algeria." In *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East*, eds. Ilya Harik and Denis Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).

Vandewalle, Dirk. "Qadhafi's 'Perestroika': Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya." *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1991).

Vandewalle, Dirk. "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia." *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 1988).

Vandewalle, Dirk. "Sensitivity and Vulnerability: Recasting European-North African Relations in the 1990s." Paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College and Headquarters United States European Command Conference, Stuttgart (Germany), 6-7 November 1991.

Vandewalle, Dirk. "Libye: un développement très lent malgré des revenus pétroliers considérables." In *L'État du Maghreb*, eds. Camille and Yves Lacoste (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).

Vandewalle, Dirk and Elbaki Hermassi, "The Second Stage of State-Building in North Africa." In *State and Society in North Africa*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

Van Evera, Stephan. "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War." *International Security* (Winter 1990-91).

Contributors

Hannes Adomeit - Dr. Adomeit is Associate Professor of International Politics and Director of the Program on Soviet and European Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Adjunct Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has held teaching and research positions at several institutions including the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies in Glasgow; the Royal Military College of Canada and Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario; the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Santa Monica; and the Soviet and Eastern European studies section at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen. He has published several books on Soviet foreign and military affairs, including *Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior* (1982) and *Die Sowjetunion unter Gorbatschow* (1990), as well as articles in *Problems of Communism*, *Orbis*, *Soviet Studies*, and *Osteuropa*.

Mattei Dogan - Dr. Dogan is Senior Research Professor with the National Center of Scientific Research in Paris and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has held professorships and fellowships at a number of institutions, including the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution; the universities of Florence, Trento, Yale, and Columbia; and the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo. He is active in professional associations in sociology and politics, chairing research committees on social ecology, political elites, comparative sociology, and political sociology. Dr. Dogan serves or has served on the editorial and advisory boards of professional journals, including *Revue Française de Sociologie*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Journal of European Integration*, and *Studies in Comparative International Development*. Published works include chapters in *Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy* (1988),

Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Pluralist Democracies (1988), and, with Dominique Pelassy, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Research* (1984, 1990).

Joseph S. Gordon - Dr. Gordon teaches European Studies at the Defense Intelligence College. Dr. Gordon is a colonel in the Army Reserve, a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, and commander of the 453d Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic). He has taught European studies and military strategy at the Defense Intelligence College since 1981 and has also taught history at Duke University and Campbell College. Dr. Gordon has completed a book-length manuscript, *The End of History: Political Indoctrination in East Germany*, written as a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. Recent publications include *Psychological Operations: The Soviet Challenge* (1988); *The GDR: From Volksarmee to Bundeswehr* (1991); and "German Unification and the Bundeswehr," *Military Review* (1991).

Vladimir R. Kusin - Dr. Kusin is the former Chief Analyst and Deputy Research Director, Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty Research Institute, Munich. He has been a member of the Executive Committee of the British National Association for Soviet and East European Studies and the Executive Board of the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies. Dr. Kusin was a Research Fellow at the Comenius Centre, University of Lancaster, and at the University of Glasgow, and Director of the International Information Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow, and has lectured at universities around the world. His publications include *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring* (1971), *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (1972), and *From Dubcek to Charter 77* (1978), as well as numerous articles and reviews.

Martha Brill Olcott - Dr. Olcott is a Professor of Political Science at Colgate University, where she has taught since 1975. During the 1991-92 academic year, she was a Research Fellow at the East-West Center at Duke University. She has received numerous fellowships and grants, of which a 1990-92 MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Award is the most recent. Dr. Olcott was also a Social Science Research Council Senior Fellow in the Soviet Sociology Program, a Research Fellow at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and a recipient of a GIST Award from the International Research and Exchanges Board. She has published numerous books and articles on Soviet Central Asia and national minorities, including *The Kazakhs* (1987); *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents* (1990); "The Soviet (Dis)union," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1991); and "The Lithuanian Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1990).

Dirk Joseph Vandewalle - Dr. Vandewalle is currently on the faculty of the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. He has also taught at Columbia University and Fordham University and is a consultant to the World Bank, the International Institute of Finance, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (London), and the Mediterranean Unit of the European Community. Dr. Vandewalle specialized in the political economy of the Maghreb and has received research fellowships from Columbia University and the Institute of Current World Affairs. His publications include "Egypt and its Western Creditors," *Middle East Review* (Summer 1988); "Diverging Strategies for Development: The State and Development in Libya and Algeria," in *The Rentier State: Essays in the Political Economy of Arab Countries*, eds. G. Luciani and H. Beblawi (1987); and, "Qadhafi's 'Perestroika': Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya," *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1991).

Stephen W. Van Evera - Dr. Van Evera is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has also taught at Tufts University, Princeton, and the University of California at Davis. He is a recognized scholar on European security issues with particular interests in the causes of wars. Dr. Van Evera has been a Research Fellow at the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and at the Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs. He also served as managing editor of *International Security* from 1986 to 1987. He has published numerous articles and books on European security issues including: "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* (Winter 1990/91); "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 1990); and *Causes of War* (1984). Dr. Van Evera is a member of the International Studies Association and a frequent lecturer on European security affairs.

William Zimmerman - Dr. Zimmerman has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1974 after joining the faculty in 1963. He has also served as Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies and as Associate Dean for Faculty, College of Literature, Science, and Arts. Professor Zimmerman has lived and travelled widely in Eastern Europe, including the USSR and Yugoslavia, where he was a Fulbright scholar. He has received numerous fellowships, grants, and awards, including the Helen Dwight Reid and Pi Sigma Alpha awards of the American Political Science Association. He is the author of several books on Soviet, Yugoslav, and international politics, including *Open Borders, Non-Alignment, and the Political Development of Yugoslavia* (1987), a monograph entitled *Politics and Culture in Yugoslavia* (1987), as well as many book chapters and articles.